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A bstract
This thesis examines the relationship between civil society and democracy 
through a case study of the revival of the Catholic Church in the post­
communist Czech Republic. I use an ideal typical conception of civic 
organisations that emphasises three characteristics: civility, independence, 
and autonomy. I ask how each of these characteristics is related to 
democracy and how the degree to which the Czech Catholic Church 
approximates each characteristic can be explained.
Civility - my research challenges the contemporary consensus 
around the work of Robert Putnam that there is an  inverse relationship 
between civility and associational hierarchy. I show how the organisations 
and networks in which the Bishops were involved during Communism 
functioned as schools of democracy, producing the strong civil values of 
Czech Bishops still in evidence today. The argument indicates that Putnam 
and other social capital theorists should move beyond the formal level of 
associations in their search for the causes of civic virtue.
Independence - The failure of the church to restitute its property 
and its continued dependence on the Czech state is conventionally 
explained by reference to either an historic anti-Catholicism or the 
contemporary exigencies of justice. I reject these argum ents, and show 
how Church restitution is artificially created as an issue by politicians 
seeking to build distinct party identities in the difficult circumstances of a 
society still awaiting the consolidation of new social cleavages.
Autonomy - the Church’s weak links to the public sphere are 
generally explained by reference to a  communist legacy of anti-political 
attitudes, or to poor political skills on the part of civic associations. 
Instead, I argue that the strongest explanatory factor lies with the political 
programme of the Klaus administration and its post-communist inspired 
concerns to limit power to the Parliament, and more particularly to the 
executive, where Klaus’ party was dominant. I show how Klaus’ success 
was greatly facilitated by the speed of the ‘transition’, which allowed the 
easy implementation of a radical ideology by a political entrepreneur who 
faced little opposition from parliamentary colleagues unable to find 
‘partners’ in a  post-Communist atomised society.
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C hapter One
In troduction : th e  Em ergence o f Civil S ociety  in  
E astern  Europe: Church and  S ta te  in  th e  Czech 
Republic
1. Civil Society and Democracy
This th es is  exam ines the  rela tionsh ip  betw een civil society and  
dem ocracy th rough  a  study  of the  em ergence of the  Catholic C hurch  
in the  post-C om m unist Czech Republic. The Czech Republic, along 
w ith  o ther ex-C om m unist coun tries of E as te rn  E urope - Poland, 
H ungary, an d  Slovakia - can  be described  a s  dem ocratic. E ach  of 
these  coun tries dem onstra tes those fea tu res th a t  D ahl specifies as 
the  defining tra its  of a  polyarchy: free, fair a n d  open elections; an  
independen t m edia; free speech; a n d  the  righ t to jo in  o rgan isations 
th a t  are separa te  from the sta te  (Dahl, 1989: 221-224). Added to 
these  fea tu res, there  is a  p redom inan t belief th a t  the  new  political 
ru les  are  “the  only game in tow n”, th u s  dem o n stra tin g  the 
charac teristic  th a t Przeworksi a rgues is the  ha llm ark  of 
‘conso lida ted’ regim es (Przeworski, 1991:26)1.
D ah l’s definition is no t w ithou t opponen ts. The m ain  a rg u m en t 
ag a in st h im  is th a t the  criteria  he u se s  to define dem ocracy are  not 
dem anding  enough. (G unther e t al, 1996) His m in im um  version of
1 “Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a 
particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine 
acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to tiy again 
within the same institutions under which they have just lost.” (Przeworski, 1991:26)
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dem ocracy allows inclusion to the  club of dem ocracies, governm ents 
th a t  are m ilitaristic, clientalistic, and  d isregard ing  of th e ir citizens 
a p a r t  from a t  election tim es. D ah l’s critics offer a  powerful 
condem nation  of these  so-called dem ocracies, one so powerful 
however, th a t  it is liable to exclude from th e  definition v irtually  any  
regim e th a t  springs to m ind. This is w here the  problem  lies. W here 
m in im um  definitions clearly have th e ir w eaknesses, m axim um  
definitions are  im practical for they are  exacting  to the  ex ten t th a t  
they  can  leave u s  w ith no ‘dem ocratic’ case s  w ith w hich we can  
c o n tra s t ‘non-dem ocratic’ regim es. For th is  reaso n  O’ D onnell 
defends D ah l’s s tan d ard  a s  reasonable  an d  usefu l, a  s ta n d a rd  “th a t  
sep a ra te s  cases w here there  exists inclusive, fair, a n d  com petitive 
elections an d  basic accom panying freedom s from all o thers, 
including  no t only u n ab ash e d  au th o rita rian  regim es b u t also 
coun tries th a t  hold elections b u t lack som e of the  ch arac te ris tic s  
th a t  jo in tly  define po lyarchy’ (O’Donnell, 1996:36).
The acceptance of a  m inim al definition of dem ocracy su c h  as  
D ah l’s does not, however, prevent a  critique of ‘really existing 
dem ocracy’ or a  d iscussion  ab o u t how dem ocracy can  be su s ta in ed , 
im proved, an d  deepened. It is on th is  te rra in  th a t  m any of the  
deba tes over the  recently  revived concept of ‘civil society’ take  place. 
The concept of ‘civil society’, for a  long tim e o u t of u se  in W estern  
E urope, began to appear in the w ritings of E as t E u ro p ean  d issid en ts  
in the  la s t decade of the Soviet em pire. U nder a u th o rita r ian  
conditions, the  term  took on a  variety of m ean ings depending  on 
political c ircum stances. Its m ain  value, however, w as polem ical; “a  
m ajor w eapon in the  ideological a rsen a l of opposition forces ag a in st 
s ta te  oppression” (Woods, 1995:243), a  “slogan” w ith a  “capacity  to 
s tir e n th u s ia sm  and  inspire action” (Gellner, 1994:3, 5), an  
expression  of “a  twofold opposition ... civil society w as “u s ”; the  
au th o ritie s  were ‘th em ”’ (Smolar, 1996:24).
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The term  w as taken  u p  en th u siastica lly  by academ ics 
elsew here in Europe. The idea th a t an  eclectic m ix of o rgan isa tions 
an d  m ovem ents could prove a  challenge to the  Soviet regim e w as of 
g rea t appeal to an ti-C om m unists on the  w estern  left, a  left long 
u n d e r sway to the M arxist view th a t civil society existed to 
consolidate s ta te s  and  no t to oppose them  (W hitehead, 1997:95-99). 
These clear signs of opposition in E as te rn  E urope were the  driving 
force of a  theoretical a ttack  on the  m ateria lis t in te rp re ta tio n  of civil 
society. For exam ple, G ouldner’s 1980 essay  in “The Two M arxism s” 
argued  th a t  “no em ancipation  is possible in  the  m odern  world ... 
w ithou t a  strong  civil society th a t  can  s tren g th en  the  public sphere  
an d  can  provide a  haven from and  a  cen tre  of res is tan ce  to the  
B ehem oth s ta te” (cited in K um ar, 1993:381). And J e a n  C ohen 's 1986 
“C lass an d  Civil Society” m ain tained  th a t “no ad eq u a te  theory  of civil 
society is possible on the b asis  of M arxian C lass Theory” (Cohen, 
1986:20).
W estern en th u s ia sm  for th is  la te s t nom encla tu re  w as 
u ltim ately  secured  with the rise to power, a lbeit tem porarily , of self- 
styled civil society m ovem ents in the revolutions of 1989.2 It w as no t 
su rp rising , therefore, th a t the  dom inan t norm ative proposition  of the  
revived notion  of civil society w as th a t it w as positively linked to 
dem ocratisation . The m ain a ssu m p tio n s in th e  lite ra tu re  can  be 
sum m ed u p  a s  w hat Ndegwa calls the  “civil society-political 
liberalisa tion” thesis  (Ndegwa, 1996:2). In essence , th is  is the  
a rg u m en t th a t  civil society, once cen tra l in opposing the  
undem ocratic  C om m unist regim es, is now cen tra l to fu rthering  an d  
deepening the  dem ocratisation  of p o s t-a u th o rita rian  societies.
2 For example Lewis writes of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: “Civil 
society seemed suddenly stronger and more prominent within the context of modern life 
than anyone had foreseen, and its role in eroding dictatorship and facilitating the 
establishment of democracy correspondingly more powerful and direct” (Lewis, 1992:2).
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D iam ond’s assertion  th a t “civil society can , an d  typically m u st, play 
a  significant role in building an d  consolidating  dem ocracy” 
(1996:239) illu stra tes the new civil society perspective.
However, th is  proposed significance of civil society is regularly  
c a s t in functional term s, w here the re la tionsh ip  betw een civil society 
a n d  dem ocracy is understood  in term s of the  u tility  of th e  form er for 
the  latter. Four functions in p articu la r are  em phasised  here: 
regulatory , incubatory , representative, an d  legitim ating. F irst, civil 
society ap p ea rs  a s  an  aud ito r of the  s ta te ’s power, capable of 
criticising th is  power and  pointing o u t w hen s ta te  pow er is being 
a b u sed  (see, for exam ple, D iam ond, 1996:230; Gellner: 1994:5; 
Keane: 1998:88-89; Potter e t al, 1997:265). Second, it is a rgued  th a t  
civil society n u rtu re s  and  develops those civic a ttitu d e s  n ecessa ry  for 
dem ocracy, acting  a s  a  train ing  ground for politicians, a n d  producing  
new  political leaders (see Diam ond, 1996: 232; Post & R osenblum , 
2002:18). Third, civil society is seen a s  a  place w here people of 
sim ilar in te res ts  can  gather together an d  organise th e ir in te res ts  to 
be rep resen ted  in group form (see D iam ond, 1996:231; Post an d  
R osenblum , 2002:18; Touraine, 1997: 51; M arada, 1997:9-14). 
F ourth , civil society, by acting  th rough  rep resen ta tive  political 
in stitu tio n s , legitim ates and  s tren g th en s bo th  th ese  a n d  the  s ta te  
(see T ouraine, 1997: 42; Parro tt, 1997:23; D iam ond, 1996: 234).
In sum , the  role charted  for civil society in  these  new  
dem ocracies is diverse. Yet, novel a s  th is  role m ay be for E as te rn  
E urope, it is nevertheless a  descrip tion  th a t  fails to d ep art, in  any  
significant way, from civil society’s conventionally ascribed  role in  the  
w est. C entra l to the  relevant lite ra tu re , a s  H irst a rgues, is a n  
em phasis  on the  o rgan isations of civil society a s  of “secondary” value 
an d  in a  supporting  role to the  “prim ary” o rgan isation , the  s ta te  
(Hirst, 1995: 92; see also F raser, 1992:133). The underly ing  
m echan ism  in these  accoun ts is an  in p u t/o u tp u t  model: civil society
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feeds into a  representative system  th a t in consequence  yields ever 
g rea ter am o u n ts  of dem ocracy. Here, civil society is th e  m onitor of 
dem ocracy, b u t it is a  dem ocracy th a t h ap p en s som ew here else. Civil 
society produces leaders, the  m ost im portan t of w hom  go som ew here 
else. And civil society aggregates in te res ts , in te re s ts  th a t  are 
channelled  to som ew here else. In th is  lite ra tu re , dem ocracy  is always 
elsew here, p e rh ap s u nsu rp rising ly  so, for it is c lear th a t  the  
dem ocracy u n d e r d iscussion  is parliam entary  a n d  represen ta tive .
The problem  with th is  conception of civil society 's rela tionsh ip  
to dem ocracy is partly  one of em phasis. C ertainly  the  concern  w ith 
how in te res ts  are channelled  to cen tra l governm ent is a n  im portan t 
one; th is  is the  topic u n d e r d iscussion  in ch ap te r four of th is  thesis. 
B u t the  d iscussion  is, nevertheless, problem atic. The overwhelm ing 
concern  w ith dem ocracy a t the centre, or in w h a t C ohen describes as 
‘political society’, drags u s  away from dem ocratic possib ilities in civil 
society. These possibilities never get m uch  of a n  airing  because  too 
often they  are raised  aga in st a n  om n ip resen t u n d e rc u rre n t of 
anxiety, a s  in R osenblum  an d  Post, for exam ple, w ith the  “conditions 
th a t  reinforce overarching no rm s and  th a t  incline g roups to 
con tribu te  to governm ental efforts to m ain ta in  political stab ility .” 
(Rosenblum  an d  Post, 2002:14). Precisely w here, w hen, an d  how 
m uch  of these  overarching norm s a  dem ocratic society needs is 
rarely  questioned, yet the  dem ands of a ttem pting  to com bine th is  
ostensib le  need for deep co n sen su s  w ith the  realities of p lu ralism  
re su lt in w ritings whose m ajor concep tual effort is to em phasise  the  
line betw een  civil society an d  the  s ta te , in stead  of th ink ing  ab o u t the 
w ays in w hich th a t  line could be redraw n. For exam ple, there  is very 
little consideration  of the  possibility of w hat M arx in  re la tion  to the 
Paris Com m une, described  as, the  “reabsorp tion  of th e  s ta te  power 
by society a s  its own living forces in stead  of a s  forces controlling an d  
su b d u in g  it” (cited in Neocleous, 1995:404). M arx notoriously
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conceived of civil society exclusively in econom istic te rm s, yet, h is 
concern  w ith social capacities is im portan t for its  s trik ing  c o n tra s t to 
m any  of the  m ore p luralistic  versions of civil society w here power is 
sim ply absen t. This is the  poin t to F ra se r 's  conception  of ‘weak 
publics', publics, she argues “w hose deliberative p rac tice  consists 
exclusively in opinion form ation an d  does n o t also  encom pass 
decision m aking” (Fraser, 1992:134). D iam ond a n d  Keane an d  o thers 
em brace civil society for its  po ten tial to co u n te rac t the  overw eening 
pow ers of the  sta te , however, in these  versions of civil society, th a t 
po ten tial is p redom inantly  realised e ither a t the  level of or th rough  
the  sta te . If no t paradoxical, th is  is a t  lea s t u n n ecessa ry . A solution 
to the  problem  of s ta te  power could ju s t  a s  easily concen tra te  on how 
to tran sfe r power from the  s ta te  an d  governm ent to social 
o rgan isations, in stead  of concen tra ting  on how  to b ring  social 
o rgan isations into the  governm ent an d  the  sta te .
M any of these  concerns have been  ad d ressed  by those  who 
have becom e know n a s  the  rad ical th eo ris ts  of dem ocracy. 
Partic ipa tion ists su ch  a s  B enjam in B arber have a rgued  vigorously 
th a t  “w ithou t public spaces for the  active partic ipa tion  of the 
citizenry in ru ling  an d  being ruled, w ithou t a  decisive narrow ing of 
the  gap betw een ru le rs  an d  ruled , to the  po in t of its  abolition, polities 
are dem ocratic  in nam e only” (cited in C ohen a n d  Arato, 1992:7). 
N evertheless, these  ideas get ra th e r  sh o rt sh rift in  m u ch  of the  
contem porary  lite ra tu re . In a  d irect criticism  of the  partic ipa tion ists  
(Barber included), Cohen an d  Arato give the  s tric t w arn ing  that: 
it shou ld  no t be forgotton th a t  c lassical dem ocratic  
theory  rested  on an  undifferen tiated  conception  of 
Sittlichkeit, th a t is, on an  ethically  superio r co n sen su s  
regarding  the  good to w hich all m u s t adhere  if they  
choose no t to leave. In a  m odern  world charac terized  by 
value p lu ralism  and  the  w ar of gods, su ch  a  conception
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is an ach ro n is tic .” (Cohen and  Arato, 1992:609)
This rejection of the  partic ipa tion ist view is ju s t  too easy  
however. It ignores the  plausibility  of the  so rt of political m odels, 
defended by H irst, M onsm a and  Soper, w hich a ttem p t to com bine 
both  p lu ralism  an d  participation  (Hirst, 1994; M onsm a a n d  Soper, 
1997). H irst a rgues th a t “individual liberty a n d  h u m a n  welfare are  
bo th  b est served w hen as m any of the  affairs of society a s  possible  
are  m anaged  by voluntary  an d  dem ocratically  self-governing 
assoc ia tions” (1994:19). At the  sam e tim e, H irst is in tensely  
p lu ralis tic  in h is insistence th a t “citizens need  a  political com m unity  
th a t  will enable them  to be different, an d  n o t one th a t  exhorts them  
to be the  sam e” (1994:14). M onsm a an d  Soper agree. They po in t o u t 
th a t  “there  is no t a n  in heren t tension  betw een the  need  for society to 
reach  som e c o n sen su s  on key social values, w ith a  public  polity th a t  
accom m odates group identities” (M onsma an d  Soper, 1997:205).
1.1 Civil Society Against Democracy
The m ajor a rg u m en t in the  lite ra tu re  on civil society co n cen tra te s  on 
the  im portance of associational life for dem ocracy. T here is, 
nevertheless, a  su b s tan tia l am o u n t of opposition to th is  view w ith 
m any  a u th o rs  m ain tain ing  th a t civil society m ay ju s t  a s  easily  be 
de trim en ta l to dem ocracy as supportive of it. K um ar a ttem p ts  to 
h ighlight w h a t he describes a s  the “po ten tial ty ranny  of civil society”, 
citing a s  suppo rt, “the  strongly au th o rita rian  tendencies in  the  [post 
1989] Polish Catholic C hurch ...a long  w ith o th er forces of a  
xenophobic an d  populist k ind” (Kumar, 1994:129).3 If th e n  civil 
society can  be bo th  positive and  negative for dem ocracy, why, Keane
3 However, what and who these forces and tendencies are, Kumar does not disclose, 
except to say that they “have revealed themselves only too clearly in the post-1989 period” 
(Kumar, 1994:129).
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ask s, shou ld  we "cherish  it a s  a  p ractical accom plishm en t, or a s  an  
ideal? Are there  any  good an d  com pelling rea so n s  w hy it shou ld  be 
suppo rted?” (1998:50) R osenblum  an d  P ost in s is t th a t  there  are. 
“Freedom  of association ,” they rem ind  u s  “is a n  in d ep en d en t good, 
w hose value can  be realized only w ith in  a  flourish ing  civil society” 
(Rosenblum  and  Post, 2002:22). C ertainly, civil society is no t a  
“sufficient condition” of dem ocracy, b u t it is nevertheless necessary , 
“for responsive and  accoun tab le  dem ocratic  in s titu tio n s” (Rosenblum  
an d  Post, 2002:18). In sum , civil society 's re la tio n sh ip  to these  
in s titu tio n s  is to be seen  as  bo th  con tingen t a n d , paradoxically, 
necessary . I would add  furtherm ore  th a t  it is necessarily  contingent. 
Dem ocracy, C astoriadis, po in ts  ou t, u s  is in h eren tly  risky and  
a ttem p ts  to m axim ise or en su re  the  p redictability  of th e  dem ocratic 
p rocess can  destroy the  very u n c e rta in ty  th a t  is th e  lifeblood of the 
dem ocratic im agination (Castoriadis, 1987).
1.2 The Problem with ‘Civil Society’
Despite the  recurring  them es of uncivil societies, the  contem porary  
lite ra tu re  chiefly in s is ts  th a t civil society is a n  e ssen tia l and  
beneficial feature  of dem ocracy. The difficulty w ith  th is  lite ra tu re  
however, is th a t  it often fails to specify how th is  is th e  case; th a t  is, 
the  question  of exactly  why, or how, civil society m akes or does no t 
m ake dem ocracy w ork is sim ply n o t ad d ressed  by m any  of civil 
society’s m ost a rd e n t advocates. D iam ond’s d iscu ssio n  of the 
re la tionsh ip  betw een civil society a n d  dem ocracy illu s tra te s  the 
shortcom ings in the con tem porary  lite ra tu re  (Diam ond, 1996). As a  
descrip tion  of the  potentia l of civil society to co n trib u te  to the 
build ing an d  m ain tenance  of dem ocracy, D iam ond’s acco u n t is clear 
and  com prehensive. However, w ha t is m issing  is a  considera tion  of 
the  c ircum stances u n d e r  w hich civil society fulfils th is  potential.
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D iam ond no tes th a t n o t “all civil o rgan isa tions have th e  sam e 
po ten tia l to perform  dem ocracy build ing fun c tio n s” (Diam ond, 
1996:234), yet, h is rem arks on why th is  is the  case  p roduce  
exp lanations th a t  lack evidence or tend  tow ards the  tautological. For 
in stan ce , he a rgues tb a t groups w ith a im s th a t  a re  opposed to 
dem ocracy will no t m ake a  con tribu tion  to bu ild ing  dem ocracy, yet 
he  provides no evidence for th is  view w hich is, p e rh a p s  questionable . 
Indeed, a  group opposed to dem ocracy could  still fulfil those  
‘dem ocratic  functions ' th a t  D iam ond him self is especially concerned  
w ith; it could provide a lternative inform ation, criticise G overnm ent, 
an d  aggregate in te rests . D iam ond goes on to a rgue  th a t  if the  
in te rn a l ch a rac te r of o rgan isations is n o t dem ocratic, th is  affects the  
likelihood of dem ocratic norm s being encouraged  am ong the  
m em bers. Again, no evidence is offered to su p p o rt th is  proposition, 
and , while on the  surface it seem s persuasive , qu estio n s a b o u t the  
sou rces of dem ocratic norm s are sim ply too re levan t to th e  civil 
society debate  to to lerate such  curso ry  trea tm en t. The a rg u m en ts  
here  are  sim ply too general to be of m uch  u se  a n d  w ould be m ore 
productive if m ore clearly specified.
A final exam ple of the  problem  w ith overly general a rg u m en ts  
is in  D iam ond’s d iscussion  of the  s ta te , a  key factor, he  con tends, in 
shap ing  civil society. Here D iam ond a rgues th a t  the  degree of 
au tonom y associations have from the  s ta te  in fluences th e ir 
dem ocratic  functions. U nder au th o rita rian  regim es co rp o ra tis t 
a rran g em en ts  can  stifle the  em ergence of dem ocracy. On the  o ther 
h an d , u n re s tra in ed  ill-disciplined civil societies can  overw helm  the 
sta te  w ith dem ands an d  pose a  p a rticu la r th re a t to very new  
dem ocracies who need su p p o rt in the  tran s itio n a l period. W hat is 
u ltim ately  m issing, however, from D iam ond’s acco u n t is a  
considera tion  of why, in any  p a rticu la r society, civil society or its 
assoc ia tions grow to be restra ined , disciplined, com prom ising,
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em pathic, while in o ther societies they  do not, or w hy som e 
assoc iations enjoy a  high degree of au tonom y, while, in the  sam e 
society, o ther associations do not. There is a  sim ilar problem  w ith 
N icholas D eakin’s d iscussion  of civil society. He rem ark s th a t, “w here 
the  s ta te ’s actions are  in trud ing  on the  civic space, th en  certa in  
assoc iations in som e c ircum stances can  provide an  essen tia l 
coun terbalancing  elem ent” (Deakin, 2001:110). W hat c ircu m stan ces, 
an d  w hich associations, are  both  left unspecified . Finally, C ohen a n d  
Arato, by m any accoun ts the  con tem porary  canonical a u th o rs  of civil 
society, provide little em pirical detail. To be su re , th is  w as th e ir 
in ten tion , for the ir w ork is explicitly devoted to an  a ttem p t to ju stify  
the  idea of civil society, ra th e r th a n  g rounding  th a t  idea in any  
p a rticu la r se t of c ircum stances. Yet, w h a t we are  left w ith  is an o th e r 
addition  to an  ever expanding lite ra tu re  suppo rting  the  concept of 
civil society, to the de trim en t of a  lite ra tu re  th a n  could exam ine the  
political processes  su rro u n d in g  its in stitu tiona lisa tion .
D iam ond’s thesis  - the “civil society liberalisation  th e s is” - is 
th a t  w here civil societies develop certa in  fea tu res  - dem ocratic  no rm s 
or au tonom y - they  a ss is t the dem ocratic p rocess. B u t th e  real 
question  th a t  rem ains is the  how and  why of th is . In w h a t w ays, from 
w hich cau ses, and  to w ha t ends is civil society dem ocratic? D iam ond 
an d  o thers are u ltim ately  unable  to ad d re ss  these  qu estio n s w hen 
civil society is trea ted  a s  a  concept ab strac ted  from the  con tex ts of a  
p a rticu la r regime. E dw ards and  Foley affirm  th is  po in t w hen  they  
conclude the ir essay  w ith  the  rem ark  that:
In the  la s t analysis, concepts su ch  a s  civil society, s ta te , 
an d  m arke t are  too coarse grained to help  very m u ch  in 
sorting  o u t the  variety of initiatives th a t  m ake u p  a  vital 
dem ocracy...it will be very difficult to specify in the  
a b s tra c t w hich charac teristics of civil society pe r se ... 
con tribu te  to healthy  dem ocracy an d  w hich do not,
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because  the  specific ro ste r of beneficial ch arac te ris tic s  
would vary cross nationally  an d  over tim e along w ith the  
socio-econom ic and  political context. (Edw ards a n d  
Foley, 1998b: 128)
The shortcom ings in working purely  a t  the  a b s tra c t level are 
acknow ledged too by G razyna S kapska  a n d  Andrew G reen who, w ith 
regard  to E aste rn  Europe, note respectively th a t  “bo th  the 
celebration of an d  d isappo in tm en t w ith civil society a rise  because  of 
concep tual deficiencies and , m ore im portan t, a  growing gap betw een 
ac tu a l political developm ents an d  civil society theory” (Skapska, 
1997), an d  th a t  “beyond echoes of ^ ^ - c e n tu r y  philosophy ... 
conceptions of civil society and  its  re la tionsh ip  to dem ocracy are 
vague a n d  sim plistic” (Green, 1997:309).
1.2 Empirically Grounding Civil Society
‘T ransition ’ academ ics agree th a t  across E as te rn  E urope, dem ocracy 
h a s  consolidated  itself in a  surprisingly  sh o rt space  of tim e. There is, 
nevertheless, a  feeling th a t  “p rocedural dem ocracy th a t  ap p ea rs  
ro b u s t institu tionally  rem ains weakly rooted socially, a n d  formally 
dem ocratic governm ent ap p ea rs  to be the  province of politicians and  
elites who operate  quite independently  of the  real concerns of m any” 
(Comisso, 1995:19).
As such , the  in te res ts  of the  advocates of civil society a re  well 
placed, m oving away a s  they  do from w h a t h a s  been  an  
overem phasis on the  developm ent of s ta te  an d  parliam en tary  
in s titu tio n s  to the  question  of w hat m ay b ind  those  in s titu tio n s  into 
society an d  to the  question  of w hat post-C om m unist citizensh ip  will 
m ean  in the  new political a rrangem en ts . In these  post-C om m unist 
regim es of E as te rn  E urope, the  presence or absence  of civil society is 
increasingly  proposed as  an  ind icator of the  s tren g th  of dem ocracy.
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As the  space denoting the  realm  of engaged au to n o m o u s citizenry, 
civil society is certainly a  welcome an tido te  to the  trad itiona l reliance 
on fair elections and  free speech a s  dem ocracy’s constitu tive  
fea tu res. Nevertheless, s tud ies of dem ocratisa tion  th a t  have tak en  
th is  recen t civic tu rn  often fail to tell u s  m u ch  a b o u t th e  s tren g th  of 
those o rgan isations w hich are p a rt of th e  so called ‘th ird  sec to r.’ 
While m uch  h a s  been said  of the  im portan t role to be played by civil 
society for the  durability  of dem ocratic in stitu tio n s , there  is little in 
the  way of em pirical investigation. Equally, while there  are  m any  
definitions of w hat civil society is an d  w hat, or who, is involved in  it, 
an d  w here it is located, there  is little th a t  identifies the  p rocesses by 
w hich it em erges and  the factors th a t enable an d  delim it its role. The 
slow b u t steady  growth of non-sta te , au to n o m o u s o rgan isa tions in 
E as te rn  E urope h a s  been asserted , yet w ithou t a n  investigation into 
how th ese  o rgan isations develop, estab lish  or re -estab lish  them selves 
u n d e r dem ocratic conditions, we are m issing  a n  im p o rtan t p a r t  of 
the  p ic tu re  of how th is  sphere grows. In sho rt, civil society h a s  been  
over-theorised and  u n d e r researched . While we m ay know  the  
reaso n s  why civil society w as su p p ressed  u n d e r  C om m unism , we do 
no t know  the  reasons for its em ergence, or indeed for its con tinued  
su p p ress io n  u n d e r dem ocracy. An u n d e rs tan d in g  of w hy civil society 
em erges an d  of the  shape  th a t it tak es m ay well dem and  reflection 
on the  way the  term  h a s  been understood  to date .
This paucity  of em pirical research  h a s  becom e the  su b jec t of 
increasing  com m ent. E dw ards an d  Foley, com m enting  on  the  
abso rp tion  of the  civil society debate into definitional d isp u tes , po in t 
o u t th a t  “boundary  m ain tenance  efforts generally come a t  the  
expense of em pirical inquiry  into how social ph en o m en a  ac tually  
w ork” (Edw ards and  Foley, 1998b: 127). It is a  view given su p p o rt by 
W hite, Howell an d  X iaoyuan who, in th e ir w ork on in term ediary  
o rgan isa tions in C hina, argue the  im portance  of d istingu ish ing
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“betw een civil society a s  an  ‘ideal type’ concep t w hich em bodies the 
qualities of separation , autonom y, and  v o lun tary  assoc ia tion  in the ir 
pu re  form and  the real world of civil societies w hich em bodies these  
princip les to varying degrees” (White e t al., 1996:6). Sim ilarly Robert 
Hefner w rites, “to realise its prom ise, the  concept of civil society m u s t 
be m ore firmly te thered  to its sociological a n d  c ro ss-cu ltu ra l 
m oorings, an d  analysed  in relation to rea l social w orlds” (Hefner, 
1998b:7). And finally, Em irbayer an d  Sheller note, “th e  inability  of 
an a ly sts  in terested  in civil society ... to move beyond th e  norm ative 
level by incorporating  research  tech n iq u es a n d  in sig h ts  from 
em pirical sociology” (1998:729).
2. The Research Question
This th es is  sub jects the  claim s of civil society th eo ris ts  to em pirical 
enquiry. The aim  of the  research  is to arrive a t  a n  acco u n t of those 
factors causally  identifiable for the  dem ocracy-build ing n a tu re  of civil 
society. T hus, the  cen tra l research  question  th a t  is the  s ta rtin g  po in t 
of the  s tudy  can  be defined a s  follow:
Where civil society is argued to be significant fo r  the  
extension o f  democracy , how can one best explain, in  
sociological term s, the determ inants o f  th is p rocess?  or
In short:
W hy is civil society important fo r  dem ocracy?
The em pirical exam ination  of civil society an d  its  role in dem ocracy 
confronts an  im m ediate obstacle: there  is no estab lish ed  stra tegy  for 
proceeding w ith su ch  an  investigation. To date , op in ions on post- 
C om m unist civil society have addressed  civil society only a s  a  b road  
category. E ither the  referent is civil society a s  the  sphere  w ithin  
w hich groups and  organ isations will ac t w ith little reference to the
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groups a n d  o rgan isations them selves. A lternatively, the  referen t is an  
aggregate of a  large n u m b er of groups or o rgan isa tions w hich, it is 
supposed , will con tinue collectively to fu rth e r the  ta sk , begun  in 
som e coun tries  prior to 1989, of defining an d  in stitu tio n a lis in g  the 
bo rders th a t  will delim it the  civil sphere  from  in terference by the 
sta te .
In c o n tra s t to these  approaches, a  sm all n u m b er of stud ies 
ou tside  of E aste rn  Europe have a ttem p ted  to resea rch  th e  conditions 
an d  w orkings of civil society by u sin g  case  s tu d ies  of one or two of its 
constitu tive  o rganisations. Ndegwa, Mac D onald, an d  He are  th ree  
resea rch e rs  each  of whom  in the  la s t few years h a s  u n d e rta k en  
em pirically g rounded stud ies of civil society in co u n tries  a ttem pting  
to confron t au th o rita rian  p a s ts  (He, 1997; M acD onald, 1997; 
Nedgwa, 1996). All th ree  adopted  an  ap p ro ach  of analysing  civil 
society in te rm s of the  o rgan isations of w hich it consisted . By 
sub jecting  one or two of these  o rgan isations to a  close exam ination , 
these  a u th o rs  were able to provide a  c learer p ic tu re  of th e  p rocesses 
th a t  h in d er or enable the developm ent of civil society w ith in  w hich 
these  o rgan isa tions were operating.
Ndegwa’s research  on non-governm ental o rgan isa tions in 
Kenya described  how two highly sim ilar o rgan isa tions operating  
u n d e r broadly  sim ilar conditions responded  very differently w hen 
given a n  opportun ity  to su p p o rt the  K enyan dem ocracy m ovem ent. 
This led Ndegwa to consider the  im portance of the  personalities of 
non-governm ental leaders a s  a  key determ in ing  factor in civil 
society’s re la tionsh ip  to dem ocracy. Ndegwa’s s tu d y  is in te resting  
because  it challenges the  p redom inan t view th a t  civil o rgan isa tions 
in developing coun tries are unquestionab ly  a  co un te rba lance  to sta te  
au thority . W hat is especially relevant ab o u t h is  w ork is th a t  it 
h ighlights the  im portance of m aking the cen tra l focus of enqu iry  the 
factors responsib le  for the dem ocratic role of civil society ra th e r  th an
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sim ply describ ing  th is  process w hen it does occur. M acD onald’s 
research  in Latin Am erica also led h er to challenge th e  th e s is  th a t 
civil society w as inheren tly  pro-dem ocratic. And B aogang He’s 
findings forced a  reflection on the  lim itations of the  concept of civil 
society, cu lm inating  in the  developm ent of the  idea of a  semi-civil 
society to explain the  function of o rgan isations in C h ina  th a t  were in 
p a rt sponsored  by the  s ta te  and  in p a rt independen t.
R egardless of the  individual m erits of th is  work, w h a t all these  
a u th o rs  succeeded in doing w as to p roduce  m ore n u an ced  
u n d e rs tan d in g s  of civil society th a n  is p resen tly  the  case  w ith 
research  on E aste rn  Europe. Following th is  work, th is  thesis  
app roaches the  question  of civil society by focusing on one civic 
assoc ia tion ’s a ttem p ts  to estab lish  itself in  the  newly dem ocratizing 
environm ents of E aste rn  Europe. Civil society varied greatly  a s  to its 
im portance in the  las t decades of C om m unism  a n d  in th e  role it 
played in the  overthrow  of the  sta te . Now, u n d e r  the  p ost­
a u th o rita rian  dem ocratic regim es, the  ex ten t to w hich it is possible 
to theorize in the  general case the  role of civil society ab s trac te d  from 
na tional contex ts is equally lim ited. At th is  early  stage in  the 
developm ent of new political system s, a rg u m en ts  on  the  role of civil 
society shou ld  aim  to be carefully grounded  claim s.
He, M acDonald, an d  Ndegwa, adop ted  the  case  study  
approach  in the ir exam inations of civil society in  Kenya, Latin 
Am erican, and  China. The case study  h a s  been  estab lish ed  a s  a  
highly effective research  strategy. Yin a rgues th a t  it is a  particu larly  
app ropria te  m ethod, w ith “w hen, ‘how ’ or Svhy’ questions...b e ing  
posed, w hen the investigator h a s  little control over events, a n d  w hen 
the  focus is on a  contem porary  phenom enon w ith som e real-life 
context” (Yin, 1989:13). Yet, the  case  study , w he ther single or 
m ultiple h a s  often been criticised on the  g rounds th a t  the  re su lts  
apply only to the  case or cases in hand , an d  can n o t be generalised  to
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o th er in stances. A gainst th is  view Yin in s is ts  th a t  the  case  s tu d y  is 
generalizable. However, it is “generalizable to theore tical propositions 
an d  n o t to populations or un iverses ... th e  investigato r’s goal is to 
expand  an d  generalize theories (analytic generalization) a n d  n o t to 
en u m era te  frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Yin, 1989:21).
3. The Case Study: the Czech Catholic Church
I choose the  Czech Catholic C hurch  a s  a  case  s tu d y  of a  civic 
o rgan isa tion ’s em ergence under, an d  re la tionsh ip  to, dem ocracy. 
This m ethodological strategy is explicitly a  single  case  s tu d y  of a  
single civic organisation: the  Catholic C hu rch  in  a  single country , the 
Czech Republic. Yin recom m ends the  adop tion  of a  single case  over 
a  m ultip le case  approach  w hen one of th ree  cond itions are  p resen t; 
the  event in  question  is a  “critical case”, a n  “extrem e or u n iq u e  case”, 
or a  “revelatory case” (Yin, 1989:47). The case  of the  Czech Catholic 
C hu rch  in the  context of the proposed s tu d y  exhib its all of these  
features. F irst, the  case can  be regarded, in Yin’s term s, a s  critical 
because  it con ta ins w ithin itself all the  e lem ents capab le  of tes tin g  a  
certa in  proposition. It is a  n o n -sta te  o rgan isation  in  a  newly 
dem ocratising  environm ent, an d  can  be u sed  to “confirm , challenge, 
or ex tend the  theory” th a t  civil society is vital for dem ocracy (Yin, 
1989:47). Second, the  case  of the  Czech Catholic C hu rch  is un ique  
for a  few reasons. The Czech Republic is one of the  few co u n tries  in 
the  world w hose m ajority religion is a t  the  sam e tim e a  religion 
trad itionally  perceived in th a t coun try  a s  an ti-na tiona l. The Czech 
ch u rch  also suffered a  m uch  g reater degree of rep ression  u n d e r 
C om m unism  th a n  any  o ther chu rch , e ither w ith in  the  Czech 
Republic or in the  neighbouring E as t E u ropean  coun tries. As such , 
there  is a  certa in  d istinctiveness to the  experience of the  Czech 
Catholic C hurch . The m ore liberal a ttitu d e  adop ted  by the
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C om m unists tow ards religion in Poland a n d  H ungary, o r the  strong  
association  betw een C atholicism  an d  the  n a tio n  in  Slovakia and  
Poland, m eans th a t the issu e  of re s titu tio n  (d iscussed  below in 
C hap ter Two) or the question  of com m unication  links w ith  the  sta te  
(d iscussed  in C hap ter Four) is posed in each  of these  co u n tries  in 
very different ways. Third, the  case of th e  C atholic C hu rch  is 
revelatory, it provides inform ation on a  u n s tu d ie d  topic, the  little 
resea rched  post-C om m unist Czech C atholic C hurch . The case  also 
provides inform ation on the  m ore generally u n d e r-re se a rc h ed  a re a  of 
the  religious organisation  a s  a  p a rt of civil society.
As an  exam ple of a n  organ isation  w hose re la tionsh ip  to 
dem ocracy is held to be am biguous, the  case  of th e  Catholic C hurch  
highlights the  lim its of a b s tra c t theorising  unaccom pan ied  by 
em pirical inquiry. U nder au th o rita rian  or non-dem ocratic  regim es, 
the  C hu rch  h a s  often provided a  space for th e  gathering  of forces 
opposed to a  repressive sta te . The con tribu tion  th a t  religious 
o rgan isations m ade to the  overthrow  of undem ocra tic  forces is 
e stab lished  in Poland, S ou th  Africa, an d  m any  p a rts  of Latin Am erica 
(see for exam ple, Hewitt, 1990; K uperus, 1996). Yet in  o ther 
au th o rita rian  regim es th is  h a s  n o t been the  case; Spain  before the 
1960’s an d  Chile are  bo th  exam ples w here the  Catholic C hurch  
proved predom inantly  to be a  bu lw ark  of su p p o rt to the  governm ent. 
While the  role of religious organ izations u n d e r  repressive 
c ircu m stan ces seem s to vary from one of accom m odation  w ith  the 
regim e to one of ou trigh t rejection, the  role of the  C atholic C h u rch  in 
dem ocratic  societies is m ore typically considered  a  conservative force. 
The Polish Catholic C hu rch  in recen t tim es h a s  generated  m ost 
in te res t am ong com m enta to rs in E as te rn  E urope. Given its  prior 
position a s  the  m ain in stitu tio n  in  civil society opposed to the 
C om m unist regime, its behav iour in the  new  dem ocratic  s ta te  h a s  
cau sed  d ism ay and  stim u la ted  criticism , (see, for exam ple, Tem pest,
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1997 :137)4 On the  o ther h an d , b road  generalizations regarding 
C atholicism  an d  dem ocracy are  difficult to su s ta in . The opposition of 
the  V atican to the  bom bing of Iraq, the  active role of the  ch u rch es  in 
B rita in ’s an ti-deb t m ovem ent, a n d  m ost recently  th e  Pope’s criticism
t
of cap ita l p u n ish m en t in Am erica all m ilitate a g a in st a  too easy  take 
on the  role of organized religion in dem ocratic societies.
This am biguity of the  c h u rc h ’s re la tionsh ip  to dem ocracy h as  
been  add ressed  by Jo se  C asanova. C asanova suggests th ree  
a lternative  m odels of existence for th e  c h u rc h  in dem ocratic 
societies. F irst, a  model of p rivatised  C atholicism , w here the  ch u rch  
confines itself to a  strictly  private sphere  an d  carries o u t purely 
religious activities an d  du ties. Second, Catholic hegem ony in civil 
society w here nation  an d  ch u rch  closely identify w ith  each  o ther and  
are re s is ta n t to secu lar in te res ts  or the  in te res ts  of o th e r religious 
groups. Finally, Catholic p lu ralism  w here the  c h u rc h  regards itself a s  
p a rt of civil society, ra th e r th a n  political society, accep ts eth ical 
diversity, b u t con tinues legitim ately to try  an d  influence secu lar 
spheres (Casanova, 1993). In m any  p a rts  of the  ex-C om m unist 
world, it is still unc lear w hich of C asanova’s th ree  m odels will 
u ltim ately  en trench  itself. This is tru e  also of th e  Czech Republic 
w here two of C asanova’s m odels; privatised  C atholicism  an d  Catholic 
P luralism , have the ir distinctive supporte rs .
3.1 Church and Civil Society in the Czech Republic
The Czech C onstitu tion , adop ted  on 16th D ecem ber 1992, declares 
th a t, “D em ocratic values co n stitu te  the  foundation  of the  S tate , so 
th a t  it m ay n o t be bound  e ither by an  exclusive ideology or by a
4 Tempest charges the Polish Catholic Church the lack of “an accommodative and 
bargaining mentality, but one informed by an absolute moral certainty” (Tempest, 
1997:137).
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p a rticu la r religious faith .”5 While the  C onstitu tion  clearly favours a  
s ta te  stra tegy  th a t is n eu tra l an d  n o n -p a rtisa n  tow ards religious 
o rgan isations, it nevertheless leaves open to question  w hat the 
co n ten t or details of the  a rrangem en t betw een s ta te  an d  ch u rch  
shou ld  be. In practice, s ta te -ch u rch  n eu tra lity  h a s  been  open to a  
variety  of in terp reta tions. In the  U nited S ta te s  neu tra lity  is 
u n d ers to o d  to dem and  the equal consignm ent of all religions to the 
private sphere, while in the  N etherlands the  s ta te  strives to ensu re  
th a t  religious o rgan isations have equal oppo rtun ities to a c t in public 
(see M onsm a an d  Soper, 1997). Yet, even am ong those  coun tries 
w here ch u rc h -s ta te  neu tra lity  is und ers to o d  a s  compatible  w ith a  
public  role for religion, questions ab o u t the  n a tu re  of th a t  public 
role, its  protection, its  lim its, an d  its financing have found  diverse 
so lu tions.
In the  Czech Republic, these  su b stan tiv e  questio n s ab o u t the  
role of ch u rch es  have a risen  w ithin  the  con tex t of a  b roader debate 
ab o u t the  n a tu re  of post-C om m unist dem ocracy. H adjiisky describes 
the  two m ain  an d  opposing views of dem ocracy th a t  have em erged in 
the  Czech Republic a s  ‘partic ipa to ry ’ a n d  ‘m a jo rita rian ’ (Hadjiisky, 
2 0 0 1).6 The partic ipatory  model, dom inan t in the  1989-1992 
G overnm ent of Civic Forum , a im s to place “the  citizen a t the  centre  
of political life by prom oting various k inds of civic partic ipa tion  in 
public affairs” (Hadjiisky, 2001:45).7 This m odel w as d isp laced  by an  
elite, S chum peterian , V in n er take  a ll’ ap p roach  of the  Civic
5 Article 2 (1) General Provisions, Chapter One, Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Basic Freedoms adopted under Article 3 of the Czech Constitution as a part of the 
constitutional order of the Czech Republic. 16 Dec. 1992. See the Czech Parliament’s 
website at www.psp.cz.
6 A similar distinction to Hadjiisky is drawn by Potucek (2000), and by Marada (1997). 
See also Diyzek and Holmes (2000).
7 In his article, Marada notes that there were distinct developmental stages in the 
articulation of a Czech participatory model; a pre-1989 phase, the 1989 to 1992 phase, and
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D em ocratic Party  (ODS), the  m ain  party  in  G overnm ent from  1992- 
1997, a  pa rty  firmly com m itted to a  “a  delegative conception  of 
dem ocracy in w hich the  relation  betw een the  citizen a n d  the  s ta te  is 
expressed  th rough  the  m ere ac t of voting” (Hadjiisky, 2001:58). The 
outcom e of the  1998 elections b rough t p red ic tions for a  more 
inclusive, less m agisterial style of governm ent. These expectations 
were modified substan tia lly  w hen the  Social D em ocrats (CSSD) sho rt 
of a  ru ling  m ajority signed an  opposition ag reem en t w ith the  ODS. 
“T hanks to th is  agreem ent, and  despite its electoral defeat, th e  ODS 
h a s  re ta ined  a  m ajor and  very d irect influence on parliam en tary  
d eba tes an d  on the  governm ent’s policy” (Hadjiisky, 2001:60).8
This th es is  seeks to estab lish  an d  explain  the  ex ten t to w hich 
the  s ta tu s  of the  Czech Catholic C hurch  is the  p ro d u c t of con tinu ing  
a ttem p ts  to institu tiona lise  a  post-C om m unist dem ocratic  society. In 
bo th  its versions, participatory  and  elite, Czech dem ocracy is 
resolutely  liberal in its com m itm ent to the  righ ts-bearing  citizen 
exercising h is  or h e r freedom  in a  sphere  of activity hab itually  
referred to since the collapse of C om m unism  as  civil society. 
However, in  the  elite view, th is  civil society is a n  organ ised  se t of 
individual an d  private  in te res ts  w here the  freedom  of the  citizen is 
wholly secu red  th rough  legislation th a t m inim ises a s  far a s  possible, 
the  in tru s io n s  of the  sta te . This perspective h a s  been  critically 
modified by the  partic ipatory  approach  w hich a rg u es th a t  individual 
freedom s are  b est p roduced w hen supp lem ented  w ith  the  recognition 
an d  pro tection  of those groups and  o rgan isations through w hich  the  
individual acts. Moreover, the  partic ipa tion ists  m ain ta in  th a t, far 
from being m a tte rs  of private concern, the  activities of these  groups
a third phase after 1994.
8 However, the Social Democrats (CSSD) emerged the victors in the June 2002 elections 
with 70 seats against the ODS’s 58. Subsequently, the CSSD formed a coalition 
Government with the KDU-CSL and the Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU) giving
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are  m ore appropriately  described a s  public, a lbeit a  public  lying 
ou tside  the  sta te  and  the realm  of form al G overnm ent.9
These diverging perspectives on the  cond itions of freedom  have 
im p o rtan t policy im plications. P artic ipa tion ists typically argue  th a t 
p roper recognition of groups an d  assoc ia tions requ ires the  creation  
an d  p reservation  of the  resources th a t  allow g roups to govern 
them selves. This can  involve directing public  m onies aw ay from  the 
sta te  an d  tow ards various publics in civil society, a n d  can  also 
include the  involvem ent of civic o rgan isa tions in b roader public 
debates th a t  concern the ir way of life. D em ocratic e litis ts  disagree. 
They argue th a t  freedom  is b est p ro tected  by leaving public  decisions 
to elected represen tatives. Indeed, o rdered  a n d  stab le  decision 
m aking is only possible if these  rep resen ta tives are  “sh ielded  from 
too m u ch  participation  by the population: C itizens m u st, a s  it were, 
accep t th e  division of labour betw een them selves an d  th e  politicians 
they  elect” (Cohen and  Arato, 1992:6).
3.2 Researching the Czech Catholic Church.
The s ta tu s  of the  Catholic C hurch  in  m any  E as te rn  E uropean  
coun tries an d  the  issue  of w hich c h u rc h -s ta te  regim e will u ltim ately  
be consolidated  is still uncerta in . This is particu la rly  the  case  in  the 
Czech Republic w here civil society u n d e r C om m unism  suffered an  
u n u su a l level of suppression . A lthough c h u rc h  life ac ro ss  E aste rn  
E urope operated  u n d e r great restric tions, in  co u n tries  su c h  as 
Poland an d  H ungary there  em erged in the  la s t decades of
them a slim majority of 101 seats in the 200 seat member chamber.
9 Indeed, as Hirst (1997) argues this is increasingly the case in Western Europe where 
civic organisations undertake an ever-expanding range of governing functions. See also 
Monsma and Soper who note in their research that “the religious communities of all five 
countries considered in it are concerned with a wide range of public policy questions and 
are active in providing education, health care, and other social services”. (1997:9).
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C om m unist rule, genuine and  su s ta in ed  oppo rtun ities to renegotiate  
the  bou n d aries  of freedom  of expression. In C zechoslovakia, however, 
a p a r t form the  brief days of the Prague Spring, rep ression  w as severe 
u n til the  end, and  the post-C om m unist question  of the  place religion 
is to have in society raised  its head  for the  first tim e only in  1989.
The case  of the  Catholic C hu rch  in  the  Czech Republic 
rep resen ts , therefore, a  particu larly  in te res tin g  case  study . This 
relatively u n c h a rted  territory  m ight have been  expected to p roduce  a  
flu riy  of scholarly  activity, yet religious o rgan isa tion  in  the  Czech 
Republic h a s  received little a tten tion  from acad em ics.10 Two factors 
suggest them selves a s  responsible. F irst, th e  ex ten t to w hich the  
ch u rch es  in  the  form er Czechoslovakia were rep ressed  gave them , in 
com parison  to the  Polish case, sm all oppo rtun ity  to perform  a n  
oppositional role. They consequently  were of little in te re s t to 
academ ics charting  the  role th a t civil society played a g a in st the  
C om m unist sta te . Secondly, the  lack of in te re s t in the  c h u rc h  am ong 
those academ ics concerned w ith dem ocracy is p e rh a p s  stim u la ted  
fu rth er by the  belief th a t the Catholic C hu rch , so long rep ressed , 
would em erge from C om m unism  u n ta in te d  by th e  liberalising 
elem ents, especially the  decentralising  fea tu res  of V atican  II, to play 
a  conservative role in Czech society.
In trying to determ ine w hat questions to a sk  of the  c h u rc h  an d  
its re la tionsh ip  to civil society, the  lite ra tu re  h a s  been  u se fu l it 
helping to clarify w ha t those questions shou ld  be. T his is very m u ch  
in line w ith Yin's recom m endation th a t  a  review of th e  lite ra tu re
10 There is a fairly substantial literature on Catholicism and the Catholic Church prior to 
1989. The post 1989 literature is however minimal and mostly lacking in discussion of 
political or structural change. See for example DiDomizio (1997) and O Madr (1991). Ramet 
(1991) is an interesting account of the changing legal status of the church in the early post- 
Communist period. Jonathan Luxmoore (1995) (1996) (1997) provides a yearly news 
roundup of religious issues in Eastern Europe. See also Reban (1990); Jandourek (1997a) 
(1997b); Nash (1993); Halik (1991); and Michel (1992).
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shou ld  no t determ ine the  answ ers, b u t shou ld  develop “sh a rp e r  and  
m ore insightful questions ab o u t the  topic” (Yin, 1989:20). W hat is 
clear in the  lite ra tu re  looked a t in  the  early  p a rt of the  c h ap te r and  
indeed in C asanova’s m odel is th a t  factors bo th  ex ternal to a  civic 
o rganisation  and  in te rna l to it can  im pact on its  positioning in civil 
society an d  its role in dem ocracy.
External Factors
The sta te  a s  the m ajor in stitu tion  ex ternal to the  c h u rc h  provides the 
initial legal guaran tee  for the operation  of free assoc iations. Yet the 
sta te  is n o t a  d isin terested  party . The elevation of the  O rthodox 
C hurch  in  R ussia  to the  's ta te  religion’, w ith  th e  consequen t 
in stitu tiona lised  privileges th is  brings, clearly u p h o ld s B aogang He’s 
a rg u m en t th a t social associations can  “provide n o t only a  new 
channel for the s ta te ’s social control, b u t  also a  tool or source  for 
legitim ation” (Baogang He, 1997:18).
The s ta te ’s role in the  developm ent of civil society is a  cen tra l 
concern  of m uch  of civil society theory. Yet, im p o rtan t a s  th is  focus 
m ay be, there  is, a t  the  sam e tim e, a  no tab le  failure to th in k  beyond, 
or to move beyond the  state . Any considera tion  of the  Catholic 
C hurch  a s  an  o rgan isation  w ithin civil society m u s t how ever confront 
the  inadequacy  of approaches th a t rem ain  bounded  by na tional 
territory. The power of the  V atican vis-a-vis th e  local ch u rch , the 
trea ties an d  concordats th a t  exist betw een the  Holy See an d  various 
n a tio n -sta te s , the  s ta tu s  of the V atican on  E u ropean  U nion decision 
m aking bodies, all go to underline  the  tru ly  tran s-n a tio n a l ch a rac te r 
of the  Catholic C hurch . As such , civil society th eo ris ts  need  to 
re th in k  the  p resum ed  inevitability of th e  s ta te  a s  the  o rgan isation  
“th a t claim s a  m onopoly over the  right to de term ine  the  form s of
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governance w ithin a  definite territory" (Hirst, 1997:115, see also 
Hoffman, 1995).
The role of political parties is im p o rtan t too. Any organization 
th a t  needs to affect policy decision a t the  n a tio n a l level m u s t have 
the  in te rn a l streng th  an d  capacity  to forge a  co h eren t iden tity  and  
se t of aim s. However the  ability to get those  a im s h e a rd  will be 
greatly  enhanced  th rough  influence w ith professional politicians. 
W ith respec t to civil society’s rep resen ta tive  function , it is 
undo ub ted ly  the  case th a t, “political pa rties are  th e  ga tekeepers who 
can  selectively streng then  or w eaken the voice of in te re s t g roups in 
policy-m aking” (Fink-Hafner, 1998:292).
Internal factors
In term s of s tru c tu re  an d  belief, factors in te rn a l to the  Catholic 
C hurch  are  im portan t in  a  n um ber of ways. The c h u rc h ’s 
h ierarch ica l s tru c tu re  h a s  proved a  double-edged sw ord in te rm s of 
its  po ten tia l im pact on dem ocratisation . The C atholic C h u rc h ’s 
s ta tu s  a s  a  su p ra -s ta te  body w ith its p rim ary  pow er b ase  in  Rome 
h a s  often given it added political leverage a g a in st au th o rita rian  
regim es. The strongly cen tralised  an d  discip lined  n a tu re  of the 
Catholic C hu rch  in Poland m ade it an  efficient force in  coun tering  
the  C om m unist sta te . However, th is  sam e h iera rch ica l s tru c tu re  h as  
often im peded a ttem p ts  by lower rank ing  m em bers to ad d ress  
dem ocratic  deficiencies bo th  ex ternal and  in te rn a l to the  Catholic 
C hu rch  (McGuire, 1992:238).
C atholic beliefs have been u sed  in th e  service of bo th  radical 
an d  conservative ends. T hus, on the ir own, the  content of these  belief 
system s can n o t be considered a  sufficient condition  of social or 
political transfo rm ations. Yet the  availability of certa in  d iscourses 
th a t  can  be appropria ted  by forces for change can  m ake of them
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im p o rtan t factors in some contexts. Jo se  C asanova n o tes  th a t  “the 
official policies com ing from the Second V atican C ouncil gave the 
m odern  secto rs of S pan ish  Catholicism  th e  leverage they  needed to 
p ressu re  the  h ierarchy  and  to confront th e  regim e” (Casanova, 
1993:83). Policy docum ents such  as  the  1963 encyclical Pacem in 
Terris, th e  second V atican C ouncil’s Gaudium  et Spes, an d  the 
encyclical Populorum Progression, all served to legitim ate the  w ritings 
of the  influen tia l S pan ish  C hristian  D em ocratic m ovem ent on a  wide 
range of political and  civil rights. B u t w h a t u ltim ately  “tipped  the 
balance of forces in favour of the  new C atholicism ” w as th e  V atican’s 
in troduction  of new ru les governing the  com position of S pa in ’s 
B ishop’s conference w hich heralded  the  com ing to pow er of the 
reform  wing of the  ch u rch  (Casanova, 1993:84-85).
In Poland too, the  con ten t of new  pub lica tions em erging from 
the  V atican served as  sources for new appea ls on a  wide range of 
political m atte rs . The V atican aggiomamento, w hich in its essence 
w as a  recognition of E nligh tenm ent princip les se t the  stage for the 
forging of links betw een religious an d  non-relig ious in te llectuals. 
“The p asto ra l le tters of the  Polish b ishops an d  the  p ronouncem en ts  
of the  Pope served to legitim ate religiously the  m odel of a  
differentiated an d  p luralistic  society” (Casanova, 1993:101-102). 
T his allowed the  com ing together of secu la r a n d  C h ris tian  an ti­
c o m m u n is ts , th u s  greatly increasing  the  s tren g th  of the  pro­
dem ocracy m ovem ent (Michnik, 1993).
3.3 A Working Model of Civil Society.
Useful m odels of civil society m u s t contend  w ith  the  relevance of 
bo th  ex ternal an d  in te rnal factors to the  conditions a n d  developm ent 
of associational life. For th is  reason , Philippe S ch m itte r’s ideal type 
m odel of civil society is particu larly  attractive. For Schm itter
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(1997:24c))1 \  civil society “refers to a  se t or system  of self-organised 
in term ediary  groups or o rganisations which:
1. a re  relatively independen t of bo th  the  s ta te  a n d  private 
u n its  of p roduction  and  reproduction , i.e. of firm s an d  
families;
2. a re  capable of tak ing  collective action  in
defence/prom otion  of the  in te res ts  o r p a ss io n s  of th e ir 
m em bers;
3. do no t seek to replace e ither s ta te  ag en ts  or private 
(re)producers or to accep t responsib ility  for governing 
the  polity a s  a  whole;
4. do agree to ac t in ‘a  civil fash ion ’ w ith in  pre- 
estab lished  rules.
S chm itte r’s model add resses bo th  the  ex ternal a n d  in te rna l 
d im ensions of a  civic o rgan isation ’s existence. The m odel’s first 
fea tu re  ra ises  questions ab o u t the  conditions of a n  o rgan isa tion ’s 
existence, in p a rticu la r th a t determ ined by its  re la tionsh ip  w ith  the 
sta te . The m odel’s second elem ent ra ises  questio n s ab o u t the 
conditions of associational action and  the  spaces w ith in  w hich action 
will take  place. The final two fea tu res are  concerned  w ith  the  n a tu re  
an d  su b s tan ce  of institu tionalised  norm s w ith in  o rgan isations.
I adop t S chm itter’s model a s  a  w orking definition of civil 
society .12 Three of the  elem ents of h is model; independence, collective 
action , an d  civility, serve a s  the  key reference po in ts  a ro u n d  w hich I 
have organised  the  body of research . The re sea rch  question  - the
11 These elements are also to be found in other discussions. For example, Bryant 
contends that civil society involves “association, autonomy and civility as well as 
communication” (Bryant, 1994:497).
12 For an attempt to empirically ground Schmitter’s concept, and the only one I am
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im portance of civil society for dem ocracy - is explored th rough  a  
definite strategy, th a t takes each  of these  fea tu res  of civil society 
th rough  a  series of four steps: first, I a ttem p t to clarify th e  m eaning 
of the  fea tu re  in question; civility, independence, or collective action. 
Second, I a sk  w hat is the  re la tionsh ip  of the  fea tu re  to dem ocracy. 
Third, I estab lish  the  ex ten t to w hich the  fea tu re  ex ists in  the  case 
u n d e r  study; the  Czech Catholic C hurch . F ourth , I seek  to explain 
the  feature  by ask ing  how and  why it is developed or undeveloped to 
the  ex ten t th a t  it is.
The feature  of S chm itter’s civil society th a t  is lea s t d iscussed  
in th is  th es is  is w hat he describes a s  “n o n -u su rp a tio n ”: w here an  
organ isation  does no t “no t seek to replace s ta te  ag en ts ...o r to accept 
responsib ility  for governing the  polity a s  a  w hole” (Schm itter, 
1997:240). This would have been a  relevant a sp ec t to exam ine were 
the  case  s tu d y  to have been, for exam ple, th e  extrem e n a tio n a lis t 
pa rty  in  Slovakia. However, in the  case  of th e  U niversal Catholic 
C hurch , the  su p p o rt for the  n o n -u su rp a tio n  principle  h a s  becom e 
increasingly  en trenched  since V atican II’s a lm ost u n a n im o u s  vote in 
su p p o rt for the  Dignitatis H um anae  (D eclaration on Religious Liberty) 
(Coleman, 2002). There are, of course, those who adhere  to an  older 
claim  “for a  ch u rch  hegem ony over the  m orality  of s ta te  a n d  society”; 
a  position th a t  Colem an claim s now lacks “a rticu la te  spokesm en  or 
suasive a rgum en t and  would seem  to be ru led  o u t by the 
au tho rita tive  ch arac te r of the  conciliar do cu m en t” (Coleman, 
2002:231). In any event, th is  older claim  is in tended  for assertion  
“w hen C atholics are a  m ajority”; un like  the  Czech case  w here 
a th e is ts  o u tn u m b er C hristians. As su ch  the  unquestio n in g  
accep tance  by Czech B ishops of the  legitim acy of bo th  the  dem ocratic 
sta te  an d  the  plurality  of social life is p e rh ap s  ha rd ly  rem arkable. 
N evertheless, the  question  of w h a t exactly is th e  dividing line
aware of, see Baogang He (1997).
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betw een sta te  an d  society, w here th a t  line shou ld  be draw n, a n d  who 
decides w here it should  be draw n, are all q u estio n s a t  th e  h e a r t of 
debates ab o u t civil society, an d  its  in stitu tiona lisa tion . As such , 
these  questions an d  issu es do ap p ea r th ro u g h o u t the  th es is , an d  th is  
issu e  of n o n -u su rp a tio n  is re tu rn ed  to in th e  conclusion  in  ch ap te r 
six.
4. The Structure o f the Thesis
Following the  in troduction , there  are  five add itional c h ap te rs  to the  
thesis. In each  chap ter, the  exp lanatory  stra tegy  I ad o p t follows the  
idea of the  ‘p lausible  rival hyp o th esis .’ “T his s tra tegy”, Cam pbell 
a rgues, “includes seeking o u t rival exp lanations of the  focal evidence 
and  exam ining the ir p lausibility” (Campbell, 1989:7). “The objective 
is to pose com peting exp lanations for the  sam e se t of even ts” (Yin, 
1989:16). “By com paring each  theory  w ith  the  ac tu a l cou rse  of 
events”, one can  show “how one provides the  b e s t exp lanation” (Yin, 
1989:16).
4.1 Chapter Outline
C hapter two ad d resses  the  first of S chm itter’s d im ensions of civil 
society; independence from the  sta te . The em pirical focus is to 
estab lish  the  ex ten t to w hich the  Catholic C h u rch  h a s  achieved 
independence from the state. I exam ine the  d em an d s of the  c h u rc h  
for the  re tu rn  of its property, seized by the  C om m unists in  1949, an d  
focus on two m ajor a rgum en ts , w hich suggest respectively, th a t  
e ither an  h isto ric  anti-C atholicism  or the  con tem porary  exigencies of 
ju stice  acco u n t for the  n a tu re  of the  struggle over c h u rc h  econom y. 
C hap ter th ree  con tinues th is  inqu iry  by exam ining the  a rg u m en t th a t  
party  ideology is a  be tter explanation  th a n  public  opinion, or ju s tice ,
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for the  con tinued  conflict over chu rch  res titu tio n s . Given th e  lack of 
m ateria l on the  politics of restitu tion , the  em pirical focus in the 
ch ap te r is to reco n stru c t the  shifting positions of political pa rties  on 
the  res titu tio n  issue. In ch ap ter four I exam ine the  second of 
S chm itte r’s d im ensions of civil society; capacity  for collective action. 
The em pirical w ork a im s to estab lish  the  n a tu re  of the  relationship , 
on the  local a n d  na tional level, betw een the  Catholic C hu rch  and  the 
Czech sta te . I consider the  argum en ts th a t  a  C om m unist legacy of 
anti-political a ttitu d e s  or poor political skills on the  p a r t  of civic 
assoc iations explain the  c h u rc h ’s role in  d iscu ssin g  a n d  determ ining  
those a sp ec ts  of public policy th a t  directly affect it. In ch ap te r five I 
exam ine the  final elem ent of S chm itter’s model; assoc iationa l civility. 
The em pirical focus is to estab lish  the ex ten t, a n d  source, of 
dem ocratic no rm s am ong the  elite of the  C atholic C hurch . I exam ine 
the  s tren g th  of com peting explanations th a t  focus respectively on 
associational s tru c tu re  or b roader political cu ltu re .
5. Methods and Sources
Yin a rgues th a t  “the  case s tu d y ’s un ique  stren g th  is its  ability to deal 
w ith a  full variety  of evidence - docum ents, a rtifac ts , interview s, and  
observation” (Yin, 1989:20). The research  u n d e rta k e n  here  is heavily 
relian t on a  com bined a sso rtm en t of prim ary  an d  secondary  m aterial. 
Two se ts  of interview s proved extrem ely u se fu l for descriptive, 
illustrative, an d  evidential purposes. The first se t of interview s w as 
carried  o u t in the  Czech Republic in O ctober a n d  Novem ber 1998. In 
th is  period, I interviewed politicians from th ree  of the  m ain  Czech 
political p a rties  an d  m ost of the  key m em bers in the  c h u rc h ’s 
p rincipal decision m aking body, the  Czech’s B ishop Conference 
estab lished  on M arch 30 th  1993. A fu rth er four interview s were 
carried  o u t in  Septem ber 2001. A full list of interview ees is provided
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in  A ppendix A. The interviews were based  on open-ended  an d  sem i­
s tru c tu re d  questionnaires, an d  lasted  betw een one a n d  two an d  half 
h o u rs ,. All the  interviews, b a r the one w ith B ishop Ljavinec, were 
tap ed  (see Appendix B for the  questionnaires).
This m ateria l is supplem ented  by a  second se t of interviews 
w ith  Czech religious elites and  m em bers of th e  Czech underg round  
ch u rch . This second se t of interviews w as carried  o u t in 1993 by a  
sm all independen t Irish  film com pany, E sras . W hat proved to be an  
extrem ely usefu l source of inform ation w as m ateria l given to me by 
E sras , a  sm all Irish  film com pany devoted to religious affairs. E sras  
p roduced  two sh o rt docum entaries for Irish  Television on religion in 
the  Czech Republic. They gave me th e  com plete tran sc rip ts  of 
interview s they  h ad  carried  o u t for th e ir research . The m ajority of 
m ateria l in the  tran sc rip ts  h a s  no t appeared  in  the  public  dom ain 
e ith e r on television or in prin t. The tran s la to r  for th e  Irish  research  
an d  film team  w as Eva Sharpova, a  p rom inen t Czech jo u rn a lis t, and  
th e  BBC’s m ain  Czech C orrespondent before the  1989 collapse.
B oth se ts  of interviews were essen tia l to the  resea rch  because 
th e  views of religious elites on key issue  su rro u n d in g  civil society are 
n o t know n. Some of the  interviews, or m ore com m only ‘so u n d b ites’, 
p ub lished  in new spapers are of too brief a  ch a rac te r to be usefu l for 
au th e n tic  research . However, a s  far a s  possible, I have included bo th  
public  a n d  private s ta tem en ts  to guard  a g a in st the  accusa tion  th a t 
interview ees m ay be expressing  opinions to m e, th a t  they  do nor, or 
a re  unlikely  to express elsewhere. The p u rpose  of the  interview s w as 
to find o u t how b ishops an d  politicians regarded  th e ir re la tionsh ip  
w ith each  o ther, how they regarded the  ap p ro p ria ten ess  of th a t 
re la tionsh ip , an d  the ir a ttitu d e  to civic assoc iation  in  general. The 
questio n s a re  designed w ith the  aim  of exploring the  ex ten t to w hich 
th e  ch u rch  could be regarded as dem ocratic  an d  th e  conditions 
u n d e r  w hich th is  m ight occur. The im portance of bo th  in te rnal an d
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ex ternal factors th a t  m ight con tribu te  to or negate th is  po ten tia l w as 
borne  in m ind in the  design of the  questionnaire . The m ain  sources 
for the  secondary  m ateria l were Radio Free E urope R eports, Radio 
Free E u rope’s T ran s itio n s’ jo u rn a l, the  Czech News Agency (CTK), 
th e  O pen Society Archives in B udapest, a n d  Czech new spapers: 
M lada F ron ta  Dnes; Lidove Noviny; Lidove D em ocracie; R ude Pravo; 
th e  P rague Post; an d  the  Satirical Jo u rn a l, Nevidelny Pes. Non-Czech 
so u rces included  The Tablet, the  F inancial T im es, The G uard ian , 
BBC M onitoring service, R euters News Service, the  A ssociated Press, 
an d  Agence F rance Presse In ternational.
6. Conclusion
The key proposition in the  contem porary  lite ra tu re  on civil society is 
th a t  civil society is essen tia l to dem ocracy. Yet a n  im p o rtan t gap in 
the  lite ra tu re  is the  failure to exam ine th e  political p rocesses by 
w hich su ch  a  rela tionsh ip  becom es estab lished . One obstacle  to such  
a n  investigation is the failure to tre a t the  concept w ith  any  em pirical 
rigour. 'Civil society’ is often trea ted  a s  a n  aggregate concept 
ab s trac te d  from any  real world environm ent. T his m akes it difficult 
to see how an d  why any p articu la r civil society em erges, how d istinc t 
fea tu res  of civil society m ay develop differently an d  a t  d ifferent tim es, 
an d  how any  p articu la r rela tionsh ip  betw een civil society and  
dem ocracy m ight occur. This thes is  seeks to avoid a n d  com pensate  
for these  failings. It adop ts a  case s tudy  stra tegy  capable  of 
developing civil society liberalisation theory, an d  ad o p ts  a  working 
m odel sensitive to bo th  the  d iscrete  fea tu res of civil society, a n d  to 
the  in te rn a l an d  external factors th a t  affect or inh ib it the 
developm ent of these  features. In doing so it th row s light on  the 
question  of w ha t factors should  be considered  in any  analysis 
a ttem p ting  to u n d e rs ta n d  the obstacles an d  oppo rtun ities  to the  re ­
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grow th of civil society u n d e r the  dem ocratic  conditions now 
prevailing in E aste rn  Europe.
The th es is  is relevant to the  question  of the  revival of bo th  civil 
society a n d  the  public sphere  in post a u th o rita r ia n  societies. It 
co n trib u tes  to a n  existing body of knowledge on th is  issue  in the 
following ways. The em pirical w ork carried  o u t for the  thesis  
co n trib u tes  new and  prim ary m ateria l on the  a ttitu d e s  of key 
political figures regarding the  role of sta te-socie ty  re la tions an d  on 
the  Czech Catholic C hurch , in p a rticu la r the  a ttitu d e s  of the  elites of 
the  c h u rc h  ab o u t the ir role in Czech society. The in -dep th  focus on 
the  C atholic C hu rch  a s  a n  organization w ith in  civil society suggests 
a  fram ew ork for u n d e rs tan d in g  rela tions betw een religious groupings 
an d  political groupings an d  the  in stitu tio n a lisa tio n  of ch u rch -s ta te  
regim es in  post C om m unist societies. Finally, by calling a tten tion  to 
the  factors th a t  prove relevant to the  em ergence of ‘in term ediary  
o rg an isa tio n s’ in the  Czech Republic, in  p a rticu la r, b u t no t 
exclusively, the  Catholic C hurch , the  th es is  co n trib u tes  to the  theory 
build ing efforts of research ers  considering  the  role of civil society in 
general.
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C hapter Two
Econom ic Freedom : Ju s tic e  v e rsu s C ulture.
1. Introduction
In C hap te r One, I adopted  S chm itter’s definition of civil society a s  an  
ideal type w orking m odel for the  thesis . S chm itter suggests  th a t  civil 
society refers to "a se t or system  of self-organised in term ediary  
g roups or o rgan isa tions” w hich h a s  four conditions. The first of these 
conditions is “dual autonom y” w here o rgan isa tions or assoc ia tions 
m u s t be “relatively independen t of bo th  public  au th o ritie s  and  
private u n its  of production  and  reproduction , th a t  is, of firm s and  
fam ilies” (Schm itter, 1997:240). Schm itter does n o t e laborate  on th is  
descrip tion  of autonom y, b u t h is elision of the  te rm s ‘independence’ 
a n d  ‘au tonom y’ is im m ediately problem atic. H an n ah  A rendt m ade 
the  case  for regarding independence as  a  su b se t, or condition, of 
au tonom y ra th e r  th a n  its equivalent. She a rgued  th a t  one could be 
liberated , or becom e independen t, from  dom ination , an d  yet still no t 
become  au tonom ous (Arendt, 2000:442).
A sim ilar, an d  earlier, d istinction  w as d raw n by B erlin w hen he 
categorised  the  concept of freedom  into two types: positive freedom  
a n d  negative freedom. Like A rendt’s ‘independence’, B erlin ’s negative 
freedom  deno tes an  absence, ra th e r  th a n  a  p resence. Negative 
freedom  is “the  a rea  w ithin w hich a  m an  can  ac t u n o b s tru c te d  by 
o th e rs”. (Berlin, 2001: 128). It is the  a rea  w ith in  w hich one is not 
p revented  from doing som ething, the choices th a t  one could  m ake if 
one w ished to. The m easu re  of negative freedom  th e n  is n o t ‘ac tio n ’
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b u t 'opportunity . It is “the  opportun ity  to act, no t action  itself” 
(Berlin, cited in W arburton , 2001: 6).
Positive freedom  on the o ther h a n d  is ab o u t action. Berlin 
described  w h a t he m eans by positive freedom  in  the  following way:
deciding, n o t being decided for, self-directed a n d  not 
acted upon ...conceiving goals an d  policies of m y own a n d  
realising  them ...to  be conscious of m yself a s  a  th ink ing , 
willing, active being, bearing  responsib ility  for h is  
choices an d  able to explain them  by reference to h is  own 
ideas a n d  purposes. (Berlin, 2001:133, em p h asis  mine)
For A rendt too, freedom, or au tonom y, “is prim arily  expressed  
in ac tion” (Arendt, 2000:444), an d  indeed, in  S ch m itte r’s own m odel 
of civil society, it is w ith the  addition of h is  second  fea tu re  th a t  ju s t  
su ch  a  d istinc tion  betw een freedom  from  ac tion  a n d  freedom  in 
action , becom es possible. Here, in h is  second condition of civil 
society, S chm itter’s ideal typical association  is m ore th a n  sim ply 
in d ep en d en t from the sta te  b u t also “capable  of deliberating  ab o u t 
an d  tak ing  collective actions in defense or prom otion  of [its] in te re s ts  
or p a ss io n s” (Schm itter, 1997:240).
The consequences of the  failure to d is tin g u ish  betw een 
independence  and  au tonom y are evident in  th e  early  w ritings on 
post-C om m unist E aste rn  Europe. M any of th ese  w ritings tended  to 
a ssu m e  th a t  an  active civil life would au tom atica lly  em erge u p o n  the  
dem ise of the  a u th o rita rian  state . In E as te rn  E urope, th is  did n o t 
happen ; on the  con trary , there  w as a  rap id  decline in  m any  of those  
o rgan isa tions w hich h ad  been m ost active in  the  late  1980s; the  
peace an d  environm ental m ovem ents, for exam ple, (see Holm es, 
1997). At the  h e a rt of these  early p red ictions for civil society lay the  
p resupposition  th a t au tonom y is the  equivalen t of independence, an  
a ssu m p tio n  th a t  had  the  effect of denying the  concep tua l space 
w ith in  w hich to consider th a t the c au se s  of independence, or of its
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lack, m ay well be different from those of au tonom y. T his w as 
precisely the  so rt of confusion th a t A rend t’s u n d e rs tan d in g  of 
freedom  sough t to avoid. C om m enting on th e  h isto rical 
u n d e rs tan d in g  of the  term , she writes,
The s ta tu s  of freedom  did no t follow au tom atica lly  u p o n  
the  a c t of liberation. Freedom  needed, in add ition  to 
m ere liberation, the  com pany of o th er m en  who were in 
the  sam e sta te , an d  it needed a  com m on public  space to 
m eet them  - a  politically organized world, in o th er w ords, 
into w hich each  of the  free m en could in se rt h im self by 
w ord an d  deed. (Arendt, 2000:442)
A rendt rem inds u s  th a t  any  d iscussion  a b o u t the  em ergence of civil 
society in E as te rn  E urope m u s t b ear in m ind th a t  the  p rocesses th a t 
b ring  a b o u t independence or liberty for civic assoc ia tions are  d istinc t 
from  those  th a t  m ay bring about, or in stitu tiona lise , the  autonom y, 
or freedom  of associations. W ith th is  in m ind, the  cen tra l inquiry  of 
th is  c h ap te r begins by replacing S chm itter’s first fea tu re  of civil 
society, ‘au tonom y’, w ith the term  ‘associational independence’; the  
m eaning  th a t  Schm itter, I suggest, in ten d s in any  case  to convey. 
Following th is  d istinction, the  focus of th is  ch ap te r is restric ted  
m ainly to an  exam ination  of associational independence  while the 
issu e  of associational au tonom y will be the  focus of C hap te r Four. In 
the  c u rre n t chap ter, the  aim s are: to consider the  rela tionsh ip  
betw een associational independence an d  dem ocracy; to es tab lish  the 
degree to w hich the  Catholic C hurch  in  the  Czech Republic could  be 
considered  an  independen t organisation; and , finally, to a sk  how  the 
n a tu re  of the  independence of the  Czech C atholic C hu rch  can  be 
accoun ted  for.
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2. Associational Independence and Democracy
W hat is the  rela tionsh ip  betw een assoc iationa l independence  and  
dem ocracy? Is civic independence im p o rtan t for dem ocracy? How 
m u ch  does associational independence from  public  au th o ritie s  
p ro tec t dem ocracy, and  how does it th rea te n  dem ocracy?
O rganisations an d  associations certain ly  need  to have som e  
independence  from the sta te , for otherw ise there  is little reason  to 
regard  them  as any th ing  o ther th a n  the  s ta te  itself.13 However, it is 
the  n a tu re , an d  degree, of th a t independence, th a t  a re  often critical 
for determ in ing  an  o rgan isation ’s capacities. Som e in terference by 
the  s ta te , d irect funding, for in stan ce , m ay s tren g th en  an  
organ isation ; indeed it m ay even en su re  a n  o rg an isa tio n ’s survival. 
At the  sam e tim e, th is  increase in stren g th  m ay p e rh a p s  be secured  
a t  the  cost of an  o rgan isa tion ’s freedom. The E u ropean  Com m ission, 
for in stance , h a s  a  large budget for the  funding  of environm ental 
o rgan isa tions w hich helps m any groups to carry  o u t th e ir activities. 
Yet a  glance a t the  com m ission’s w ebsite reveals th a t  th is  funding  
com es w ith the  condition th a t “the  p roposed  activ ities m u s t not, 
directly or indirectly, send  m essages w hich conflict w ith  C om m unity 
policies or be associated  w ith an  image, w hich is n o t in keeping w ith 
th a t  of the  in s titu tio n s .”14
13 For example, it is difficult to see how there was anything non-state about the 
Czechoslovak religious organisation Pacem in Terris regarded under Communism as the 
official Catholic Church. This association, established by the Communists in 1941, was 
monitored so closely by state officials that it carried out no independent activities at all. Its 
priests were appointed directly by the state, all of whom swore an allegiance to the state. 
Priests were expected to, and did, support state policy, for example policy on abortion. 
Publications, writings, letters, and speeches were all sanctioned by state officials. Rallies 
and parades were also organised by the state.
14 The European Commission’s funding document ‘Financial Support for European 
Environmental Organisations’ can be viewed at http://europa.eu.int/com m / 
environment/funding/ finansup.htm. The relevant section comes under point 3. ‘Exclusion
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Clearly, dependence on public au th o ritie s  can  have serious 
consequences for the  independence of o rgan isations. Larger 
o rgan isa tions m ay m ore easily avoid these  consequences by, a s  in 
the  case  of G reenpeace, sim ply refusing  funding  from  public 
au tho ritie s . Poorer o rganisations, however, do n o t have su c h  a  
choice. The issue  is of particu larly  significance in E as te rn  Europe 
w here a  notab le  feature of the non-profit sector is “the  overw helm ing 
dependence  of civil associations, particu larly  those  in social, health , 
or h u m a n  righ ts services, on s ta te  fu n d s” (Green a n d  Leff, 1997:73). 
D am ohorsky’s resea rch  on the  Czech A ssociation for the  Protection of 
N ature  acknow ledges its  increased  incom e after 1989. She 
m ain ta in s , nevertheless, th a t the  con tinued  reliance on the 
G overnm ent budget is “a t the  expense of objectivity of expression  and  
free speech, because  it m akes organizations censo r them selves” 
(D am horsky, cited in Potucek, 1999).
The case  of bo th  the  E uropean  C om m ission an d  the  Czech 
A ssociation for the  Protection of N ature illu stra te  well th e  paradoxes 
of pa tronage. This is w ha t H aberm as described  a s  the  “am bivalence 
of guaran tee ing  freedom  an d  tak ing  it away”; w here it is th e  “very 
m ean s of guaran tee ing  freedom  th a t  endangers the  freedom  of the 
beneficiaries,” (H aberm as, cited in  Stew art, 2001:165). These 
exam ples show  th a t in term s of the  re la tionsh ip  of civic 
independence  to dem ocracy, a  g roup’s financial dependence  on the 
s ta te  m ay very well stifle the  so rt of dem ocratic  functions d iscussed  
in  the  previous chap ter, for o rgan isations m ay hold b ack  from  overtly 
criticising the  sta te  for fear th a t it will im peril th e ir funding  
opportun ities . A ssociational functions aside however, a  funding  
p rocess th a t  m akes self-censorship a  ra tional choice is a  strike  to the 
very h e a rt of liberal dem ocracy; freedom  of speech. Likewise, any
criteria’. Thanks to Clare Coffey of the Institute for European Environmental Policy for 
drawing my attention to this.
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funding  p rocess th a t fails to question  assoc iationa l reliance on the 
s ta te  s trikes a t  the  h e a rt of an  even deeper regu la ting  norm  of 
dem ocracy; the  self-m anaging society.
While it is clear th a t  the  gran ting  of independence  to a  civic 
group can  improve or deepen dem ocracy, a t  th e  sam e tim e, it is 
obvious th a t  su ch  independence is only a  necessary , a n d  no t 
sufficient, condition of any  dem ocratising  functions assoc ia tions m ay 
have. If independence is a  necessary  requisite  of dem ocracy, it is also 
som ew hat paradoxically  contingent. W hat a n  o rgan isa tion  will do 
w ith  its  independence is unknow n, sim ilar to the  question  of w h a t an  
individual will do. Yet despite th is  contingency, desp ite  the  fact th a t 
civic independence m ay n o t deepen dem ocracy, Mill a rgued  th a t  the 
im portance of independence w as n o t ju s t  th a t  it w as necessa ry  to 
dem ocracy, b u t also th a t  it w ent beyond dem ocracy, or a t  least 
rep resen ta tive  dem ocracy. In represen ta tive  dem ocracy the  righ ts of 
the  m inority  give way to the  rights of the  m ajority. Independence  is a  
way a ro u n d  th a t  problem , giving people the  m axim um  a m o u n t of 
independence w here it does no h arm  to o th ers  (W arburton, 2001:43- 
61).
3. The Catholic Church: an Independent Organisation?
C an the  Czech Catholic C hurch  be considered  a n  independen t 
o rgan isation?  To w hat ex ten t does it fit th e  first of civil society 's ideal 
typical features: independence from the  s ta te?  The m ost im m ediate 
po in t of com parison  is w ith the position  of the  c h u rc h  u n d e r 
C om m unism , and  in th is  respect there  h a s  been  m u ch  space for an  
expansion  in religious freedom s.
We have taken  the  B ishops’ land , We have tak en  the ir
p ress. I have p u t com m issioners into every consistory . I
have closed all the ch u rch  schools. Now we are  g radually
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tak ing  aw ay their churches. We are  im prisoning  p riests .
And now ...ano ther im portan t m easu re  - a  new  wage law 
for p ries ts  ... We will decide who will get pa id  an d  u n d e r  
w ha t conditions. (Lidove Dem ocracie, 16 M arch, 1992)
This an n o u n cem en t in Septem ber 1949 by the  G eneral Secretary  of 
the  C zechoslovakian C om m unist Party, R udolph S lansky, illu stra te s  
the  conditions u n d e r w hich religious o rgan isa tions existed u n til the 
collapse of Soviet power some forty years later. W ith the  exception of 
A lbania an d  R ussia , the  Catholic C hu rch  in Czechoslovakia suffered 
the  g rea tes t degree of repression  in the  Soviet U nion an d  E aste rn  
Europe. While no t officially b an n ed  u n d e r  C om m unism , the 
c h u rc h e s ’ sub jugation  by the au tho ritie s  w as so wholly efficient a s  to 
ren d er the  ch u rch  virtually non-ex isten t. M onasteries, convents, 
ch u rches , an d  ch u rch  land  were nationalised  by the  S tate . C hurch  
schools were closed an d  Catholics in the  educa tion  system  a n d  in  the  
w orkplace were d iscrim inated  against. More th a n  15,000 m em bers of 
the religious o rders were sen t to p risons or cam ps. B ishops and  
p ries ts  were requ ired  to apply for s ta te  perm ission  to practice, and  
th is  w as regularly  refused. The c h u rc h  h a d  no econom ic 
independence, an d  all wages to p ries ts  a n d  b ishops were paid  by the 
sta te . The m ajority  of B ishoprics rem ained  em pty  an d  it w as virtually  
im possible to get a  place in a  sem inary  (Ramet, 1990; C uh ra , 1999; 
C lark, 1996).
The revolutionary events of 1989 b ro u g h t a n  im m ediate 
increase  in  religious independence. In add ition  to the  individual 
righ ts to belief an d  practice gu aran teed  in the  C onstitu tion , Act Nr. 
308 w as in troduced  in 1991, se tting  o u t the  position  of the  ch u rch es  
and  religious organisations. This ac t e n su red  the  ex trication  of the 
s ta te  from m any  of the  day to day affairs of the  ch u rch . It abolished  
the S ta te  Office for Religious Affairs w hich w as estab lish ed  in  1949 to 
supervise the  activities of religious o rgan isations. In its  place, th e  Act
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g u aran teed  th a t  “C hurches and  religious societies ad m in iste r their 
own affairs, in  p a rticu la r they  estab lish  th e ir bodies, ap p o in t their 
p ries ts , an d  estab lish  religious o rders an d  o th er c h u rc h  in stitu tio n s , 
ind ep en d en t from the organs of the  s ta te .” The law en titled  ch u rch es 
to “have the ir own p ress and  pub lish ing  h o u ses  an d  p rin ting  offices” 
an d  to “se t u p  an d  operate  their own h ea lth -care  facilities, social care 
facilities an d  also participa te  in  the provision of su c h  services in  the  
governm ent ru n  facilities.” Finally, the  Law allowed for the 
estab lish m en t of ch u rch  schools, the  right, w ith  p a ren ta l agreem ent, 
to teach  religion in sta te  schools, an d  the  righ t to provide services to 
the  religious in m ilitary e s tab lish m en ts .15 The 1991 Law h a s  recently  
been  replaced  by Law Nr. 3 /2 0 0 2  w ith the  in ten tion  of liberalising 
the  p rocess of reg istra tion  for ch u rch es  an d  conso lidating  the 
provisions in the  earlier a c t .16
15 See Article 5, 6, and 9 of The Act on the freedom of religious faith and the position of 
churches and religious societies Nr. 308 of 4 July 1991.’ The act can be viewed at 
http://spcp.prf.cuni.cz /aj/308-91en.htm .
16 These recent legal developments have proved unstable. The 2002 Law has sparked a 
new series of controversies. The most problematic aspect for the Catholic Church is that 
“under this law churches are not allowed to establish philanthropic organizations and 
charities as an integral part of the church, but have to register them as separate civic 
enterprises.” Karel Nowak, President of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in the Czech 
Republic, cited at http://gbgm -umc.Org/mission_Programs/ecg/2.19/czech/ 
latest_news.htm. It is unclear what the implications of this are for the traditional areas of 
church life, but there is sufficient ambiguity for the bill to have had substantial opposition. 
It was rejected by a majority of the Senate, President Havel attempted a veto of the bill, and 
on its final reading three of the four main opposition parties, the KDU-CSL, the Freedom 
Union, and the Communists voted against it. The Czech Ecumenical Council and the 
Catholic Church have lodged a joint appeal for a review of the legislation with the 
Constitutional Court. The Churches and others also oppose the Bill on the grounds that the 
registration system continues to discriminate against smaller religious groups, see ‘Act 
Nr.3/2002 Coll on freedom of religious confession and the position of churches and 
religious societies and on the changes of some legal acts (Law on churches and religious 
societies’ at http://spcp.prf.cuni.cz/aj/3-02en.htm .
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While these  changes have d ram atically  increased  ch u rch  
independence, the  significance of the  increase  is d im in ished  by the 
con tinu ing  failure of successive governm ents to reform  the  econom ic 
re la tionsh ip  betw een ch u rch  and  sta te . T his re la tionsh ip  rem ains 
governed by the  C om m unist 1949 law w hich placed in  the  h a n d s  of 
the  s ta te  the  m anagem ent of the  ch u rch  econom y. U nder th is  law 
p rie s ts  an d  b ishops are effectively regarded  as  civil se rvan ts, and  
receive the ir sa lary  from the sta te . Both C hurch  an d  G overnm ent 
agree on the  need to reform  the rela tionsh ip , b u t the  m a tte r  is 
com plicated by an  agreem ent th a t the  ending  of d irec t s ta te  financing 
shou ld  h ap p en  in tandem  w ith the  re tu rn  of ch u rch  property  
confiscated in  1949. In 1992 a  d raft bill to re tu rn  p roperty  to the  
Catholic C hurch  failed in Parliam ent. Ever since, the  issue  h a s  been 
the  source of d ispu te  betw een the  governm ent a n d  the  Catholic 
C hurch , an d  today the  Catholic C hu rch  co n tin u es to p ress  for 
re s titu tio n .17
From  the  view poin t of the  ch u rch , the  failure to secure  
econom ic independence is both  p rac tica l an d  symbolic. Clerical 
sa laries are  sm all and  well below the  n a tio n a l average wage. 
Furtherm ore , sa laries to b ishops an d  p riests , technically  regarded as 
s ta te  em ployees, have rem ained the  sam e while sa laries to o ther 
s ta te  em ployees have increased. Im portan t a s  th ese  m a tte rs  are , the  
issue  of s ta te  financing is m ore th a n  one of wages. The C h u rc h ’s lack 
of funds lim its its ability to p u rsu e  its religious activities. In th is 
context, a  crucial source of potential funding  is the  c h u rc h  property
17 On the recommendation of Vaclav Klaus, the then Federation’s Minister of Finance, 
church claims were removed from the draft legislation. Klaus announced his support for 
church restitutions in principle, but argued that the introduction of legislation for the return 
of church property should be done in conjunction with the ending of state funding to the 
churches. The general restitution laws passed so far contain blocking articles intended to 
prevent the state from selling to third parties, properties which the churches claim as their 
own.
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confiscated by the  C om m unist regime. “We w ould like to found 
schools a n d  charitab le  in s titu tio n s” explained B ishop H rdlicka “the 
c h u rc h  w an ts  to fulfil its m ission an d  w an ts  to have title a t  least to 
w h a t belongs to the ch u rch ” (interview, 1998). B ishop Lobkowicz 
argued  tha t:
The ch u rch  is completely free, yet there  are  som e 
problem s - the economic support. If a  bu ild ing  needs to 
be repaired  the  chu rch  is required  to pay  for it a s  a  
foundation . The chu rch  in these  in s tan c es  finds it h a s  
no sources to un d ertak e  any  large rep ara tio n s. In the  
case  of res titu tion  I could sell one hectare  of forest and  
th en  would have some m oney I could m anage the  
property  with. I could do th en  m y own econom y, 
(interview, 1998)
Finally, restitu tion  is im portan t n o t only because  of the 
possibilities it creates for increasing  c h u rc h  revenue, b u t  also 
because  it w ould provide an  independent source of incom e. The 
form er regim e’s insistence on being the  sole source  of finance for the 
c h u rch  w as a n  und isgu ised  strategy of control, a n d  th is  very recen t 
h istory  h a s  m ade the  chu rch  w ary of any  a rran g em en t w here it is 
dependen t on the  sta te  for funding. The re s titu tio n s  are  im portan t, 
a rgues C ardinal Vlk, because “in the  p ast, th e  c h u rc h  h a s  learned  
how dangerous it is to depend on the  S tate , on th e  political power... 
We w an t to be free. So w e  have to f in d  our ow n  fin a n c e d  (Esras, 
1993j, em phasis  mine).
3.1 The Failure of Church Economic Independence.
The 1991 law on the  position of ch u rch es  failed to ad d re ss  the  
financial re la tionsh ip  betw een ch u rch  an d  sta te . Ten years la te r the 
com m issions estab lished  to d raft the  rep lacem en t law Act Nr.
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3 /2 0 0 2  m et w ith a  sim ilar fate .18 Not only does th is  failure c o n tra s t 
w ith  the  success of Poland, Slovakia, an d  H ungary  in  resolving these  
issu es , b u t it also co n trasts  w ith the  optim ism  expressed  a t  the  
beginning  of the  dem ocratic period th a t  th is  m a tte r  w ould be swiftly 
resolved. Indeed, the  a tm osphere  w ith in  the  co u n try ’s first post- 
C om m unist G overnm ent w as sufficiently positive for com m en ta to rs 
to note th a t  “it is expected th a t by the  end  of 1992, p rio r to the  
im plem entation  of tax  reform s in the  coun try , th e  issu e  of econom ic 
re la tions betw een the S tate  and  the  ch u rc h es  will be se ttled” (M artin, 
1991:17)
4. Explaining the Obstacles to the R estitution of  
Church Property
Prior to 1989, the  C om m unist s ta te  ow ned approxim ately  96 p er cen t 
of real e sta te  in Czechoslovakia. The new  dem ocratic  regim e th a t  
cam e to power in 1989 rapidly in troduced  th ree  re s titu tio n  law s 
betw een O ctober 1991 and  May 1991 w hich re tu rn e d  b u s in esse s , 
in d u strie s , ap a rtm en t buildings, houses, a n d  land , to form er ow ners. 
Yet, m ore th a n  a  decade after the  collapse of C om m unism , the  
Catholic C hurch  con tinues to p ress  for the  re s titu tio n  of its  property , 
an d  rem ains dependen t on the s ta te  for its econom ic survival. How 
w as it possible th a t the  new dem ocratic regim e so rap id ly  re s titu ted , 
or privatised, the  bu lk  of its  property , an d  yet failed to re s titu te  the  
p roperty  th a t  belonged to the  Catholic C h u rc h ? 19
18 This is in spite of the fact that one of the central intentions of the Commissions was to 
address this issue. But eventually it was agreed to postpone the financial discussions to a 
later date because of the difficulties in coming to an agreement on an appropriate model of 
financing.
19 Identifying an explanation for the conflict immediately encounters a number of 
obstacles, not the least of which is the paucity of academic articles on the topic of 
restitution in general. Kozminski (1997) notes the lack of research on the topic. See
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C laus Offe’s explanation for the  adoption  of re s titu tio n  law s is 
firmly couched in a ssu m p tio n s ab o u t the  cau sa l force of ju s tic e  (Offe, 
1992). He argues:
It is evident th a t the  acto rs of the  old regim e have 
com m itted ac ts  w hich call for san c tio n s u n d e r  the  new  
regime. A general am nesty  for these  ac to rs a n d  ac ts  
w ould n o t appear acceptable to the  new  political elites, 
and  it would be vehem ently p ro tested  by th e  m ass  of the  
people. (Offe, 1992:195; em phasis mine)
As such , Offe sees the  m easu res of “deprivation, re tribu tion , (and) 
re s titu tio n ,” adopted  by political elites a s  ones aim ed a t  “com ing to 
te rm s w ith the  p a s t an d  achieving the  political u n ity  and  
reconciliation of society”20 (1992:196). E vident in these  rem ark s is a  
belief th a t  a  co n sen su s on h istorical w rongs an d  how  to righ t them  is 
beh ind  the  re tu rn  of expropriated property. However, Offe offers no 
evidence to su p p o rt h is contention  th a t  som e desire  for ju s tic e  w as 
the  prim e m over beh ind  decisions to res titu te . This conten tion , I 
suggest, needs to be tem pered in light of the  fact th a t  the  res titu tion  
law s draw n u p  by political elites acro ss E as te rn  E urope, explicitly 
excluded as  m any  of those who h ad  an  equally valid claim  to ju stice  
a s  those  who w ere  successfully  covered by the  legislation. Indeed,
however, Burger, (1993) and Cepl, (1993). As the restitution laws in the Czech Republic 
have returned vast quantities of farmland, forests, lakes, castles, factories, flats, and houses 
to their original owners, the apparent lack of interest in the topic is striking, given the 
potential implications the laws have for a variety of areas including the organization of 
agriculture, the farming of carp, the changing class structure, state housing and landlord 
tenant relations, to mention just a few.
20 Offe’s analysis is similar to Bruce Ackerman’s in The Future of Liberal Revolution’ 
(1992). Ackerman makes a distinction between what he describes as liberal revolutionaries’ 
and ‘total revolutionaries.’ Unlike their 1917 (or 1789) predecessors who he contends draw a 
clear line between the past and the future, today’s (1989) liberal revolutionaries’ open their 
ears to the past, acknowledge the injustices of the past and unavoidably open themselves 
up to a welter of demands to right these wrongs.
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som e of the  excluded were g roups who could arguab ly  claim  to have 
suffered m ost u n d e r  the  previous regim e, in  p a rticu la r Jew ish  
o rgan isa tions who, u n d e r the  successive au th o ritie s  of bo th  Nazism 
an d  C om m unism , were stripped  of the ir collective property.
Yet, despite  Offe’s failure to ad d re ss  cases  of u n su ccessfu l 
claim s to restitu tion , h is d iscussion  ends w ith the  qualification th a t 
efforts a t  “backw ard  looking ju s tic e ” will be tem pered  by 
considera tions of “forward looking ju s tic e ”, a  qualification th a t 
p red ic ts ju s t  the  kind  of criticism  offered above. The im portance  of 
the  idea of “forward looking ju s tic e ” is given all the  m ore su p p o rt by 
its  resonance  w ith the  d iscourse  of re s titu tio n  th a t  em erged in the 
Czech Republic som e years after Offe first m ade these  rem arks. Here, 
ideas a b o u t ju s tic e  w ithin lim its, or pragm atic  ju s tice , were offered 
by political elites in  the  Czech Republic to explain the  lim ita tions in 
the  adm in istra tion  of restitu tion .
4.1 Justice within Limits
In the  Czech Republic, considerations of ‘forw ard looking ju s tic e ’ 
serve a s  the  legitim ating factor for the  lim its p laced on res titu tio n . In 
the  case of the  Catholic C hurch , politicians con tend  th a t  the 
inability  of religious elites to recognise these  co n s tra in ts  acco u n ts  for 
the  con tinu ing  conflict over ch u rch  property  claim s. In brief, it is 
argued , politicians are pragm atic  an d  the  ch u rch  is not. The ch u rch  
does n o t recognise the  im possibility of a  com plete or uncond itional 
rectification of p a s t injustice. The ch u rc h  does n o t u n d e rs ta n d  th a t 
a lthough  politicians w an t to be ju s t  an d  fair these  considera tions 
have to be tem pered  by the necessity  to be practical, by the  necessity  
to lim it restitu tion . “[It] is a  very com plicated issu e ” explained K laus’s 
chief advisor J ir i Weigl, an d  he sensibly  added: “You c a n ’t re tu rn  the
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histo ry  back  ... you will end u p  in more an d  m ore com peting claim s, 
an d  you will never stop” (interview, 2002).
The lim its to res titu tion  are as follows. The th ree  res titu tio n  
law s in troduced  betw een O ctober 1991 an d  May 1991 covered only 
those  people who h ad  their property  confiscated after  th e  C om m unist 
p u tsc h  in 1948. The laws also applied only to individuals  and , finally, 
they  applied only  to individuals who resided in  the  Czech Republic. 
These lim its neatly  excluded the  chu rches on th e  g rounds th a t  they  
were o rgan isations an d  no t individuals, the  Jew ish  C om m unity  
because  it h ad  its property  confiscated before 1948, em igres because  
they  no longer lived in the Czech Republic, a n d  finally the  S udeten  
G erm ans, expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945.
These legal lim its prevented the righting of all p a s t w rongs. 
N evertheless, there  were g rounds on w hich to regard  them  a s  ju s t, 
because  m any  were enacted  in the in te res ts  of com peting m oral 
claim s. For exam ple, strong dem ocratic g rounds existed  for refusing  
to resto re  property  taken  before 1948. The governm ent before 1948 
w as dem ocratically  elected, w ith the C om m unist coup  only tak ing  
place in F ebruary  of th a t year. It seem ed justifiab le , th en , th a t  the 
ch u rch , along w ith o ther organ isations and  indiv iduals be prevented  
from claim ing back  property  before 1948.
Politicians argue th a t the  Catholic C h u rc h ’s refusal to 
recognise these  lim its is the  cause to con tinued  conflict over 
res titu tion . Miroslav Ransdorf, the  Vice C hair of th e  C om m unist 
Party  and  its  leading in tellectual light, com m ented:
These property  claim s, it w as very rid iculous. I w as here  
in the  Federal Assembly an d  m any of th e  claim s of the  
Catholic C hurch  were rid iculous because  they  w ent 
beyond the  confiscation m ade by E m peror Jo se f  the  II. 
(interview, 1998)
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And M iroslava Nemcova, the  ODS Shadow  M inister for 
C u ltu re , suggested a  sim ilar in transigence on the  p a r t  of the  church :
It is absolu tely  im possible to re tu rn  to som e original 
point, som e ju s t , righteous point, w hich  w ould be able to 
atone for w hat happened  ... it is possib le  to a tone  for 
only som e  property  in justice ...here  I see one of the  
origins of the  conflict. There can  be only re tu rn e d  ju s t  a  
p a rt [of the  property], because  the  s ta te  is n o t able to 
re tu rn  the  ch u rch  nor anybody  else, to the  original s ta te .
All th is  creates the  conflict... It is n o t possible  to re tu rn  
to everybody everything, (interview, 1998)
However, if the  c h u rc h ’s refusal to recognise any  su c h  lim its to 
res titu tio n  is supposedly  the source of the  conflict, there  is little 
evidence for th is  in the  views of Czech B ishops. W hen I a sk ed  the 
resp o n d en ts  in my interviews if they  sou g h t to claim  back  property  
prior to 1948, they were, (wearily) ad am an t, th a t  th is  w as n o t the 
case. Their answ ers variously were: B ishop Maly: “(No) It’s only a  
m a tte r  th a t  the  ch u rch  would have a  chance  to choose from  w hat 
w as tak en  aw ay in 1948. It’s clear th a t  the  c h u rc h  d o esn ’t  w an t to 
receive back  all property; only certa in  bu ild ings, n o t all m eadow s, 
no t all forests, no t all ponds, only w h a t it th in k s  is the  b est to give it 
good financial sources for social a n d  educa tional activ ities” 
(interview, 1998). B ishop Lobkowicz: “(No) T here w as alw ays a  lim it 
an d  we agreed w ith th is  - 1948.” Fr. H erm an: “For u s  the  optim al 
m odel w ould be no t to res titu te  everything. I t’s n o t possible, we know  
th a t .” And la te r in the  interview, he rem arked  again  “We know  th a t  
we m u st be realists. Before the F ebruary  C om m unist p u tsc h  of 1948, 
the  ch u rch  in the  Czech Republic h ad  in th e ir h a n d s  a b o u t th ree  an d  
a  h a lf th o u sa n d  buildings an d  fields a n d  we will res titu te , claim  
back, only w h a t w e  really need  for o u r service. I t’s ab o u t 600 
build ings n o t everything” (interview, 1998).
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O ther sources confirm  an  apprecia tion  on the  p a r t  of the 
Catholic C hurch  for these  lim its. As early  a s  1991, Radio Free 
E urope reported  an  an nouncem en t from th e  Czechoslovak B ishops’ 
Conference th a t it hoped th a t the  Federal A ssem bly w ould “not 
re tu rn  to u s  all [former] property” (Martin, 1991:18, em p h asis  mine). 
Radio Free E urope w ent on to add  “it ap p ea r s.... th e  R om an Catholic 
C hu rch  w an ts  only enough property  to be re tu rn e d  to it to cover the  
costs of its  pasto ra l and  social w ork.” M aterial from th e  E sras  
archives su p p o rt the  Radio Free E urope view. B ishop D uka, the  
C h u rc h ’s spokesperson  on restitu tion  com m ented  th a t,
In the  political parties and  in  p a rts  of th e  ch u rch , views 
of the  res titu tion  question  vary greatly, [however] there  is 
a  basic  co n sen su s shared  by the  B ishop’s Conference, 
the  Conference of H eads of Religious O rders, an d  the  
V atican th a t  integral, to tal res titu tion  of c h u rc h  p roperty  
is politically and  socially im possible, a n d  legally veiy 
com plicated. (Esras, 1993b)21
By 1996, the  C h u rch ’s position rem ained  u n changed . In a  rare  
interview  in the  Czech new spaper Lidove Noviny , the  leader of 
C atholics in the  Czech Republic, C ardinal Vlk took the  opportun ity  to 
affirm:
From  3,300 h o u se s  we require  a b o u t 800. Also we
require  ab o u t 240,000 hec tares of th e  fields a n d  forests.
In o u r biggest in te res ts  are  m ostly fo rests w hich w ould 
m ake a  traditionally  good econom ical base  for the
21 Bishop Duka was then Fr. Duka, Vice President of the International Conference of 
Heads of Religious Orders. 1993, and one of the members of the triumvirate elected to 
conduct negotiations with the government. (Esras Archives, 1993b.) It was a position again 
highlighted in 1993 by The Tablet who reported a statement by the Czech Cardinal Vlk 
making clear that the church would only claim property that was seized under Communism 
and that in addition, most property would continue to be used for educational and 
charitable needs. (The Tablet: 27 February, 1993)
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chu rch . We do no t require financial com pensa tion  for the  
property  w hich w as nationalised  d u ring  C om m unism  for 
the  public u se , for instance  to bu ild  a  high-w ay or 
h ouses. (Lidove Noviny, 1 February , 1996).
In my own interviews, I asked  Ja ro m ir  Talir, th e  ex-M inister of 
C u ltu re , if he felt the  C hurch  could be doing an y th in g  fu rth e r to help 
in  the  reso lu tion  of the  issue. He com m ented , “I do n o t th in k  so. 
They said  a  couple of tim es th a t they  w ould be hap p y  if the  s ta te  
w ould re tu rn  th is  property  and  they w ould accep t to get back  m aybe 
a  p a r t  of it w hich they would list” (interview, 1998).
N otw ithstanding these  views, new spaper artic les an d
politicians con tinue to s ta te  confidently a n d  w ith  no supporting
evidence th a t  the  c h u rc h ’s inability to recognise th e  c u t off da te  of 
1948 is the  source of the problem . “It is th e  sam e a s  if we w ould 
w an t to re tu rn  the  USA to Indians, th a t ’s w hy we c an n o t be ask ing  
for full res titu tio n ”, com plained the  well know n jo u rn a lis t Vaclav Zak 
in a  leading Czech daily. (Pravo, 16 J a n , 1997). It w as th is  general a ir 
of confusion th a t  led a  fru stra ted  Vaclav B enda to com plain  th a t,
If you look a t the  resolution of the  executive of th e  Civic 
D em ocratic Party  (ODS)..you find s ta te d  th a t  no th ing  
shou ld  be re tu rn ed  to the  c h u rc h  w hich h a d  been 
confiscated  before 25 February  1948, b u t  th a t  cut-off 
da te  h a s  never  been questioned  by anybody and
certain ly  it h a s  been em phasised  in th e  proposal
subm itted  to the  G overnm ent by the  c h u rc h  - so th ere  is 
no d ispu te  on th is  point. (Esras, 19931).
W hen I p ressed  Nemcova on the  po in t she  adm itted , “OK, they  do 
n o t w an t everything, b u t they w an t th a t  p a r t  (of the  property) th a t 
m ay ap p ea r to the  sta te  im possible to re tu rn  in th is  form an d  the  
s ta te  suggests the re tu rn  of different p a r ts” (interview, 1998). One 
exam ple she gave is the  fact th a t som e bu ild ings are  now u sed  by
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o th er in stitu tio n s  such  as  schools. Again, ak in  to C laus Offe’s notion 
of forward-looking ju stice , Nemcova po in ted  o u t th a t, “..because  
som e [buildings] have served for long for a  different p u rpose  ... to 
re s titu te  these  would m ake more dam age if it w ould be re tu rn e d ” 
(interview, 1998). A sim ilar point w as m ade by Karel Floss, the  Social 
D em ocratic Senato r who argued, “it is difficult to re tu rn  everything, 
because  the  m ost im portan t th ing  is for exam ple build ings a n d  they 
now serve a s  im portan t in stitu tio n s” (interview, 2001).
Nem cova’s concern w ith the  question  of w h a t new  injustice  
m ay be cau sed  by seeking to correct old in ju s tices is highly 
pertinen t. Policy m akers in the  Czech Republic incorpora ted  a  range 
of qualifications to the  general restitu tion  law s in  a n  a ttem p t to 
forestall any  un in ten d ed  consequences. One exam ple will suffice: 
w here s ta te  flats were re tu rn ed  to the ir form er ow ners, new  ow ners 
were prevented  from raising  prices on ren t- controlled  property. The 
principle of ‘forward looking ju s tic e ’ is clearly a n  im p o rtan t one; yet, 
it still fails to explain the  prevailing res is tan ce  to the  re tu rn  of 
ch u rch  property. The suggestion th a t the  problem  lies w ith a  ch u rch  
essen tia lly  too greedy or myopic is difficult to square  w ith  the 
em pirical record w hich indicates otherw ise. Indeed, the  Catholic 
C hu rch  h a s  been  a  p e rs is ten t and  distinctive voice in  argu ing  th a t 
p roperty  shou ld  come w ith responsibility, an  increasing ly  novel idea 
in today’s Czech Republic, (see Czech B ishops Conference, 2000).22 
And in the  case  of its own claim s to property , it h a s  keenly p u rsu e d
22 For example, the Bishops write “Private ownership, which respects the rule of law as a 
fundamental constraint on the creation of profit...and which is socially responsible ...Only 
such private ownership is able to make room for real entrepreneurship, creativity and the 
application of people’s talents for the necessary modernization of our economy. The still 
prevailing negative perception of the institution of ‘private ownership as theft’ (Proudhon) 
needs to be reversed if economic transformation is to be successfully completed. Ownership 
is responsibility and service; it has been entrusted to u s.” (Czech Bishops Conference, 
2002: Section 16)
56
th e  idea of ‘forward looking ju s tic e ’, tak ing  every oppo rtun ity  to 
ad d re ss  com peting claim s to ju stice . For exam ple, the  c h u rc h  h as  
m ade clear th a t  it w an ts to claim  only p roperty  th a t  is in  the  h a n d s  
of the  s ta te  an d  the  m unicipal au tho rities, a n d  n o t p roperty  th a t  is 
now in the  h a n d s  of private individuals. B ishop D uka  argued:
It is a  question  of co-operation an d  of justice. It seem s to 
m e quite  possible, realistic, to resto re  to the  c h u rc h  th a t  
p a rt of h e r property  w hich is now held  by the  s ta te  an d  
for the  ch u rch  to renounce th a t  p a r t  of h e r [former] 
p roperty  w hich is in the  h a n d s  of physical persons. 
(E sras, 1993b)23 
Sim ilarly Vaclav B enda pointed o u t th a t,
The ODS (Civic Dem ocratic Party) s ta te  th a t  re s titu tio n s  
shou ld  concern  only  th a t p roperty  w hich  is a t  p re sen t 
held  by the  sta te . We are in com plete ag reem en t w ith  it 
because  we too, and  also the  c h u rc h  in the  proposal 
(subm itted  to Government), exclude an y  re s titu tio n  of 
property  curren tly  owned by physical persons, 
com panies w ith foreign participation , a n d  a  series of 
o ther categories of ow ners - a  principle  th a t  h a s  been  
w ritten  into o ther restitu tion  laws. (E sras, 19931)
The ch u rch  h a s  also m ade clear its w illingness to accom m odate the 
p resen t in cu m b en ts  of build ings th a t  it claim s; the  m ain  in cum ben t 
is the  sta te . Daniel H erm an, The C atholic C h u rc h ’s p re ss  secre tary  
told the  Prague Post th a t  if real esta te  w as re tu rn e d  to them :
M any properties would re ta in  th e ir c u rre n t u se s  a s
23 At the time of this interview, Bishop Duka was Fr. Duka, and Vice President of the 
International Conference of Heads of Religious Orders. He was one of the triumvirate 
appointed by the church to negotiate on restitutions with the government. (Esras, 1993b) 
Duka is responding to a question by the Esras interview team asking if he agreed with the 
Bishops’ demand that land and forests should be returned to the Catholic Church.
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com m ercial or s ta te  office build ings or cu ltu ra l 
m onum en ts. The difference would be th a t  the  s ta te  or a  
private com pany would be paying ren t. S uch  a  b u s in ess  
re la tionsh ip  is superior to the  c u rre n t system  of 
subsid ies from the state ...T he ch u rch  w ould keep 
build ings su ch  a s  historic ch u rch es an d  m onaste ries 
open a s  cu ltu ra l m onum ents. For o th er bu ild ings su ch  
as  schools and  hosp itals, the  ch u rch  w ould ru n  them  as  
charities. (The Prague Post, 25 A ugust, 1998)
In conclusion, it appears th a t tensions betw een the  claim s of forward 
looking ju stice  vis-a-vis backw ard looking ju s tice  are  inadequate  for 
the  ta sk  of explaining the  continuing  conflict betw een ch u rch  and  
s ta te  over restitu tion . B oth  chu rch  an d  sta te  governm ent ostensib ly  
agree to the  principle of forward looking ju s tice , an d  yet w ith in  the 
co n stra in ts  of th a t  principle, bo th  pa rties have different ideas a s  to 
how res titu tio n  should  proceed. If ju stice  is, a s  Offe seem s to 
suggest, a  usefu l prism  th rough  w hich to analyse  res titu tio n , it 
needs, a t  the  m inim um , to be th o u g h t of in  te rm s of the  politics of 
ju s tic e .24
4.2 The Politics of Justice
The im portance of conceiving of ju stice  a s  s tra in ed  th ro u g h  politics is 
highlighted by a  consideration  of B ruce A ckerm an’s rem arks. While 
one c an n o t deny h is sage com m ent th a t  “the  b e tte r p a r t  of w isdom  is
24 Ellen Comisso's excellent case study of restitution in Hungary is primarily concerned 
with the politics of restitution and in that regard is by far the most successful account to 
date of what factors are important in deciding who got what, where, when and how under 
the restitution laws. Her article however, like the others, confines itself to the politics of 
those who had already successfully staked a claim in the restitution process, namely, 
individuals and foregoes an analysis of the politics of exclusion, in the main of organizations, 
religious or otherwise. (Comisso, 1995)
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to keep the  dem and  for corrective ju stice  u n d e r  con tro l,” (1992:4), h is 
analysis  w ould have been of m ore u se  if he  h a d  focused on the  
factors th a t  m ilitate again st the  adoption of th is  seem ingly sim ple 
panacea . Who shall be the  forces th a t  lim it the  dem and  for restitu tive  
ju s tice , a n d  who should  decide w hat those lim its a re  were questions 
th a t  dogged the  new Latin Am erican dem ocracies a n d  now  too 
E as te rn  Europe. The prescriptive elem ent of A ckerm an 's w ork is 
em phasised  over w hat could have been a  focus on parliam en tary  
in stitu tio n s , constitu tiona l courts , s tand ing  com m ittees, and  th e  way 
in w hich the  questions su rround ing  re s titu tio n  w orked them selves 
o u t w ith in  the  confines of those a renas.
In the  Czech Republic, the  heated  a rg u m en ts  am ong the  
governm ent coalition over the re tu rn  of confiscated  p roperty  go to 
em phasise  the  im portance of the  political process. The need  to 
com bine an  analysis of the  ju stice  of res titu tio n  w ith the politics of 
res titu tio n  is ind icated  m ost clearly in the  Jew ish  case, w hich show s 
th a t  a  political coalition th a t w as sufficiently strong  w as capable of 
sw eeping aw ay the  m ost tren c h an t opposition to res titu tio n . After the 
Second W orld W ar, the Edvard B enes G overnm ent in troduced  
legislation allowing for the  re tu rn  of Jew ish  Property  expropriated  
u n d e r  the  Nazi occupation. The process how ever w as very far from 
com plete w hen in 1948 the  C om m unists seized power, stopped  all 
res titu tio n s , an d  re-confiscated any  property  th a t  h a d  m anaged  to be 
re tu rn e d  in the  intervening period. In 1993, a  bill w as in troduced  by 
m em bers of the  Civic Dem ocratic Alliance (ODA) proposing  th a t  the 
process, begun  by B enes and  reversed by the  C om m unists , of 
re tu rn in g  property  belonging to the  Jew ish  C om m unity , shou ld  now 
be continued . The response  of K laus's Civic D em ocratic Party  (ODS) 
w as obstina te  refusal. To breach  the  “golden d a te” of F eb ruary  1948 
would, they  argued, clear the  way for sim ilar claim s by the  S udeten  
G erm ans. (Mlada F ron ta  Dnes, 4 M arch 1993). Additionally, the
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party  w as also opposed to re tu rn ing  property  th a t  w as now in  the 
h a n d s  of the  m unicipalities; the  vast a m o u n t of Jew ish  p roperty  w as 
of th is  kind. The issue  created  enorm ous ten sion  am ong the 
G overnm ent’s coalition p artners . They argued  th a t  the  M unicipalities 
h ad  no m oral right to keep the  property. “You c a n ’t replace 
everything w ith m oney” w as the response  to ODS p roposa ls  to 
provide com pensation  in lieu of p roperty  held  by regional 
au th o ritie s .25 A second a ttem p t by the  m ain  p arty  in governm ent to 
p a ss  sim ilar legislation w as m et w ith the response  th a t  it confirm ed 
the  “Bolshevik and  fascist” seizure of Jew ish  property . (13 April 
1994). Finally, in April 1994, after m on ths of political w rangling, the 
Czech P arliam ent voted an  am endm en t to the  Law on E x tra  Ju d ic ia l 
R estitu tions. The A m endm ent allowed for Jew ish  com m unities to 
claim  back  property  th a t h ad  been seized by the  Nazis, includ ing  the 
property  p resen tly  held by the  M unicipalities.(The P rague Post, 4 
May, 1993). The ODS h ad  backed down on w h a t h a d  been  portrayed  
a s  two in superab le  obstacles: property  held by au th o ritie s  o ther th a n  
the  s ta te , an d  property  confiscated before 1948.
The Jew ish  restitu tion  case is im p o rtan t because  it 
d em o n stra tes  th a t  ‘pragm atic considera tions’ in them selves can n o t 
lim it the  political agenda. Ultim ately som eone h a s  to successfu lly  
m ake the  a rg u m en t th a t these  pragm atic  concerns a re  sufficiently 
large to m atter. In the  case of property  belonging to Jew ish  
com m unities, w hat cam e to be regarded as  an  overw helm ing m oral 
im perative to re tu rn  th is  property  dem olished the  a rg u m en ts  of the 
m ajority party  in G overnm ent th a t it would be im practica l to a ttem p t 
th is  restitu tion . Certainly, the  difficulties in the  Jew ish  case  were
25 Miloslav Vyborny (KDU-CSL) in Parliament speaking on the opposition to the 
Government proposal (cited in The Prague Post, 23 February, 1993). Deputies from the 
three junior coalition parties stormed out of the voting chamber. (Reuters Eastern Europe,
20 March 1994).
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m any, b u t it w as a  question  of politics, of political will, a s  to w hether 
or n o t elites were willing to risk  the u n in te n d ed  consequences of 
m ak ing  exceptions to the  1948 border.
If politics needs to be given a t lea s t a n  equal em phasis  a s  
ju s tic e  in the  analysis of Jew ish  restitu tion , w h a t th en  of the  cases of 
re s titu tio n  to individuals? Here, there  w as little d iscussion  or 
controversy  over the  laws th a t re tu rned  p roperty  to previous owners. 
R estitu tion  to individuals w as in practice a  m essy  affair involving 
m any  of the  issu es  of ‘forward looking ju s tic e ’ a n d  legal or technical 
difficulties eagerly flagged u p  by politicians in the  case  of Jew ish  or 
Catholic p roperty .26 Yet, despite these  difficulties, no party  in 
G overnm ent ever suggested th a t these  were sufficient g rounds to 
b ack track  on the  prom ise to restitu te  private p roperty  to individuals. 
Indeed, the  g reater the  difficulties th a t em erged, the  m ore efforts 
were expended on resolving them . W hen public  concern  w as 
expressed  over the  delays caused  by com peting legal claim s, 
Km entova, Head of the G overnm ent’s R estitu tion  D epartm ent, 
an n o u n ced  th a t  “nevertheless, everyone m u s t have th e  righ t to get 
back  w h a t w as originally the irs .” (Prague Post, 16 F eb ruary  1994).
This com m itm ent to restoring the  p roperty  of indiv iduals is no t 
readily  explained by w hat C laus Offe describes a s  the  desire to 
achieve “th e  reconciliation of society” (Offe, 1992:195). Offe im plies 
th a t  the  res titu tio n  agenda and o ther ac ts  su ch  a s  lu s tra tio n  were 
draw n u p  acro ss E aste rn  Europe by politicians in tu n e  w ith the
26 Sophia Coudenove in the Prague Post discusses the difficulties involved in restituting 
property to individuals. The lack of clear records establishing ownership and the 
unintended consequences of a minimum application period initially designed to huriy up 
the process are just two of the many complications that emerged in the restitution process. 
(The Prague Post, 16 February, 1994). Many of the Czech papers carry stories of 
interminable court cases over competing claims, and the introduction of protective 
legislation to deal with the rights of present incumbents were ongoing.
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d em an d s of the  public .27 Yet, Offe gives no suppo rting  evidence for 
th is  view, an d  the  political agenda in the  im m ediate  a fte rm ath  of 
C om m unism  certainly  goes ag a in st th is  in te rp re ta tion . The logic of 
Offe’s a rg u m en t would suggest th a t  anger ab o u t p a s t  in justices 
m ight be expected to have been a t a  he igh t in  the  in itial stages of 
dem ocracy. However, a  glance a t the  program s of political pa rties  on 
the  eve of the  Czechoslovakia’s 1990 elections show s th a t  p roposals 
for res titu tio n  an d  lu stra tio n  (vetting) were n o t included  in the 
program  of a n y  political party . Furtherm ore , w here p rivatisation  is 
m entioned  in  the  p rogram s it is done w ith the  acknow ledgem ent of 
the  righ t to existence of o ther form s of ow nership  su ch  a s  co­
operatives (see Krejci, 1995: 279-280).
Indeed, the  evidence is m ore co n sis ten t w ith a  view th a t 
res titu tio n  to individuals h ad  less to do w ith ju s tic e  th a n  it h ad  w ith 
the  econom ic strategy of ODS - the  lead p a rty  in G overnm ent. All 
G overnm ent parties unquestion ing ly  accepted  the  ODS view th a t  the 
successfu l tran sitio n  to a  functioning m ark e t econom y required  the  
p rivatisa tion  of the  m eans of production; 95%  of w hich w as in the  
h a n d s  of the  sta te . R estitu tion  to ind iv iduals w as one m ethod of 
p rivatisation  an d  a  m eans of creating  a  m iddle c la ss  th a t  could, it 
w as hoped, carry  the  rap id  transfo rm ation  to a  m ark e t economy.
The question  of em igres an d  S ude ten  G erm ans is different 
again. W hatever econom ic, political, or m oral cap ita l w as to be 
gained from  res titu tio n s to individuals or to the  Jew ish  com m unities, 
in  the  case  of em igres there  are no m ajor g roups th a t  can
27 He writes that “a general amnesty for these actors and acts would not appear 
acceptable to the new political elites, and it would be vehemently protested by the mass of 
the people” (Offe, 1992:195).
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successfu lly  m ake the  case for restitu tion , a n d  none e ither in  the 
case of the  S udeten  G erm ans.28
In sum , the  concept of ju stice  is som eth ing  of a  b lack  box th a t 
needs to be opened u p  for a  fuller analysis of the  factors th a t  m ilitate 
e ither in  favour, or against, the  res titu tio n  of p roperty  to individuals 
or groups. The a rg u m en t th a t it w as ju s t  to re tu rn  p roperty  w as 
politically successfu l in the  case of the  Jew ish  C om m unity. Yet, w ith 
the  S udeten  G erm ans, who in theory  equally have a  claim  to ju stice , 
the  a rg u m en t rem ains for the  m om ent som eth ing  of a  political n o n ­
ru n n er. In the  case of the  Catholic C hurch  the  d em an d s for ju stice  
on the  p a rt of religious elites have failed m iserably; a  failure th a t 
Offe’s propositions regarding ‘forward looking ju s tic e ’ do no t 
adequate ly  accoun t for. O ther factors are  p e rh ap s  a t  play.
4.3 Public Opinion
In the  light of a  decade of failure to resolve th e  linked q u estio n s of 
econom ic independence an d  ch u rch  res titu tio n s , exp lanations have 
tended  to em phasise  the  an ti-C atholicism  of the  Czech public. This 
an tip a th y  is argued  to be the expression  of e ither the  h isto rical an ti- 
C atholicism  engendered u n d e r the  A ustro -H ungarian  Em pire or the 
m ore recen t h istory  of an ti-ch u rch  policies u n d e r  C om m unism . 
T hese views are  prevalen t am ong n o t only academ ics b u t also  key 
p ro tagon ists  in the  d ispu te  over res titu tion . J a n  Misovic, for 
exam ple, a rgues th a t  the  lack of su p p o rt for re s titu tio n  is a  
consequence of the  pub lic’s “h isto rical experience of Catholic 
activities” (Misovic, 1999:316). C ard inal Vlk explains “.it is the 
heritage of the  p a s t ...C om m unism  som ehow  rem ain s in u s  a n d  a  
certa in  anti-clericalism  is still here even after six y ears”. (Reuters
28 Czech-American organizations and other emigre groups in the US have appealed to 
Czech courts against the Government’s decision and have lobbied congress.
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E aste rn  Europe, 16 A ugust 1996). Karel F loss of th e  Social 
D em ocrats explained, “after the  revolution the  people w eren’t 
p repared  for the  restitu tion . An anim osity  developed betw een the 
c h u rc h  an d  the  people a s  a  whole, no t only the  governm ent. No 
governm ent w anted  to do th is  quickly.” (interview, 2001). And the 
Vice C hair of the  C om m unist Party  com m enting on the  ex-Prime 
M inister’s opposition to ch u rch  restitu tion  rem arks, “K laus blocked 
th is  [restitution] for m any years.... because he is very sensib le, the  
majority o f  the population in the Czech Republic are aga inst the  
property claims o f  the Catholic Church* (interview, 1998, em phasis  
m ine).
The argum en t th a t ch u rch  restitu tion  h a s  failed b ecau se  ‘the 
pub lic ’ are  ag a in st it should , however, be regarded  w ith  care. 
O pinion polls carried  o u t since 1991 show an  average of 50 per cen t 
or less opposed to ch u rch  restitu tion , w ith th is  figure falling to 36 
per cen t by 1996.29 Yet im portantly , the strength  of opinion e ither in 
favour or ag a in st res titu tion  is som ething th a t  is n o t rep resen ted  in 
the  polls. It is likely, however, th a t only a  m inority  of the  public  have 
any  strong  opinions on restitu tion , for it is difficult to find evidence of 
m uch  in te re s t in the m atte r outside the ra th e r  narrow  confines of the 
c h u rch  or the  parliam entary  arena. Indeed, the  lack  of in te re s t h a s  
encouraged  a  nu m b er of politically opposed jo u rn a lis ts  to agree on 
two issues; th a t  the  controversy over the  re s titu tio n  of ch u rch  
p roperty  “h a s  a ttrac ted  scan t public a tten tio n ” (O berm an a n d  M ates,
29 Polls by the Institute of Public Opinion Research August 1991 and February 1993. 
Another poll in 1996, again by the Institute of Public Opinion Research (IWM), showed that 
a majority of respondents were in favour of restitution. Less than half were opposed to any 
church restitution. 21 per cent supported partial restitution. 17 per cent favored restitutions 
of all post-1948 seizures and another seven per cent favoured restitutions dating back to 
the First Republic.
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1993: 46),30 an d  th a t while “the case a b o u t ow ner sh ip ... is legally very 
difficult ... people are no t going to ta lk  ab o u t it in  p u b s  (we m ean 
voters)” (Kauza Vik, Nevitelny Pes:30 Ju ly , 1996).
F urtherm ore , the  negative im pact of C om m unism  on su p p o rt 
for the  ch u rch  m ay very well be double-edged. C om m unism  could, in 
fact, be said  to have partly  s treng thened  the  C atholic C hurch  
because  it gave the  C hurch  a  m uch-needed  o p p o rtun ity  to advance 
itself a s  a  defender of the  nation. U nder th e  H apsburgs, forced 
catho lic isation  proceeded h an d -in -h an d  w ith  germ an isation , and  
there  h a s  th u s  alw ays been a  feeling in  th e  Czech lan d s  th a t 
Catholicism , despite its being the  m ajority  religion, is also a n ti­
national. Yet, du ring  C om m unism  a  n u m b er of key Catholic 
d issid en ts  played an  active role in the  opposition. F ran tisek  
T om asek, Vaclav Maly an d  Vaclav B enda are  ju s t  som e of the  figures 
who becam e notable for the  enorm ous resp ec t they  generated  am ong 
believer an d  non-believer alike, allowing the  rep u tab le  Radio Free 
E urope to rem ark  th a t after 1989 “...the C atholic C h u rch  could draw  
on a  deep well of goodwill am ong Czechs a n d  w as in  a  strong  position 
to re-estab lish  itself im m ediately after th e  fall of C om m unism ... m any 
people expected a  reconstitu ted  ch u rch  to play a  significant role in 
bo th  social an d  political life” (Kettle, 1995a). Today, key figures such  
a s  Vaclav Maly and  Tom as Halik con tinue  to in sp ire  m u ch  public 
affection.31
30 Jan Oberman and Pavel Mates beginning a commentary in one of the (generally pro- 
restitution) Radio Free Europe reports.
31 Despite support for key religious figures, general trends following the collapse of 
Communism show a declining interest in institutionalised Catholicism. In line with his 
general argument, Misovic attributes this decline to the church’s pursuit of restitution. The 
recent census figures certainly support the argument of a decline, showing a drop in the 
numbers of those claiming membership of the Catholic Church from 39 per cent in early 
1991 to just over 26 per cent in March 2001. Dramatic as the drop is, the argument that it 
can be explained by reference to restitution is difficult to reconcile with the drop in support 
for other churches not involved in restitution claims. Indeed the recent census shows a
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B ut if ch u rch  restitu tion  h a s  failed to ignite g rea t passion  
w ith in  the  public dom ain, th is  is no t the case  in  the  parliam en ta ry  
a ren a . Since 1990 the issue  h as  been the  su b jec t of h ea ted  debate  
am ong professional politicians and  w as one factor in th e  collapse of 
the  coalition G overnm ent in 1997.32 As w ith  percep tions of the 
pub lic ’s a ttitu d e  to restitu tion , the  po litic ians’ opposition, is argued  
to be an ti-C atho lic . B ishop Maly’s com m ent echoes th a t  of m any  in 
the  B ishops Conference:
In the  m inds of the  politicians there  a re  p re jud ices a n d  
w orries th a t the  church , if m aterially  secure , w ould 
becom e a  powerful institu tion , w hich w ould com pete 
w ith  the  political p a rtie s ...b u t it is n onsense . O ur c h u rc h  
d o esn ’t w ish to renew  the feudal s ta te  from  the  p a s t  - we 
are  living a t the  end of the  tw entieth  cen tu ry  a n d  the  
only goal of the  chu rch  is to have certa in  financial 
sou rces b u t no t to be again a  very pow erful in s titu tio n  
w hich is in com petition with political parties , (interview,
slightly greater drop in support for those churches not involved in the restitution 
controversies. The figures are a drop in membership of 32.6 per cent for the Catholic 
Church, 32.8 per cent for the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, and 45.9 per cent for 
the Hussite Church. Figures at the website of the Czech Statistical Office, www.czco.cz
32 The fact that politicians may place far greater emphasis on an issue than the public is 
not unusual. Here, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s account of the elite model of democracy 
captures well contemporary Czech political practice. (Cohen and Arato, 1992). On the elite 
view “there is no pretense., that voters either set the political agenda or make political 
decisions; they neither generate issues nor choose policies. Rather, leaders (political parties) 
aggregate interests and decide which are to become politically salient. Moreover they select 
issues and structure public opinion” (5) “On this model societal interests cannot be 
represented. Neither public opinion nor raw individual interests find representation in the 
political system” (608). The break-up of Czechoslovakia in December 1992 is a case in 
point. The premiers of Slovakia and Czechia, Meciar and Klaus, refused to hold a 
referendum on the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian State amid clear calls for one and in 
the face of numerous polls showing majority preferences for an alternative solution. (Krejci, 
1994:271-272.)
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There are  indeed grounds to su p p o rt th e  con ten tion  th a t  fears 
a b o u t C atholicism  are behind  the  political failure to res titu te  
property. For exam ple, Ja ro m ir Talir of KDU-CSL, argued: “[It] is the 
problem  of the  view of the  Czech political p a rties  on the  C hurch . If 
you are  talk ing  to represen ta tives of o ther political parties; CSSD and  
ODS, you can  see th a t  the ir opinion is th a t  the  C hu rch  shou ld  be 
poor an d  they  should  no t own any th ing” (interview, 1998). And 
Miloslav R ansdorf the  vice C hair of the  C om m unist Party, justify ing  
the  C om m unist opposition to restitu tion , explained: “We are  no t 
ag a in st financing the  activities of ch u rch es , we are  a g a in st the 
creation  of an  u lterio r econom ic basis  for political clericalism  in the 
Czech Republic” (interview, 1998).
5. Conclusion: The Politics o f Restitution
The a rg u m en t th a t ju stice , or public opinion, is the  m ajor obstacle  to 
c h u rch  res titu tions , is difficult to su s ta in . However, the  s tren g th  of 
politicians’ opinion is perhaps, a  w eightier factor. If it is the  case  th a t  
the  failure to restore ch u rch  property  lies in the  an ti-C atholic  
a ttitu d e s  of Czech politicians, ra th e r  th a n  the  Czech public, the  te s t 
is to see if these  a ttitu d es  have been  tran s la te d  in to  action , a n d  if so 
w here th is  h a s  happened . The nex t ch ap te r considers the  ex ten t to 
w hich politicians were guided by firm views on  religious res titu tio n s , 
a n d  the  ex ten t to w hich their actions were m itigated  by o ther 
concerns.
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C hapter T hree
The Politics o f Econom ic Freedom  
1. Introduction
The previous ch ap ter ended w ith the proposition  th a t  the  s tren g th  of 
an ti-re s titu tio n  opinion am ong Czech p a rliam en ta rian s  m ay be an  
exp lanation  for the  c h u rc h ’s failure to recover its  property. The aim  
of th is  ch ap te r is to exam ine the extent to w hich th a t  a rg u m en t is 
co n sis ten t w ith the  a c tu a l course of events su rro u n d in g  restitu tion . 
The c h ap te r concen tra tes on the question  of w he ther po litic ians’ 
beliefs ab o u t res titu tion  were a  guide to th e ir  ac tions or w hether 
o th er m ore im portan t factors were a t play. T here is no single accoun t 
of the  politics of chu rch  restitu tions. The descrip tion  of even ts in  th is 
ch ap te r is necessarily  a  reconstruction  of th e  position  of the  various 
parliam en ta ry  pa rties th roughou t the  cou rse  of the  res titu tio n  
controversy. The reconstruction  relies on new spaper artic les and  
reports. The final p a rt of the  chap ter is an  ana ly sis  of these  events.
The position of the  Czech parliam en tary  p a rties  on th is  issue  
varied over tim e b u t two broad political cam ps can  be identified. On 
the  one side, opposed to the  re tu rn  of c h u rc h  property , w as an  
alliance m ade u p  of the  right wing Civic D em ocratic Party  (ODS), 
suppo rted  by the  two left parties, the  Czech Social D em ocratic Party  
(CSSD) an d  the  C om m unist Party  of B ohem ia a n d  M oravia (KSCM). 
The final m em ber of the  an ti-res titu tion  group  w as a  late-com er to 
the  political scene, the  neo-fascist A ssociation for the  Republic- 
Czechoslovak R epublican Party (SPR). The p ro -res titu tio n  side in  the 
c h u rc h  debate  w as rep resen ted  by th ree  m ain  groups: the  sm all
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C hristian  D em ocratic Party  (KDS), the  larger C h ristian  D em ocratic 
Union - Czechoslovakian People’s P arty  (KDU-CSL) an d , a t  a  
su b seq u e n t stage, the  Civic Dem ocratic Alliance (ODA).
2. June 1990 - June 1992
The first post-C om m unist elections in C zechoslovakia were held  in 
J u n e  1990 an d  resu lted  in a  win of 68 se a ts  for Civic Forum , 15 for 
the  C om m unist Party, and  9 for the  C hristian-D em ocratic  Union -  
Czechoslovakian People’s Party  (KDU-CSL). (Rose, M unro and  
Mackie, 1998). In the  following year a  n u m b er of law s were passed  
re tu rn in g  properties seized from the C om m unists  to th e ir form er 
ow ners. The th ird  res titu tion  law, p assed  in  May 1991, h ad , in  its 
d raft stage, provided for the re tu rn  of lan d  to th e  ch u rch . Finally, 
however, provisions for the  ch u rch es were rem oved from  the 
legislation, on the  recom m endation of Vaclav K laus, the  F edera tion ’s 
th en  M inister of Finance. While K laus an n o u n ced  h is  su p p o rt in 
principle for ch u rch  res titu tions, a t the  sam e tim e he argued  th a t  the 
in troduction  of legislation for the re tu rn  of c h u rc h  p roperty  should  
be done in conjunction  w ith the  ending of s ta te  funding  of organised  
religion (M artin, 1991; E sras  19931). The issu e  of c h u rc h  res titu tio n s  
w as therefore separa ted  from the general re s titu tio n  legislation w ith 
the  prom ise th a t it would be dealt w ith a t  a  la te r stage.
ODS - Obcanska Demokraticka Strana (Civic Democratic Parly)
CSSD - Ceska Strana Socialne Demockraticka (Czech Democratic Socialist Party) 
KSCM - Komunisticka Strana Cech a Moravy (The Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia)
SPR - RSC - Sdruzeni Pro Republiku - Republikanska Strana Ceskoslovenska 
(Association for the Republic - the Czechoslovak Republican Party)
KDS - Krestanskodemokraticka Strana (Christian Democratic Party)
KDU-CSL - Krestanska a Demokraticka Unie - Ceskoslovenska Strana Lidova 
(Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovakian People’s Party)
ODA - Obcanska Demokraticka Alliance (Civic Democratic Alliance)
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N evertheless, the  G overnm ent m ade no a ttem p t to ad d re ss  the 
o u ts tan d in g  m atte r of restitu tion  to the  ch u rch es . F ru s tra ted  with 
the  lack  of progress, som e sixty depu ties from  various p arties  cam e 
together to d raft legislation in Ju n e  1991 a n d  M arch 1992. The 
legislation proposed th a t all p roperty  tak e n  from  religious 
o rgan isations after 25 th  February  1948 w ould be re tu rn ed . The 
d raft legislation received cross party  suppo rt, a n d  desp ite  opposition 
from elem ents of the  Governm ent, delegates in  su p p o rt of the 
proposed legislation m anaged to guide it th ro u g h  th e  app ropria te  
com m ittee stages. P resenting the bill in  P arliam ent, M otycka, a  
rep resen ta tive  from the KDU-CSL rem inded  the  A ssem bly a n d  the 
G overnm ent of their repeated  prom ises to solve the  problem  of 
re s titu tio n s  of ch u rch  property. He argued  th a t  th e  view point of the 
Federal G overnm ent,
C on trad icts w ith the  G overnm ent’s basic  declara tions on 
the  transfo rm ation  of the  econom y an d  the  creation  of a  
dem ocratic environm ent. The governm ent h a s  little 
in ten tion  of re-in sta ting  a  real ow ner to the  ch u rch  
property, it w an ts to do it ju s t  for show  while in  reality  it 
w ould reaffirm  the sta te  adm in istra tion  th e  sam e way 
the  to ta litarian  C om m unist regim e did a t  its  beginning 
(Motycka, cited in Lidove Dem ocracie, 16 M arch, 1992).
On th e  15th of April 1992, the  d raft law on th e  re tu rn  of p roperty  to 
the  C atholic C hurch  w as rejected by the  C zechoslovak Federal 
Assembly. The draft legislation had  gained a  m ajority  of su p p o rt in 
the  H ouse of People b u t failed in the  H ouse of N ations w here a  
coalition of C om m unists, Social-dem ocrats, a n d  neo-liberals 
successfu lly  argued th a t  if land  w as re s titu ted  to th e  c h u rc h  th is
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could  dam age the collective farm s crea ted  u n d e r  C om m unism . 
(M artin, 1991:62).34
3. June 1992 - June 1996
In 1992, the  Civic Dem ocratic Party (ODS) a n d  the  C hristian  
D em ocratic Party  (KDS) form ed an  electoral a lliance. This alliance 
w on the  m ost votes in the  J u n e  1992 elections, 76 sea ts  in  th e  200 
se a t Czech Parliam ent. Lacking a  m ajority, a  coalition G overnm ent 
w as form ed w ith Jo se f  Lux’s KDU-CSL (15 seats) an d  J a n  Kalvoda’s 
Civic D em ocratic Alliance (ODA) (14 seats), giving th e  new  ru ling  
pa rtie s  a  com bined to tal of 105 seats.
This coalition w as in a  strong position and , exceptionally  for a  
post-C om m unist governm ent, gained stren g th  th ro u g h o u t its  te rm  of 
office (Olson, 1997:181). Two factors were especially  im p o rtan t in 
con tribu ting  to the  streng th  of th a t coalition. F irst, th e  coalition 
m em bers were all com m itted to the creation  of a  free m ark e t a n d  all 
agreed th a t  the  privatisation  of sta te  a sse ts  w as a  vital p a r t  of th a t  
p rocess .35 Second, p e rs is ten t splits w ithin the  opposition p a rtie s  an d  
the  lack  of any  cooperation betw een them  gave the  governm ent a  free 
rein  in im plem enting policy. In the face of a n  opposition unw illing or
34The two-chamber Federal Assembly consist of the 150-member House of People, whose 
Deputies are elected in proportion to population and the House of Nations. The House of 
Nations consists of 75 Deputies from the Slovak Republic and 75 Deputies from the Czech 
Republic.
35 Jan Kavan, (CSSD), the Czech Republic’s Foreign Minister argued that members of 
Civic Forum were interested in a diverse form of property relations. However, after the initial 
euphoria at the end of 1989, it became impossible to advance these ideas in an environment 
where anyone who questioned the adoption of Western institutions was labelled as anti­
transition (or anti-democratic) by the political right. It was difficult in any case to criticize 
Western economic models to a population who had little experience of them. To paraphrase 
Kavan people said “why do we need to create new models when we already know that the 
Western ones work?’ (Kavan, speaking at the Ideas of 1989’ seminar at the LSE, January 
2 0 0 0 ).
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un ab le  to m u ste r any  challenge, the coalition, w ith th e ir com bined 
m ajority  votes, were able to collect all th e  key p arliam en ta ry  posts. 
The im potence of the opposition w as d em o n stra ted  by the ir inability  
to u n ite  even on issu es of great im portance su c h  a s  the  creation  of 
the  C onstitu tional C ourt, the appo in tm en t of ju d g es  or the  ru les  to 
govern the  C entral Auditing Office (Pehe, 1994a: 15-21).
In the  face of th is  decidedly w eak opposition, the  G overnm ent 
w as able to p a ss  various pieces of legislation w ith relative ease. If the 
governing coalition h ad  w ished to ad d re ss  the  m a tte r  of p roperty  
belonging to the  chu rches, th is  would have been  a n  ideal tim e to do 
so. Yet no a ttem p t w as m ade. D espite a  co n sen su s  on  policy 
regarding  the  transfo rm ation  of the  econom y, the  issu e  of ch u rch  
re s titu tio n s  w as an  a rea  w here there  w as s trong  d isag reem en t am ong 
the  coalition m em bers. While both  the  C h ris tian  parties , B enda’s 
KDS an d  Lux’s KDU-CSL, were com m itted to th e  rehab ilita tion  of 
ch u rch es  an d  religious o rgan isations in  Czech society, a  political 
project w hich included the resto ra tion  of property , th is  w as n o t a  
p a rt of the  agenda of e ither the  Civic D em ocratic P arty  (ODS) or the 
Civic D em ocratic Alliance (ODA). It w as difficult for the  coalition 
p a rtn e rs  to have these  questions tak en  u p  for debate  w ith in  the 
G overnm ent, let alone Parliam ent. A vote w ith in  the  cab inet 
determ ined  the  G overnm ent agenda and , w ith the  ODS a s  the 
m ajority party , it becam e easy for them  to contro l the  decision 
m aking  process. T hus, the  vote of April 1992 w as regarded  a s  finally 
closing the  issue.
3.1 The Velvet Divorce
In D ecem ber 1992, the  Czechoslovakian F ederation  broke ap art. The 
creation  of a  new sta te , the  Czech Republic, on 1 Ja n u a ry , 1993, gave 
those eager to p ress for the  re tu rn  of c h u rc h  p roperty  a n  unexpected
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opportun ity  to re-open the  issue  of restititu ion . At the  end  of th a t 
m on th  Lux, the  leader of the  KDU-CSL, com plained  th a t  th e  o ther 
p a rties  to the  coalition, in particu lar, K laus’s ODS, were ignoring 
prom ises th a t  h ad  been m ade w hen the  coalition w as form ed. One of 
these  w as the  prom ise to restore p roperty  to the  ch u rch es . Lux 
s ta ted  th a t, if the  ou tstand ing  issues in the  coalition agreem en t were 
no t addressed , h is party  would consider leaving th e  coalition (Lidove 
Dem ocracie, 22 February, 1993). Lux quickly gained su p p o rt from 
B enda’s C hristian  D em ocrats who argued  for the  in troduction  of a 
law th a t  would remove the  “u n ju s t lim ita tion” of the  righ ts of the  
C hurch  to property  (The Tablet, 27 F ebruary , 1993). The com bined 
action  of the  two parties generated enough  p re ssu re  to e n su re  the 
issue  w as reopened.
The two C hristian  parties had  successfu lly  m anaged  to re tu rn  
the issue  to the  political agenda, b u t th e  coalition w as u n ab le  to 
agree the  term s of d raft legislation. The C h ris tian  pa rtie s  were 
ad am an t th a t  the  ch u rch es should  have the  righ t to claim  back  
property  in the  m unicipalities, while the  ODS w as equally  a d am an t 
th a t  the  ch u rch  should  renounce th ese  c laim s a n d  lim it the ir 
req u ests  to only th a t property  owned by the  S tate . This proposal w as 
unaccep tab le  to the C hristian  D em ocrats, all th e  m ore so because  
som e of the  property  claim ed by the  c h u rc h es  h a d  in fact been 
tran sfe rred  by the  G overnm ent to the  M unicipalities. To deny the 
ch u rch es claim s to th is  property, would, B enda argued ,
deny the  very principle of res titu tio n ....S h o u ld  the  ODS 
also m ean  the  exclusion of th a t p roperty  w hich the  s ta te  
h ad  transferred  to m unicipalities in the  p a s t  two years, 
th en  the  restitu tion  of the  bu lk  of c h u rc h  p roperty  w ould 
be blocked and  th a t we could n o t accept. (E sras, 19931)
There were o ther elem ents of the p roposal th a t  were equally 
unaccep tab le  to the C hristian  parties in the  coalition. One of these
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w as K laus’s suggestion th a t  restitu tion  of p roperty  be slowed down, 
delaying the  re tu rn  of property  for a t  least th ree  to five years. The 
C hristian  parties  also supported  a  g radual p rocess of re s titu tio n  b u t 
du ring  w hich tim e the  S tate  would subsid ise  the  upkeep  of h isto rical 
c h u rc h  build ings and  su p p o rt certa in  charities. K laus, however, 
w ished to stop sta te  funding of the ch u rch es  before th e  com pletion of 
restitu tion . Again, Vaclav B enda com plained th a t  th is  p roposal 
d isto rted  coalition prom ises m ade betw een h is  p a rty  a n d  th e  ODS:
In the  G overnm ent coalition we h ad  agreed th a t  we 
w ould approach  the question  of c h u rc h  re s titu tio n s  n o t 
a s  a  separa te  problem  b u t a s  p a rt of the  tran sfo rm ation  
of the  whole ch u rch -s ta te  re la tionsh ip  w hich, w ithin  
th ree  to five years, should  re su lt in com plete political 
an d  econom ic independence of the  ch u rc h es  from the  
s ta te . The ODS s ta n d s  by th a t  opinion b u t, absurd ly , 
they  have reversed the  tim e-table, the  sequence  of steps: 
in stead  of m aking property  re s titu tio n  the  first step  in 
the  process of the  em ancipation  of the  ch u rch es , they  
are  proposing to m ake it the  la s t step. T h a t j u s t  is n o t on 
- we can n o t begin to m aking the  ch u rc h es  econom ically 
independen t by depriving them  of s ta te  subsidy  an d  only 
then , th ree  to five years later, p e rh ap s  resto re  to them  
the  property  w hich would secure  th e ir in d ep en d en t 
existence. (Esras, 19931)
The position of the  Civic D em ocratic P arty  (ODS) w as certain ly  
the  m ajor obstacle to the  re tu rn  of p roperty  to the  ch u rch . W hat gave 
th is  obstacle  its potency were the su b s ta n tia l political differences 
th a t  existed betw een the two C hristian  pa rties , differences w hich 
underm ined  the possibility of the ir com bining in  opposition to Klaus. 
B enda’s C hristian  Dem ocratic party  w as easily the  m o st right-w ing of 
all the  parties in  the coalition while the  KDU-CSL w as fu rth e s t to the
74
left. D espite B enda’s su p p o rt for res titu tio n , h is  p a rty  w as the 
c losest to K laus on virtually all o ther issu es , while the  KDU-CSL 
were alone am ong the  coalition m em bers in  th e ir concern  for welfare, 
social security  an d  m arke t controls. This c lo seness betw een the  right 
w ing C hristian  Dem ocratic Party  and  th e  ODS constra ined  the  
direction of B enda’s criticism . Instead  of d irecting  it tow ards the 
m ost powerful section of the  an ti-res titu tion  group, B enda’s criticism  
w as m ore com m only reserved for the g ro u p ’s w eaker m em ber, the 
o th er ‘civic’ and  (at th a t  time) an ti-res titu tio n  party , the  Civic 
D em ocratic Alliance (ODA). This greatly u n d erm in ed  the  possibilities 
for a  m ore effective debate  on the issue.
In M arch 1993, am id growing ten sio n s over ch u rc h  restitu tion , 
K laus a ttem pted  to close the issue. He an n o u n ced  th a t  buildings 
th a t  h ad  formerly been u sed  for social and  charitab le  activities would 
be re tu rned . Land, forests, and  real e sta te , however, would no t be 
re tu rn ed , an d  there  would be no com pensa tion  for these  asse ts . 
Ju stify ing  h is position, K laus w as keen  to m ake c lear th a t the  
conflict over restitu tion , “is ne ither a  question  of C hristian ity  or 
C hristian  ideals and  values nor of the  good a n d  the  p rosperity  of 
society .. It is exclusively an d  only a  concern  of p roperty  - an d  certain  
advan tages, political and  otherwise linked w ith  th a t” (The Prague 
Post, 2 Ju n e , 1993).
The response  of bo th  C hristian  p a rties  w as to a rgue  th a t the  
only way for the  ch u rch es to become financially  independen t from 
the  s ta te  w as the  re tu rn  of their property. Setting  aside h is u su a l 
reserve in criticising ODS policy, B enda angrily  denounced  the  
proposal, argu ing  that:
If the  ch u rch es are to becom e econom ically independen t 
an d  if the  re tu rn ed  property  is to service them , they 
can n o t be expected to lie for several m o n th s  o r years, 
deprived of the s ta te  subsid ies they  have been  paid  so far
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[and wait] for the  tim e w hen they will be given back  the ir 
ru ined  property. (The Prague Post, 9 Ju n e , 1993)
The conflict betw een the Civic D em ocratic P arty  (ODS) an d  the  
C hristian  parties deepened fu rth er over St. V itus C athedral, 
confiscated by the  C om m unists in 1954. As a n  im p o rtan t na tional 
m onum en t, the  ODS argued  th a t  St. V itus shou ld  rem ain  sta te  
p roperty  an d  be rem oved from the list of p roperties th a t  w as u n d e r 
consideration  for re tu rn  to the  Catholic C hurch . This new 
developm ent increased  the anxiety of the  C hristian  pa rties  th a t  K laus 
h ad  no real desire to re tu rn  the  property. The a rran g em en t in 
existence w as deeply unfavourable to the  C hurch , who were being 
charged four million crow ns a  year (approxim ately £238.000) for 
religious u se  of the  C athedral. The proposal, B enda poin ted  out, 
would m ake Czech B ishops the  only b ishops in the  world w ithout 
keys to th e ir own C athedral.36
The rem ainder of 1993 saw  ten sio n s heigh ten  am ong the 
coalition p a rtn e rs . Conflict over re s titu tio n  w as only one source of 
th is  tension . A nother source w as the percep tion  of bo th  the  KDU- 
CSL an d  the  ODA th a t K laus w as doing everything to deprive them  
of any  cred it for the  coalition’s achievem ents. Any a ttem p t by the 
sm aller p a rties  to carve o u t their own iden tities sep ara te  from ODS 
a ttrac ted  the  anger of Klaus. T hings w orsened  after the  Civic 
Dem ocratic Party  congress on the  27 th  a n d  2 8 th  November 1993 
w hen K laus openly a ttacked  h is coalition p a rtn e rs  for "d isrup ting  the 
coalition’s un ity  by engaging in a  s trange  pre-election struggle for 
vo ters’ p references.” (Pehe, 1994:20). By m id 1993, th e  th ird  coalition
36 The Government employ the Cathedral’s caretakers and determine when it is open. 
The fact that the Catholic Church does not have a set of keys to the Cathedral has caused 
some practical difficulties. Cardinal Tomasek, a short time after the collapse of 
Communism, wished to give a visiting dignatory a tour of the Cathedral. However, the 
Cathedral was closed, the caretaker could not be located, and the tour had suddenly, and 
embarrassingly to be cancelled (The Prague Post, 13 April, 1994).
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party , the  Civic Dem ocratic Alliance (ODA), h a d  com m itted  their 
su p p o rt to the  C hristian  parties on restitu tion . (CTK (Czech News 
Agency, 14 Ju ly , 1993). Welcome as  the  move w as for th e  pro­
res titu tio n  group, it m ade little difference to the  reso lu tion  of the 
issue , a s  the  ju n io r p a rtn e rs  rem ained unab le  to reach  a n  agreem ent 
w ith an  ODS seem ingly unw illing to even d isc u ss  the  m atte r, (see 
CTK (Czech News Agency, 4 February  1993; 3 D ecem ber, 1993).
Despite the  fru stra tion  of the  ju n io r p a rtn e rs  w ith K laus and  
the  growing feeling th a t they  were getting far less o u t of the  coalition 
th a n  they  h ad  bargained  for, there  w as still a n  in sistence  on the 
im portance of m ain tain ing  the coalition. Public opinion, on the 
whole, w as concerned w ith econom ic and  political stability , n o t the 
deta ils of p roperty  belonging to Catholic or Jew ish  com m unities. 
High su p p o rt for econom ic transfo rm ation  benefited  all p a rties  in 
governm ent. Clearly, a  unified front still h ad  its  advan tages. W hether 
or n o t the  coalition would be able to su s ta in  th is  u n ity  would 
depend, however, on resolving the res titu tion  question , a s  w ith  o ther 
issu e s  w here opinion w as seriously divided, election ru les  for the 
Senate  an d  legislation on non-profit o rgan isations.
In J a n u a ry  1994, K laus’s ODS finally p resen ted  proposed 
legislation on ch u rch  restitu tion . As expected, th e  d raft legislation 
proposed th a t only the  sta te , n o t the  regional or m unicipal 
au tho ritie s, w as obliged to re tu rn  confiscated c h u rc h  property , and  
th en  only property  th a t  w as u sed  for religious pu rposes. The ju n io r  
coalition p arties  rejected the  proposal, in sisting  on  th e  re s titu tio n  of 
all types of property, w ithout d iscrim ination . The d iscu ssio n s 
concluded w ith J a n  Kasai from KDU-CSL proposing  an  even m ore 
extensive piece of d raft legislation th a n  th a t  p u t forw ard by ODS. The 
possibility  of reach ing  a  peaceful reso lu tion  now  seem ed even m ore 
d is tan t. C riticising K laus and  the  ODS for the  chronic delays in 
resolving restitu tion , Orel, spokem an for the  KDU, com plained, “For
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over a  year we have been trying to prevent th is  issu e  from becom ing 
a  p re tex t to th rea ten  the  governm ent coalition ... b u t  it's  very 
difficult” (Reuters, 20 M arch, 1994).
In M arch 1995, the  issue  once m ore cam e to a  head . The ODS 
took its  firm est stance  to date  and  in sisted  th a t  the  re s titu tio n  
p rocess shou ld  be stopped. The ch u rch  could keep any  build ing  they 
already  had , b u t the  ODS rejected the re tu rn  of land  an d  po in ted  ou t 
th a t  som e of it h ad  already been sold to new  ow ners in any  case. 
KDU-CSL accused  K laus of in transigence. The opposition parties , the 
C om m unists and  the  Social D em ocrats, added  th e ir su p p o rt to 
K laus, m aking som ething of an  odd alliance a s  by th is  stage all of the 
coalition p a rtn e rs  w ith the  exception of ODS sup p o rted  ch u rch  
res titu tio n s .
W ith the  ODS supported  by the  C om m unists an d  the  Social 
D em ocrats, in  opposition to the  th ree  ju n io r coalition m em bers, one 
m ight have expected an  evenly m atched  ba ttle  to en su e , were it no t 
for the  fact th a t the streng then ing  co n sen su s  am ong all the  ju n io r  
coalition parties on restitu tion  w as m atched  by a  decline in  the 
p ro spects  of organising th is  consensus into effective political action. 
Kalvoda’s Civic Dem ocratic Alliance (ODA) w as rife w ith scandal, 
while B enda’s KDS struggled to overcom e divisions on recen t 
p roposals to merge w ith the ODS. Revelling in the  lack  of un ity  
am ong the  governing parties, Zem an, leader of the  Social D em ocrats, 
the  m ajor opposition party  suggested the  possibility  of a  coalition to 
Jo se p h  Lux should  the Social D em ocrats perform  well in the 
following y ear’s elections.37 This w as an  odd p roposal from a  party  
w hich h ad  used , and  con tinued  to u se  every opportun ity  the 
res titu tio n  conflict offered to criticise KDU-CSL. For exam ple, a t  the 
end  of 1995 w hen deputies from KDU-CSL h a d  again  proposed a  law
37 More specifically, they offered to the KDU one chair more than the ODS were willing to 
offer. Lidove Noviny, 27 January, 1996.
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to com plete the  res titu tion  of ch u rch  property , Z em an’s swift 
reaction  w as th a t Parliam ent should  w ait u n til a fter the  elections the  
following J u n e  before in troducing  any  legislation:
This problem  of the  restitu tion  of c h u rc h  property  
depends on the  resu lts  of the  com ing elections an d  I 
th in k  it is no t the  b est th ing  to d iscu ss  th is  problem  on 
w hich the  CSSD h a s  a  different opinion th a n  KDU-CSL.
V oters should  note th a t every single vote to KDU-CSL 
m eans a  vote for restitu tion  of ch u rch  p roperty  an d  of 
course  the  sam e is true  in  the  opposite way. (Zeman, 
cited in Lidove Noviny, 27 Decem ber, 1995)
3.2 Restitution and the Election Campaigns 1996
On 2 6 th  Ja n u a ry , 1996, the Social D em ocrats lau n ch ed  their 
election cam paign with a  crush ing  criticism  of the  pro ject to res titu te  
ch u rch  property. In highly emotive term s, th e  vice-leader of the 
Party, Karel Machovce, accused  C ardinal Vlk of “extortion of the 
people of th is  na tion” (Lidove Noviny, 27 Ja n u a ry , 1996). At the  sam e 
tim e, M achovce rejected the  view th a t  political differences w ith KDU 
over res titu tio n  signalled the unlikelihood of post-election 
agreem ents betw een the  two parties. Clearly, the  potential 
advan tages of a  post-election pact w ith KDU-CSL outw eighed any 
m oral m isgivings CSSD m ight have h ad  ab o u t en tering  a  p a rtn e rsh ip  
w ith the  m ain  political allies of w h a t they  described  a s  the  n a tio n ’s 
‘em bezzlers’.
The ODS, for the ir part, were equally critical of the  KDU’s 
su p p o rt for res titu tion  an d  were equally open to th e  possibility of 
m ain ta in ing  an  alliance w ith them . The ch an ces of e ither the  ODS or 
the  CSSD w inning enough sea ts  to form a  single p a rty  G overnm ent 
were slim, m aking it all the  more im p o rtan t to c o u rt p a rtn e rs  who
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m ight be willing to en te r or re-en ter a  coalition. The KDU-CSL w as 
the  obvious choice for bo th  parties, given th a t  th e  Civic D em ocratic 
Alliance (ODA) w as expected to do badly  a n d  th a t  the  KDS h a s  
a lready  agreed to a  coalition w ith the  ODS. K laus’s app roach  
con cen tra ted  on decoupling the  issu e  of re s titu tio n  from  the 
upcom ing elections. He com m ented, “I c a n ’t  im agine we could  solve it 
[the restitu tions] before the  coming elections” (Lidove Noviny, 29 
J a n u a ry , 1996). Instead , he proposed th a t  the  m ost efficient way 
forward w as to remove the  m atte r from P arliam en t an d  have the 
executive decide res titu tion  case by decree.
In M arch 1996, Vaclav B enda’s KDS finally m erged w ith  the 
ODS. W ith the  ODA in d isarray  an d  B en d a’s KDS on board , it 
seem ed on the  face of th ings th a t the  Civic D em ocratic Party  h ad  a  
definite u p p e r-h an d  in  the  coalition an d  th a t  they  were in  a  good 
position  to d isregard  the  preferences of the  KDU-CSL w ith resp ec t to 
restitu tion . W hat K laus’s ODS h ad  failed to reckon  w ith  w as a  public 
increasingly  tired  of being ignored. Em broiled in th e ir own 
squabb les, the  coalition parties h ad  p ers is ten tly  failed to pay 
a tten tio n  to the  mood of the public. A May 1995 opinion poll had  
revealed th a t 60% of the  public reg istered  m is tru s t in both  
Parliam ent an d  parliam entary  depu ties (Kettle, 1995b :72), a n d  an  
opinion poll by Stem  in J u n e  1996 show ed K laus to be considered  
generally “com petent an d  purposefu l, b u t  also a rro g an t and  
un responsive  to social problem s” (Green a n d  Leff, 1997:70) Yet, 
despite  signs of growing d issen t am ong the  e lectorate , the  coalition 
con tinued  to conduct the  election cam paign a s  if the  public scarcely 
existed, devoting their tim e to in tra  coalition a rg u m en ts  in s tead  of 
add ressing  the  criticism s of the  opposition (Pehe, 1996: 36).
The clearest sign of im pending electoral difficulty for K laus 
w as th a t  the  decline in public su p p o rt for h is  own p a rty  w as m atched  
by steady  su p p o rt for h is coalition p a rtn e rs . T his su p p o rt for the
80
sm aller coalition parties, added to the  sm aller p a rties  own lack of 
t ru s t  in K laus, seem ed likely to en su re  th a t  the  ODA an d  the KDU 
w ould adop t a  m ore forceful approach  to th e ir own in te re s ts  over and  
ag a in st the  in te res ts  of the  coalition a s  a  whole (Kettle, 1996:49). In 
the  ru n  u p  to the  1996 elections, for exam ple, bo th  Kalvoda’s ODA 
a n d  Lux's KDU-CSL com plained ab o u t the  1992 coalition agreem ent 
argu ing  th a t  the  dom ination of d ep artm en ts  by ODS h a d  en su red  
th a t  the  agreem ent w as d ishonoured  (Kettle, 1996:47).
On the  opposition side, the  Social D em ocrats were also doing 
well cash ing  in on the  n um erous p ro tes t votes a g a in st K laus's 
political style, specifically h is arrogance a n d  d is tance  from the 
electorate. In addition, they were gaining votes from  those  seriously 
d isillusioned w ith the  consequences of econom ic reform s. The ODS 
election cam paign h ad  concen tra ted  a lm ost exclusively on rem inding 
the  coun try  of w hat the  coalition an d  ODS in  p articu la r, had  
achieved. It w as an  election strategy  th a t left p lenty  of space to any 
political group capable of addressing  the  m edium  an d  long term s 
losers in the  tran sition  to a  m arke t economy. The political party  able 
to colonise th a t  space w as the Social D em ocrats, who h a d  grown into 
an  increasingly  disciplined force u n d e r the leadersh ip  of Milos Zem an 
(Pehe, 1997:8).
4. The 1996 Elections and Aftermath.
K laus’s Civic Dem ocratic Party lost its m ajority  in  th e  J u n e  1996 
elections. This loss of confidence in the  ru ling  p a rty  benefited the  
Social D em ocrats, who gained a  swing of su p p o rt th a t  left them  the 
second largest party  in Parliam ent. The m ajority  of politicians in  both  
the  ODS an d  the  Social Dem ocratic Party  rem ained , a s  they  always 
h ad  been, firmly opposed to the  re tu rn  of c h u rc h  property . Despite 
th is  co n sen su s  am ong politicians from the  two largest parties,
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strangely  enough res titu tion  becam e once again  the  m ain  item  on the 
political agenda. W hat placed the issue  of c h u rc h  p roperty  centre- 
stage w as the new  line u p  of political forces. W ith a  win of 61 sea ts  in 
the  new  P arliam ent ag a in st the  coalition 's 99, the  Social D em ocrats 
now held the  key to the  stability  of any  fu tu re  governm ent. Lengthy 
negotiations betw een the  ODS coalition a n d  the  opposition concluded 
in the  form ation of a  m inority governm ent. T hese negotiations saw  
K laus re-appoin ted  Prem ier while Z em an’s Social D em ocrats took a  
n u m b er of key positions, including the S peaker's  ch a ir an d  chair of a  
th ird  of all Parliam entary  Com m ittees (Agence F rance P ress 
In ternational, 22 Ju ly , 1996). All in all, th is  a rran g em en t could well 
have been  enough to en su re  som e elem ent of political stability. The 
CSSD h ad  done well o u t of the  various ro u n d s  of ho rse-trad ing , an d  
w ith m any  new  challenges to occupy them , a  certa in  am o u n t of 
equanim ity  betw een them  an d  the  four pa rtie s  in  G overnm ent w as 
expected.
The m ain  obstacles to political stab ility  were the  recurring  
ten sions in  K laus’s re la tionsh ip  w ith h is  own coalition p a rtn e rs . The 
d issa tisfac tion  th a t p roduced th is  tension  could no longer be ignored. 
B oth of the  coalition p a rtn e rs  h ad  perform ed well in the  J u n e  1996 
elections. The increasing  popularity  of the  Social D em ocrats h ad  no t 
dam aged Lux’s party  an d  a  win of 13 se a ts  secu red  KDU-CSL the 
th ird  strongest position in Parliam ent. In addition , a lthough  the 
coalition still seem ed se t to survive, a  m ajor change of a ttitu d e  had  
nevertheless come abou t am ongst the  ju n io r  p a rtn e rs  who h a d  come 
to the  rea lisation  th a t "being seen  a s  allies of the  ODS m ay no t 
alw ays be to the ir advantage” (Pehe, 1997:10). K laus could no longer 
operate  on the  assu m p tio n  th a t the  leaders of the  m inority  pa rties in 
G overnm ent, Lux an d  Kalvoda, w ould willingly stay  on board  
regard less of how m any tim es K laus acted  a g a in st th e ir in terests .
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Therefore it w as vital th a t Klaus now sough t to regain  the  confidence 
of h is ju n io r  parties.
However, for K laus, in the  vulnerab le  position  of h ead  of a  
m inority  G overnm ent, th is  w as no easy  task . K laus h a d  got h im self 
into the  aw kw ard s itua tion  of being hostage to h is  coalition p a rtn e rs  
an d  on the  o ther h an d  to h is opposition. A final issu e  th a t  m ade 
difficult the  ta sk  of securing  political stab ility  w as the  fact th a t  bo th  
local elections an d  senate  elections were schedu led  in the  upcom ing  
session . No political party  h ad  h ad  a  decisive victory in Ju n e , an d  
th is  considerably  upped  the  s takes of the  S enate  e lections in 
November 1996 (Olson, 1997, 178).
From  the viewpoint of the  ju n io r p a rtn e rs  in  the  coalition, if 
K laus would no t agree to the ir dem ands w hen  he w as in  a  strong  
position, the ir only option w as to p u sh  th ese  d em an d s w hen  h is 
position  w as w eakened. This stra tegy  b ro u g h t critic ism  from  the 
m edia who saw  it a s  unseem ly  th a t a  m inority  coalition p a rtn e r  
shou ld  take  advantage of the  ODS in th is  way a n d  im m oral th a t  su ch  
a  party  shou ld  endanger the  stability  of a  G overnm ent of w hich  they 
were part. The pro-K laus new spaper, Lidove Noviny, com plained 
bitterly  th a t, “after the  elections KDU-CSL u se d  the  in secu rity  of 
ODS an d  p ressed  the  d iscussion  w ithou t end  ab o u t re s titu tio n ” 
(Lidove Noviny, 17 Ju ly , 1996). Nevitelny Pes critic ised the  “p re ssu re  
of the  peaceful power of Lux” (Nevitelny Pes, 19 Ju ly , 1996), a n d  a  
la te r la te r article in the  paper com plained, “it looked very silly w hen 
Lux b rough t u p  th is  case  of re tu rn in g  the  fo rests a t  the  m om ent 
w hen the  coalition h ad  their nose two a n d  a  h a lf m illim etres above 
the  surface. W hat he b rough t u p  m ade w aves a n d  those  w aves 
b rough t w ater right into the  nose of the coalition” (Nevitelny Pes, 30 
Ju ly  1996).
N onetheless, the  KDU rem ained  sensitive to the ir political 
opportun ity  an d  in the  im m ediate a fte rm ath  of the  1996 elections
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they  p u t fierce p ressu re  on the ODS to accede to th e ir concerns .38 
Sheer political survival an d  no t any  change in  belief saw  th e  ODS 
eventually  take  action on the  issue  of th e  re s titu tio n  of C hurch  
property. This m arked  the beginning of w h a t becam e know n a s  the 
‘R estitu tion  Full S top’ talks. An agreem ent w as w orked o u t u n d e r 
w hich K laus com m itted him self to the  re tu rn  of p roperty  a n d  the 
phasing  o u t of sta te  subsid ies to the  chu rch . Following th is , on the 
2 9 th  J u n e  1996, the  sam e m onth  of the  elections, ODS deputy  
ch a irm an  J a n  S trasky  announced  th a t  the  G overnm ent w ould re tu rn  
to the  Catholic C hurch  the  forest land  it claim ed a n d  th a t, over the 
four years after the  re tu rn , s ta te  subsid ies w ould be p h ased  o u t by a  
reduction  of 25% each year.39 The real e s ta te  belonging to the 
Catholic C hurch  w as calcu lated  an d  the  governm ent pledged to 
re tu rn  to the  C hurch , if it asked  for it, approxim ately  175,000 
h ec ta res  of land , of w hich 50,000 belonged to m onaste ries and  
120,000 belonged to dioceses. It also prom ised  to re tu rn  C om m unist- 
seized ch u rch  properties now in sta te  h a n d s , if no “im p o rtan t public 
in te re s ts” were affected (Luxmoore, 1997:96).40
The speed w ith w hich the  G overnm ent w as eventually  able to 
w ork o u t th is  agreem ent cas ts  serious d o u b t on a rg u m en ts  th a t  a  
range of in su rm oun tab le  pragm atic considera tions, public  opinion, 
or deep-seated  ideological differences lay beh ind  the  delay to a  
reso lu tion  of the  restitu tion  conflict. At th e  end  of the  day, sheer
38 Not without resistance however. Unsurprisingly, there were efforts to limit the extent to 
which KDU could capitalise on these political opportunities. For example, Vaclav 
Belohradsky ODS, in an article in Lidove Noviny argued, “If KDU-CSL is stating this problem 
as its condition to be in the Government, it is trying to force its minority interest to the 
majority of this country. In this case it would be a perfect example of consequence of lower 
level of democracy in which we will have to live after the elections.” Lidove Noviny, Bez 
parlamentu? (Without the Parliament?) 29 June 1996.
39 “The agreement also allowed for the return of real estate to a host of other civic 
organizations” Reuters, Eastern Europe, 1 July 1996.
40 See also CTK News Agency, 29 June, 1996
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political survival served a s  the  m other of political invention  in  the  
face of w ha t h ad  previously been regarded a s  in su p erab le  obstacles.
B u t if the  a b o u t-tu rn  on res titu tion  w as in ten d ed  to mollify 
K laus’s coalition p a rtn e rs , it h ad  the opposite effect on the  Social 
D em ocrats. Of the  various ideological divisions betw een the  ODS an d  
the  Social D em ocrats, the  issue  of the re tu rn  of C h u rch  p roperty  w as 
the  m ost divisive. The two o ther a reas  w here there  were su b s ta n tia l 
differences of opinion, tu ition  fees for U niversity a n d  reform s in  the  
h ea lth  sector, were no t in su rm oun tab le  (The F inancial T im es, 22 
Ju ly , 1996). The proposed re tu rn  of land  an d  bu ild ings to th e  c h u rc h  
w as still vigorously opposed by the  Social D em ocrats, the  
C om m unist Party, and  the  extrem e right R epublicans. N either the  
R epublicans or the  C om m unists w ished the  c h u rc h  to have any  
p roperty  back, arguing  th a t it should  rem ain  in  the  h a n d s  of the  
s ta te . K laus’s stra tegy  w as to bypass the  h a za rd s  of open debate . He 
decided th a t  the  G overnm ent would issue  a n  executive o rder to 
re tu rn  the  property.
K laus m ade no a ttem p t to soften the  position  of th e  Social 
D em ocrats. Indeed the  Governm ent' s a n n o u n cem en t on 2 9 th  J u n e  
w as w ithou t any  preceding d iscussion  w ith  the  religious bodies or 
w ith the  Social D em ocrats who were no t even been  notified of the  
G overnm ent's in ten tions (CTK (Czech News Agency), 29 Ju n e , 1996). 
The CSSD were furious and  a  m ajor show dow n w as schedu led  for 
23rd  Ju ly  w hen the  G overnm ent w as due  to p resen t its  p rogram m e 
to Parliam ent, including its proposals on re s titu tio n  a n d  th e n  face a  
vote of confidence. K laus’s s options were lim ited. He could n o t hope 
to p lease  bo th  h is coalition party  and  h is  opposition a n d  so the  
critical question  w as w hich of h is two adversaries, CSSD or th e  KDU, 
w as likely to do him  m ost dam age. Of the two p arties , KDU h a d  far 
less to lose in refusing  to sup p o rt the  coalition. Z em an, on th e  o th er 
han d , w ith  h is recently  acquired  role of ‘k ingm aker’ w ould have to
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b ear responsibility  for the  inevitable in stab ility  th a t  w ould ensu re  
from a  no confidence vote in the  G overnm ent. The optim al strategy 
w as to take  a  gam ble th a t  Zem an would be re lu c ta n t to ap p ea r a s  a  
w recker.
23rd  Ju ly  w as the  date  se t for the  vote of confidence in the  
governm ent's program m e. In the  ru n  u p  to th is  first te s t of the  
m inority  governm ent’s ability to survive, all p a rties  s taked  their 
claim s. The Social D em ocrats m ade it clear th a t  th e ir confidence in 
the  G overnm ent would depend partly  on how  P arliam en t voted on 
the  proposed re tu rn  of forest land  to the C hurch . C asting  them selves 
as  the  gu a rd ian s of dem ocracy, Pavel D ostal declared, “the 
governm ent can n o t dispose of sta te  p roperty  a s  if it belonged to the 
executive” (Agence F rance Presse In terna tional., 21 Ju ly , 1996). The 
President, Vaclav Havel, who had  already expended enorm ous effort 
in estab lish ing  a  m inority G overnm ent b ro u g h t the  leader of the 
opposition, Zem an, together w ith the  th ree  leaders of the  coalition in 
talks. Havel expressed  h is  preference th a t the  opposition show  their 
confidence in the  G overnm ent an d  s tre ssed  th a t  th e  in te re s ts  of the  
coun try  were a t  stake  (Agence France Presse In terna tional., 21 Ju ly , 
1996; The F inancial Times, 22 Ju ly , 1996). Havel’s in tervention  w as 
im portan t in increasing  the  p ressu re  on Z em an. However, only one 
day before the  vote, Z em an w as arguing  th a t  a  no-confidence vote in 
the  G overnm ent “would no t be a  tragedy” (The F inancial Times, 22 
Ju ly , 1996). On the  sam e day, the  ODS a n n o u n ced  th a t  if the  
coalition did no t receive a  vote of confidence, they  w ould find it 
“unaccep tab le  to take p a rt in the form ation of a n o th e r  governm ent” 
an d  consequently , the Social D em ocrats shou ld  th en  b ear “the  entire  
responsib ility  for the  destab ilisation  of the  coun try 's  dom estic 
political s itua tion  (Agence France Presse In terna tional, 22 Ju ly , 
1996).
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It w as clear th a t  K laus’s strategy  tow ards the  Social D em ocrats 
w as no t bearing  fruit; the  party  would n o t budge. Z em an con tinued  
to in s is t th a t  the  G overnm ent be b anned  from  re tu rn in g  lan d  to the 
C hurch  an d  confirm ed th a t h is pa rty  w ould be u n ab le  to offer the ir 
su p p o rt w ithou t th is  guaran tee . W hen P arliam en t reconvened on the 
T uesday, Z em an a ttem pted  to place on the  agenda  a  reso lu tion  
opposed to the  executive re tu rn  of ch u rch  property . The assem bly  
voted ag a in st placing the  m atte r on the  agenda  a n d  in stead  agreed  to 
postpone the  vote of confidence u n til th e  following day, allowing 
Havel am ple tim e to ad d ress  Parliam ent a n d  to a ttem p t to p e rsu ad e  
depu ties th a t  the  coalition w as “a  well qualified team ” an d  th a t  the 
“G overnm ent's objectives are close to m any  opposition d ep u ties”. 
Finally, by the  purposefu l absence of d ep u ties  from  Sladek 's 
R epublican Party, K laus scraped  th rough  w inning h is  vote of 
confidence w ith ju s t  enough votes to allow h im  to proceed w ith  h is 
program m e for G overnm ent.
The following Ja n u a ry  1997, the  M inister of C u ltu re  (KDU- 
CSL) b rough t to the  G overnm ent a  list of p roperty  to be re tu rn e d  to 
the  ch u rch  by order of the  executive (Pravo, 16 Ja n u a ry , 1997). For 
those who were in favour of restitu tion , th ings seem ed, once a n d  for 
all, to have reached  a  favourable conclusion. Yet, in  th e  event, the 
executive proved inordinately  slow in  reach ing  decisions a b o u t w hat 
property  shou ld  be re tu rn ed  from the  list. By the  end  of the  y ear only 
200 item s h ad  even been approved for re s titu tio n  by th e  G overnm ent 
(The A ssociated Press, 6 May 1998).
4.1 The Collapse o f the Coalition Government
In November 1997, the  K laus-led coalition governm ent finally 
collapsed. The KDU-CSL h ad  becom e increasingly  d is tan ced  from  the 
ODS an d  the  growing storm  of financial scan d a l assoc ia ted  w ith  ODS
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m in iste rs  allowed the  KDU to opt ou t of the  coalition w ith their 
dignity in tact. Havel appoin ted  Jo se f Tosovsky, h is  favoured 
cand idate , to head  a  care taker G overnm ent. And Tosovsky, acting on 
the  conditions agreed u n d e r K laus’s governm ent, finally began to 
im plem ent the  executive decrees th a t  w ould re tu rn  property  to the  
Catholic C hurch . A lthough the  in terim  G overnm ent w as sym pathetic  
to the  idea of addressing  the ou tstand ing  concerns of the  chu rch , as 
a  tem porary  adm in istra tion  it w as only able to p repare  som e 
p roposals for the  nex t G overnm ent an d  to carry  th ro u g h  legislation 
a lready in existence. M eeting leaders from  tw enty  th ree  religious 
groups an d  ch u rch es in F ebruary  of 1998, Tosovsky’s M inister for 
C ulture, S tropnicky, m ade clear h is com m itm ent to developing 
constructive  rela tions betw een the s ta te  a n d  the  ch u rch . He regarded 
a s  a  priority  an  increase  in  c h u rch m en ’s sa laries. At the  sam e tim e, 
the  sho rt-te rm  care taker governm ent w ould be u n ab le  to deliver a  
solution on the issue  of restitu tion : “It is n o t rea listic”, Stropnicky 
sta ted , “to expect th is  governm ent to m ake a  b reak th ro u g h  in the 
re la tions betw een ch u rch es and  the s ta te ” (CTK (Czech News 
Agency), 26 February , 1998).
By the  end  of its adm in istra tion , a p a r t  from designating  a  
n u m b er of build ings to be transferred , the  Tosovsky governm ent had  
no t actually  m anaged to re tu rn  any  properties to the  church . The 
C hu rch 's  only chance of having the  res titu tio n  issu e  resolved now lay 
w ith the  upcom ing election and  the  chance  of a  new  cen tre-righ t 
G overnm ent, one in w hich the  KDU-CSL h ad  sufficient political 
weight. A nu m b er of factors com bined to m ake th is  outcom e an  
increasingly  rem ote possibility. The m em ory of th e ir rela tionsh ip  in 
G overnm ent w as apparen tly  too recen t for leaders of the  recen t 
coalition parties to p u t aside their differences an d  jo in  forces for the 
upcom ing elections. “Everything is due  to the  unfulfilled am bitions of 
individual politicians an d  their lack  of h u m b len ess  tow ards the
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opinions of the  o thers and  tow ards people's in te res ts . I'm leaving, I'll 
no longer work w ith liars” said Karel Ledvinka, depu ty  C ha irm an  of 
the  ODA (cited in M lada F ron ta  Dnes, 11 M arch, 1998). The parties 
on the  righ t an d  centre  were unab le  to stop bickering, let a lone come 
n e a r  to form ing a  consensus. A lthough ideological differences were 
n o t great, personal anim osities were rife. V lastim il T lusty, a n  ODS 
m em ber of the  B udget com m ittee, com plained b itterly  th a t, “in  the 
Lower H ouse budget com m ittee, the  m em bers of the  form er coalition 
p arties  are  capable of cooperating, which, un fo rtuna te ly , is n o t true  
of the  p a rtie s’ top leaders” (cited in M lada F ro n ta  D nes, 1 1th M arch 
1998).
The second factor, w hich m ilitated ag a in s t the  likelihood of 
KDU-CSL becom ing a  party  of consequence, w as the  em ergence of a  
new  political force w hich altered  greatly Lux' s ch an ces of tu rn in g  his 
p a rty  into a  thriving organisation  catering  to the  m iddle-classes. The 
KDU-CSL h ad  been successfu l to an  ex ten t in  c ap tu rin g  the  loyalties 
of som e of the  electorate d isconten ted  bo th  w ith  K laus’s extrem e 
righ t views and  w ith the  Social D em ocrats. However, the  Freedom  
Union, a  breakaw ay group from the ODS, led by the  highly popu lar 
MP J a n  Rum l, em erged a t the  beginning of 1998. Rum l 's party  
im m ediately becam e a  m ore n a tu ra l territo ry  for the  Czech m iddle 
c lass m ainly town dwelling a th e is ts  for w hom  the  KDU’s association  
w ith religion w as n e ither relevant or attractive . Finally, Lux' s 
w illingness to cooperate w ith CSSD an d  even e n te r a  fu tu re  coalition 
w ith them , p u t him  in a  m inority and  w orsened already  existing 
ten sions w ithin h is own party.
5. The 1998 Elections
The 1998 elections were held on the  19th an d  2 0 th  of Ju n e . The 
Social D em ocrats em erged with a  5% m argin on the  Civic D em ocratic
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Party  (ODS), 74 an d  63 sea ts  respectively. KDU-CSL won 9% of the 
vote giving them  20 sea ts  in the  200 se a t P arliam en t (Czech 
S ta tistica l Year book, 1998). No party  h a d  a n  overall victory and , 
w ith  any  n u m b er of governing coalitions possible, post-election 
bargain ing  prom ised to be a  tense  affair.
Zem an, leader of the  Social D em ocrats, h a d  a lready  p repared  
th e  g round  for negotiations w ith the  KDU-CSL. For exam ple, a t  a  
p ress  conference on the  25 th  of May to lau n c h  th e ir ‘social doctrine ' 
program m e, the  party  in troduced  th e  Catholic concept of 
‘subsid iarity ', describ ing it a s  one of the im pu lses of th e ir new party  
program m e (CTK (Czech News Agency), 25 May, 1998). A lthough 
opposition to ch u rch  re s titu tio n s w as unden iab ly  a  p a r t  of the  Social 
D em ocrats program , the  CSSD took care to avoid m ak ing  political 
s ta te m e n ts  th a t  could be charac terised  a s  anti-relig ious. Their 
su p p o rt for halting  ch u rch  re s titu tio n s w as argued  solely on the  
g rounds th a t  the  m atte r w as legally complex. P erh ap s the  ch u rch  
were n o t legally the  ow ners of the  property  they  were claim ing, 
queried  the  CSSD, b u t m erely the  adm in istra to rs. Even if they were 
the  legal ow ners, should  they, asked  the party , ever have been  given 
the  p roperty  in the  first place (Lidove Noviny, 11 Ju ly , 1998). Yet, a s  
the  election day loomed closer, Social D em ocratic com m ent on these  
lega l difficulties’ faded, an d  Z em an began to d ilu te  h is  h itherto  
h a rs h  criticism  of ch u rch  res titu tion  in  favour of mild and  
am biguous opposition. Finally, a  few w eeks before th e  election, the  
Party  reversed its position entirely. The spokesm an  for the  CSSD, 
Libor Roucek, an nounced  in an  interview  th a t  c h u rc h  property  
na tionalised  before the  1948 C om m unist take-over w ould n o t be 
re tu rn ed , b u t any th ing  seized after th a t da te  w ould be. “T hat's  the  
law ,” he said, “b u t the  borderline is Feb. 25, 1948.” M ost d ispu ted
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ch u rch  properties, he pointed o u t were na tionalised  before then . (The 
Prague Post, 22 Ju ly , 1998).41
This change in the  Social D em ocrats hard -line  stance  w as 
enough to en su re  th a t  Lux en tered  ta lk s  w ith  th e  CSSD after the  
elections. Lux agreed th a t  if h is pa rty  w as offered the  post of 
p rem iersh ip  an d  given room  to im plem ent C h ristian  elem ents of their 
p a rty ’s policies, they could en ter a  coalition w ith the  Social 
D em ocrats (H ospodarske Noviny, 30 Ju n e , 1998). Yet, two w eeks 
after the  election ne ither the  CSSD or the  ODS h a d  actually  
succeeded in  concluding any  agreem ent w ith  the  m inor pa rties  and , 
on 3rd  Ju ly , K laus and  Zem an, sw orn enem ies, en te red  ta lk s  on the  
form ation of a  m inority G overnm ent (CTK (Czech News Agency), 3 
Ju ly  1998). These ta lk s betw een the two m ajor p a rtie s  followed the 
energetic b u t failed a ttem p ts  by Zem an to a ttra c t R um l’s Freedom  
Union (US) into a  coalition w ith h is party  a n d  th e  KDU-CSL. Z em an’s 
proposal to the  Freedom  Union included the  offer of u p  to four 
positions in the  eighteen sea t cabinet, while the  position  of Prime 
M inister w as to go to KDU-CSL leader Jo se f  Lux. Rum l refused 
Z em an 's offer, expressing  in stead  h is hope for the  creation  of a  
cen tre-righ t coalition betw een h is party , the  ODS, a n d  the  KDU-CSL. 
W ith no hope of su p p o rt from the Freedom  U nion, one of two 
rem aining  options for CSSD w as to a ttem p t a  m inority  cab inet w ith 
KDU-CSL an d  the toleration of the  C om m unist Party. This proposal 
w as rejected ou trigh t by KDU-CSL who refused  to agree to any
41 In response, the Church, no doubt exhausted from continually expressing their 
agreeement with the 1948 deadine once again noted that “the church accepted the First 
Republic seizures since they occurred under a democratic government.” Nevertheless, the 
church’s spokesman, pointed out that “hundreds of church properties seized after 1948 still 
have not been restituted [and that] the church in the Czech Republic has a list of 232 
properties that form such clear-cut cases that there should be no delay in restitution, while 
other properties' ownership is disputed and still others the church recognizes it will never 
get back because of changed circumstances.” (The Prague Post, 1998).
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a rran g em en t sanctioned  by the  C om m unists. The final option open 
to the  CSSD w as a  solo G overnm ent to lerated  by the  ODS (The 
P rague Post, 8 Ju ly , 1998). Up u n til the  e lections the  idea  of any 
su c h  p ac t h ad  been rejected by bo th  parties a s  lud icrous, ye t in m id 
Ju ly , personal anim osities were p u t aside a n d  an  opposition 
agreem ent w as signed betw een K laus’s ODS a n d  Z em an 's CSSD.42
Of all po ten tial coalitions, the  one betw een the  CSSD an d  the 
ODS w as the  w orst for the  church . On 10th  Ju ly , Z em an an n o u n ced  
th a t, w ith  the  exception of the  Nazi se izures of Jew ish  property  
d u ring  WWII, the  G overnm ent w as stopping  the  p rogram  of 
res titu tin g  property  to the  ch u rch es (CTK (Czech News Agency), 10 
Ju ly , 1998; BBC Sum m ary of World B roadcasts , 13 Ju ly , 1998; 
Lidove Noviny, 11 Ju ly , 1998). Any hope for a  favourable decision on 
res titu tio n  or on o ther o u tstand ing  issu e s  su c h  a s  a  the  m a tte r  of a  
trea ty  w ith the  Holy See, w as once again  greatly  d ep en d en t on  ODS, 
the  largest pa rty  formally in opposition to a  m inority  G overnm ent.43
Two days after the  signing of the  ODS-CSSD opposition 
agreem ent, a  m eeting betw een C ardinal Vlk a n d  Vaclav K laus d ash ed  
hopes the  ch u rch  m ight have had  for any  im m ediate  change of ODS 
policy. The m eeting produced no th ing  a p a r t  from  a  com m ent from 
K laus th a t  there  would be no m ore m eetings for the  im m ediate  fu tu re  
(CTK (Czech News Agency), 13 Ju ly , 1998). However, a  fu tu re  and  
stronger ODS will p e rh ap s u se  the  ‘a n ti-c h u rc h ’ s tan ce  of th e  Social
42 Klaus and Zeman agreed between them to attempt to introduce an amendment to the 
Constitution that would rule out the smaller parties. The agreement that was signed by the 
two parties stated that such a constitutional amendment would “would lead to enhancing 
the importance of results of competition between political parties”. ODS also agreed that 
they must not initiate or support a vote of no confidence in the Government (The Prague 
Post, 15 July, 1998).
43 Jaromil Talir, ex-Minister of Culture KDU-CSL, commented to me “if today in the 
Parliament when all votes of KDU-CSL, ODS and the Freedom union are counted together 
they have 102 votes, [so] if the decision (on the Concordat) should be accepted it all depends 
up to ODS how they are going to think about those agreements.” (interview, 1998)
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D em ocrats a s  a  stick  w ith w hich to bea t them . T his possib ility  h a s  
already  been advanced by a  Czech m edia firmly opposed to the  Social 
D em ocrats. Lidove Noviny, the  pro-K laus new spaper, w hich h ad  
consisten tly  espoused  an  an ti-ch u rch  res titu tio n  line m anaged  a n  
overnight som ersau lt w ith the  com m ent th a t,
[It is a] veiy im portan t principle, w h a t w as sto len , shou ld  
be re tu rned , if it is possible in any  way. We a re  n o t 
saying th a t all K laus’s G overnm ents were keen  in 
re tu rn in g  th is  property, b u t they  did adm it the  principle 
listed  above. In th is  way they  did n o t elim inate  the  
possibility of re tu rn ing  the  property. The ch u rc h  a n d  its  
believers can  consist of, and  in  the  w estern  world they  
do have, a  m ajority of the  civil society pow er w hich  is 
helping to h um an ise  the  society. T h at they  need  m oney 
to do so is logical - how could they  have schools, 
h osp ita ls or asy lum s? How could they  p ractice  charity?
For those who are needy, a  good w ord is enough: b u t  
often they  need a t least soup  or som e clothes. In the  
visions of CSSD those th ings shou ld  be done by a  
powerful sta te . Who know s, m aybe Czech Social 
D em ocrats together w ith the  classics a re  still th ink ing  
th a t  religion is the  opium  of the  people a n d  m odern  
world will take over it. Why would people th e n  need  any  
C hurch?  (Lidove Noviny, 11 Ju ly , 1998)
For the  tim e being however, there  w as little sign of ODS playing any  
role o ther th a n  th a t of giving its silen t su p p o rt to CSSD. The vote of 
confidence in  the  new G overnm ent w as se t for th e  17th  of A ugust. 
ODS depu ties left the  parliam en t en su ring  th a t  the  Social D em ocrats’ 
74 votes were enough to win a  m ajority over th e  m inority  of M em bers 
in opposition who were left in the  C ham ber.
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5.1 The Social Democrats and Restitution
One m on th  after the  Social D em ocrats form al policy s ta te m e n t th a t  
the  G overnm ent “is no t going to carry  on th e  executive tran sfe rrin g  of 
s ta te  p roperty  to ch u rch es”, the  M inister for th e  In terior, Vaclav 
G rulich, proposed the  tran sfe r of the  Z itencky C astle  b ack  to the  
C atholic C hurch  (cited in BBC Sum m ary  of W orld B roadcasts , 20 
A ugust, 1998). G rulich w as responding  to offers by the  C h u rch  to 
pay  for the  reconstruction  of the building a n d  g u a ran tee  a  ren ta l 
price to the  G overnm ent a t a  nom inal fee for a  period of ten  years 
(Rude Pravo, 9 Septem ber, 1998). The re tu rn  of the  Z itencky C astle 
th ro u g h  a  decision by the  executive openly broke w ith  the 
G overnm ent's s ta ted  convictions by w hich it h a d  se t su c h  great 
store, th a t  p roperty  should  no t be re tu rn ed  to the  ch u rc h es  by 
executive decrees.
The Social D em ocrats (CSSD) con tinued  th e ir four year te rm  in 
power. Yet, the  ex ten t to w hich it is possible to a rgue  th a t  it w as 
indeed  the  CSSD in power is questionable. The ODS m ain ta in ed  tigh t 
control on a  n u m b er of key posts, including  th a t  of M inister for 
C ulture , w hose responsibility  covered c h u rc h es  an d  religious 
o rgan isations. There w as in th is  period no change on the  issu e  of 
restitu tion .
6. Analysis and Conclusion
This ch ap te r sough t to estab lish  w hether the  in tensity  of conflicting 
party  opinions on res titu tion  explains the  p e rs is te n t conflict over 
ch u rch  property  betw een 1990 an d  1998. If deep -seated  convictions 
on the  p a r t  of political pa rties  are  to acco u n t for the  obstac les to 
res titu tio n , it should  now be clear th a t  th is  is a n  a rg u m en t th a t  sits 
uneasily  w ith the  process described above: in sum , the  read in ess  of
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parliam en tary  parties  to change the ir position  on the  re s titu tio n  
issu e  w henever narrow  political gains were to be m ade. T hroughou t 
th e  period 1992 to 1998 the only two p a rties  th a t  were co n sis ten t on 
the  issue  of res titu tion  were the C om m unists an d  th e  C hristian  
D em ocratic U nion-Czechoslovakian People’ s Party, a  po in t I will 
re tu rn  to later. Prior to 1992 the  sm aller of the  two Czech C hristian  
Parties, Vaclav B enda's right-w ing KDS, began  its  political career 
w ith  a  firm com m itm ent to restitu tion , m odified th a t  position 
su b s tan tia lly  w hen it form ed an  electoral p a c t w ith K laus’s ODS and  
th ro u g h o u t the  G overnm ent coalition held  b ack  from  critic ising the 
ODS’ an ti-ch u rch  res titu tion  line. The Civic D em ocratic Alliance 
(ODA) adopted  an  an ti-ch u rch  res titu tion  line in  the  early  9 0 ’s bu t, 
a fter growing d isillusionm ent in their p a rtn e rsh ip  w ith  K laus, shifted 
th e ir position to p ro -restitu tion . Vaclav K laus, the  leader of ODS, led 
h is  party  from an  initial prom ise to re s titu te  c h u rc h  p roperty  to 
belligerent refusal to even d iscuss the  m atter. He subsequen tly  
agreed to res titu te  a  sm all n um ber of p roperties, la te r agreeing to 
re s titu te  all property. Finally, Klaus proposed  a n  executive decree 
th a t  w ould bypass Parliam ent and  re tu rn  c h u rc h  property , b u t 
u ltim ately  backed the  Social D em ocrats policy to stop  all ch u rch  
res titu tions . The Social D em ocrats for th e ir p a r t  were opposed to 
res titu tion , modified th e ir position on the  eve of th e ir com ing to 
power, stopped all res titu tio n s w hen they  cam e to pow er in  the  
A utum n of 1998 (on the  basis  th a t P arliam ent w as being bypassed  in 
the  decision making) an d  th en  them selves bypassed  P arliam en t to 
re tu rn  ch u rch  property  they  did no t w ant.
From  th is  reconstruction  of events we can  conclude th a t, while 
political pa rties certainly  had  d istinc t a ttitu d e s  tow ards res titu tio n , 
these  a ttitu d es , for m ost of the  parties , were n o t a  significant 
d e te rm in an t of the ir actions. The question  posed  a t  the  s ta r t  of th is  
ch ap te r w as w hether the  streng th  of a n ti-re s titu tio n  op in ions am ong
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politicians w as the decisive factor in prolonging the  restitu tion  
conflict. It now seem s, on the  contrary , th a t  it is the  relative 
w e a k n e ss  of politicians’ convictions th a t  is significant, for these  
convictions were always vulnerable to being tru m p ed  by o ther more 
im p o rtan t in te rests . Two paradoxes need to be ad d ressed  here. F irst, 
w hy w ould an  issue  (church restitu tions) th a t  held  little in te res t for 
th e  public  becom e so controversial am ong political parties?  Second, 
how, on th is  m ost divisive of political issu es, w as it th en  possible, 
politically, for politicians to be so capriciously inconsis ten t?
6.1 Paradox One: the Discrepancy Between Public and
Parliamentary Concerns
The first paradox  only ap p ea rs  as su ch  if one su ccu m b s to the  fallacy 
of com parative transference. T hat is, th ere  h a s  been  a  tendency 
am ong political sc ien tis ts to believe th a t  conclusions reached  
regard ing  the  developm ent of w estern  party  system s can  be u n - 
problem atically  applied in o ther contexts (see, for exam ple, Lipset 
a n d  R okkan, 1967). This h a s  led to confident a sse rtio n s  th a t  political 
p a rties  em erging in E aste rn  E urope after the  collapse of C om m unism  
w ould em erge on the  basis  of pre-existing social cleavages (see for 
exam ple, K itschelt, 1992; Evans and  W hitfield, 1993). This w as no t 
th e  case  in post-C om m unist C zechoslovakia.44 K laus’s ODS,
44The building of parties and party systems is something that political elites in all post­
authoritarian contexts need to address. It is difficult however to draw any broadly applicable 
conclusions on the basis of comparisons between Latin America, Southern and Eastern 
Europe. The distinguishing feature of Eastern Europe is the lengthy and unbroken period of 
time these countries spent under authoritarianism. This stands in sharp contrast to 
Southern Europe where, for example, in Greece and Spain “opposition parties maintained a 
significant existence in emigre form and elements of political pluralism were able to regain 
some strength” (Pridham and Lewis (1996). The situation is very different from Latin 
America too. In Venezuela for example, the period of dictatorship lasted ten years, a 
comparatively short period. What marks these cases off most strikingly from Eastern
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Kalvoda's ODA, and  B enda’s KDS were su ccesso r p arties  to the  
b road -based  Civic Forum . Em erging a t  the  elite level, a s  a  
consequence of sp lits w ithin Parliam ent, th ese  p a rtie s  were w ithout 
constituencies, h ad  few roots in society an d  sm all m em bersh ips.45
As such , these  political parties are  faced w ith th e  challenge of 
build ing the ir constituencies from the top down; a  p rocess th a t is all 
the  m ore difficult because  the  parties a re  so very sim ilar. M ateju 
an d  V lachova’s research  on the  role of political a ttitu d e s  an d  values 
in electoral decisions concluded w ith resp ec t to ODS an d  ODA th a t 
“bo th  parties are  the  v irtua l and  ideological tw ins of the  Czech
Europe is that mobolising elites were operating in a context where their societies had 
already made a transition to a global capitalist economy; thus, they could appeal to 
relatively well-defined constituencies. Eastern European societies, on the other hand, were 
often faced with what Offe has termed ‘triple transitions’. For example, the Czech Republic 
and the Slovak Republic had to face the problem of building new states in 1993 at a time 
when they were attempting to consolidate the transition to a liberal democracy and integrate 
themselves into a global economy (See Cammack, (1997); Julia Buxton, (2001); Przeworski, 
“Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy” in O'Donnell, G. et al. (eds) 
(1986);. Indeed, even within the areas, differences among countries are sufficient to make 
generalisations awkward (See for example, Lijphart et al, (1998).
45 The first post-revolution organization that governed the country is more adequately 
described as a movement rather than a party. Civic Forum had a weak, formal structure if 
any, it had no country organization, and it had none but the vaguest of membership rules. 
It was not based on economic or social cleavages, but on political ones. It’s appeal was the 
anti-Communist vote and its sole function in the 1990 elections was to allow people to give 
their stamp of approval to the Velvet Revolution’ and to indicate whether or not they wanted 
to carry on with some broadly defined ‘return to the West.’ The emergence however of ODS 
and the ODA was based neither on economic nor social cleavages. These parties emerged 
out of the broad based Civic Forum on the basis of political differences. Both parties were 
comparable in makeup and were aimed at broadly similar constituences. The differences 
were that Klaus’s ODS wanted to organize Civic Forum into a proper party with a clear 
hierarchial structure, rules for membership, party dues and so on, whereas ODA wanted to 
retain the looser structure of a movement and was resistant to ‘particisation’ with all the 
negative connotations that term held for a public understandably cynical of anything to do 
with ‘Party’. Civic Forum split and the success of Klaus’s strategy proved itself in the 1992 
elections - a fact which underlines the commensurate importance of both solidarity and 
organization.
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political scene”, an d  th a t  the  sim ilarities a re  so strong  “th a t  it is 
virtually  im possible to m odel the  choice betw een th em .” (M ateju and  
Vlachova, 1998:264).46 A sim ilar po ten tial for rivalry face the  Social 
D em ocrats (CSSD) and  the  C hristian  D em ocratic U nion (KDU-CSL); 
61% of KDU-CSL suppo rte rs  p u t them selves a t  the  cen tre  a n d  60% 
of Social D em ocrat sup p o rte rs  also see them selves a s  being cen tris t 
(Klima, 1998:494).
W ith the  ODA an d  the  ODS a ttem p ting  to a ttra c t the  sam e 
sectors of the  electorate, and  the  CSSD a n d  KDU-CSL m arked  by 
sim ilar rivalry, it becam e necessary  for th ese  pa rtie s  to estab lish  
them selves in society while, a t the  sam e tim e, d istingu ish ing  
them selves from each o ther.47 I suggest th a t  the  issu e  of ch u rch  
res titu tio n  offered the  parties an  opportun ity  to do precisely th is; an  
opportun ity  to build  d istinc t publics. A lthough the  public  w as not 
especially in terested  in ch u rch  res titu tio n s , the  issu e  nevertheless 
gave the  parties a  chance to build  the ir iden tities in opposition to 
each  other. C hurch  res titu tion  w as the  ‘political football’ th a t  allowed 
KDU-CSL to be charac terised  a s  the  V atican 's rep resen ta tives and  
the  Social D em ocrats a s  C om m unist fana tics who w anted , a s  K laus 
w arned, ‘to tu rn  the clock b ack .’ The P rague Post no ted  th a t  K laus 
“repeatedly  described the  Ju n e  elections a s  a  sim ple choice betw een 
con tinu ing  the  transfo rm ation  s ta rted  in 1989 - u n d e r  h im  - or 
reversing it” (27 May 1998). The difficulty for the  Social D em ocrats in 
resisting  su ch  a  descrip tion  w as, a s  one com m enta to r rem arked , no t 
so m uch  “the  "red" label som e opponen ts try  to p in  on  the  p a rty  ... 
b u t the  lack  of a  clear, a lternative [political] p rogram .” (The Prague
46 Interestingly in their analysis of what are relevant conflicts/values in voting decisions, 
church restitution or religion in general does not feature. Similarly Petr Kopecky’s article 
(1995) shows no difference between the policies of ODS and Kalvoda’s Civic Democratic 
Alliance.
47 The alternative would be amalgamation, but strong personality differences weighed 
against this possibility.
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Post, 4 F ebruary  1998).48 All those who w an t to live in  freedom  
shou ld  vote for the ODS, recom m ended K laus in h is  p ro -restitu tion  
p h ase  (CTK (Czech News Agency), 7 May, 1998). The typical and  
lim ited response  by the  Social D em ocrats were, “I believe we can  only 
really end  th is  perception after we get in to  pow er a n d  show  th a t  we 
are  no t doing any th ing  to tu rn  back  the  clock.” (The Prague Post, 4 
February , 1998)
In a  society w hich is still aw aiting th e  consolidation  of new 
social cleavages, it is u n su rp ris in g  p e rh ap s  th a t  pa rties  m ight still 
try  to keep alive th a t m ost m ajor of issu es, indeed the  sole issue , of 
the  1990 elections - the  defence of the  Velvet Revolution. The lack  of 
su p p o rt in  the  Czech Republic for a  re tu rn  to the  C om m unist regime, 
m ean t th a t  all parties had , in one way or an o th er, to p resen t 
them selves a s  building on the  ach ievem ents of the  Revolution. 
P erhaps th is  explains why, regard less of w h a t position  a  p arty  s tru c k  
w ith respec t to ch u rch  restitu tion , it w as a  position  unfailingly 
described  by the ir political opponents a s  an ti-revolu tion . In effect, all 
p a rties  to the  res titu tion  conflict were accused  of w an ting  a  re tu rn  to 
the  past. In the  case of the  C om m unists or the  Social D em ocrats it 
w as a  desire to re tu rn  to the  previous regime: in  th e  case  of the 
C hristian  Parties to the  s ta tu s  quo an te , a n d  in  the  case  of K laus’s 
ODS the  accusation  w as th a t by refusing  re s titu tio n  they  were 
im plicitly supporting  the  policies of the  C om m unist regime. Equally, 
the  response  of all the accused  w as firm denial; none sup p o rted  the  
previous regime, an d  none were an ti-C h ris tian . If they  were opposed 
to res titu tio n  it w as because  they were p ragm atic , fu tu re  oriented, 
an d  realistic. R ather th a n  looking b ack  to a  C om m unist or 
trad itiona l p ast, the ir preferred stance , all claim ed, looked to the 
fu tu re . For the  C om m unist Party it w as sim ply a  case  th a t, “m any  of 
these  res titu tio n  cases are  before the  co u rts  for m any  y ears  a n d  have
48 The Prague Post citing Jiri Sandera, a manager at the Stem Polling Agency
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n o t been finished so I m ean its a  problem  of econom ic ra tionality .” 
(interview w ith Miloslav Ransdorf, 1998) For the  C hristian  P arties 
res titu tio n , far from being a  re tu rn  to the  p ast, re s titu tio n  w as a  
‘re tu rn  to the  w est’ a s  it would bring the  Czech Republic in to  line 
w ith  the  m ore general model of ch u rc h -s ta te  re la tions in  th e  re s t  of 
E urope. Similarly, the  CSSD claim ed to have no position  on the  
c h u rc h  itself; the ir an ti-res titu tion  stance  w as derived m erely from  a  
concern  to p ro tec t the  in stitu tions of p a rliam en ta ry  dem ocracy.
In sum , a  ‘politics of dem onisa tion’ ap tly  describes m u ch  of 
political in terac tion  in the  Czech Republic. The lack  of ‘n o rm al’ 
political debate  becam e a  frequent sub jec t of d isapproval by bo th  
politicians an d  the  public. The Czech sociologist J ir i  Pehe, cap tu red  
the  m ood well in h is com m ent th a t political cu ltu re  w ould be b est 
served, “if politicians s ta rted  to focus on m atter-of-fact d iscu ssio n  on 
various topics, if they  stopped moving in an  artificially c rea ted  reality  
of m yths w hich they  them selves create  a n d  w ith w hich they  
expediently scare the  society.” (cited by CTK (Czech News Agency, 7 
May 1998). In th is  context, the  possibility of resolving the  issu e  of 
c h u rc h  res titu tion  th rough  reasoned  d iscu ssio n  w as greatly  reduced . 
W hen tak en  u p  a t the  level of the  sta te , differences over th e  role of 
religion an d  the  role of the  ch u rch  becam e assim ila ted  to th e  m ore 
narrow  concerns of parliam en tarians. U ltim ately, the  line-up  of 
political forces and  the ir com peting in te re s ts  acco u n ts  for the  
c h u rc h ’s slow progress in developing econom ic independence. 
Politics, n o t anti-C atholic a ttitu d es, is th e  crucia l an d  dynam ic factor 
in explaining the  ch u rch 's  con tinued  reliance on th e  sta te .
6.2 Paradox Two: the Instability of Party Preferences
This ch ap te r described a  political process th a t  saw  political p a rties  
readily  d itch ing  policy positions w hen the  opportun ity  to do so
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b rough t g reater rew ards. Yet, it is no tab le  th a t  fick leness w as n o t a  
tra it  of e ither the  KDU-CSL or the  C om m unist Party. B oth these  
p a rties  rem ained  consisten t in the ir a ttitu d e s  tow ards restitu tion . 
The C hristian  Party (KDU-CSL) and  the C om m un ist P arty  have th ree  
th ings in com m on. The first is the  reliability  of th e ir  respective 
positions on restitu tion , the  second is th e ir p a rty  age.49 an d  the  th ird  
is the ir high party  m em bersh ip .50 B oth p a rty  age a n d  high party  
m em bersh ip  con tribu te  to identity  an d  stability . I suggest identity  
an d  stability  m ilitate again st erra tic  behaviour: p a rties  have a  g reater 
sense  of the ir constituen ts , have the ir co lours m ore firmly nailed  to 
the  m ast, and , there  is therefore m u ch  less scope to be 
opportun istic  or cynical. From  th is  perspective, it m ak es sense , th a t 
the  KDU-CSL tu rn ed  down the  opportun ity  to e n te r in to  a  coalition 
w ith the  Social D em ocrats, even though  the  consequences of th a t  
decision were the exit of the  party  from a  place in  G overnm ent for the  
first tim e in the  Party 's history.
The new er parties did no t operate  u n d e r  su c h  constra in ts . 
N evertheless, the ir w illingness to sw itch th e ir positions on any  issue  
began to have consequences. Even the  u su a lly  docile Czech p ress  
(see C hap ter Six) expressed  a  degree of a larm . Indeed, a lm ost
49 The Party was created in 1918 and even during Communism the KDU-CSL remained 
a ‘parliamentary party’. The Party’s website notes that although “The Communist Party 
became the only autonomous entity (after 1948). It allowed a few other parties to exist 
within the so-called National Front; however these parties held no real power and were 
created to provide an outward image of Czechoslovakia as a democratic state.” 
(http://www.czech.cz:80/czech/political.htm.). The elections in August of 1998 saw for the 
first time since its inception the vaction of KDU-CSL from a place in Government. The 
Czech Communist Party is the only Communist Party in Eastern Europe which retained its 
name after the events of 1989.
50 Where the strongest party Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (ODS) had a membership of 
22,000 in 1996, the Communist Party figure was over nine times that amount with a 
declared membership of around 200,000, the highest of any party in the Czech Republic. 
KDU-CSL had an 80,000 membership figure, the Social Democrats (CSSD), 13,000, and the 
Civic Democratic Association (ODA), 2,500. Figures from Lidove Noviny, 16th April 1996.
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im m ediately after the  post-election p ac t betw een K laus an d  Zem an, 
the  new spaper M lada F ron ta  Dnes, com m ented  ironically th a t, “for 
som eone unfam iliar w ith Czech politics, they  w ould never believe 
th a t  one of the  polite gentlem en h ad  recently  called h is  c o u n te rp art a  
th ie f a n d  em bezzler while the  o ther h ad  responded  by saying th a t  h is 
rival w an ted  to drag  the  coun try  back  in to  the  d a rk  ages of 
C om m unism .” The paper concluded th a t  “the  m agic potion of 
pe rsonal in te res ts  h a s  however m ade them  if n o t allies th en  a t least 
fellow -conspirators” (Mlada F ron ta  D nes, 16 A ugust, 1998). 
Sim ilarly, the  new spaper Zem ske Noviny no ted  th a t  desp ite  K laus's 
end less w arnings ab o u t the  dangers of voting for the  Social 
D em ocrats it w as, a t  the  sam e tim e, “K laus h im self w hose opposition 
ag reem en t ... opened the doors to C abinet Office for Z em an.”. The 
P aper com plained, ODS voters read  afterw ards in  the  ODS election 
n ew spaper th a t  the  party  h ad  pro tected  th e ir vote. B u t these  people 
voted for the  ODS to stop the  CSSD getting in to  pow er.” (Zemske 
Noviny , 16 A ugust, 1998).
6.3 Structure and Agency
Political opportun ities emerge ou t of a  co n ju n c tu re  of long-term  an d  
sh o rt-te rm  ones. The sudden  collapse of C om m unism  forced parties 
to build  d istinc t political identities from the  top down. This, in a  
society w here the  alternatives to global m ark e ts  an d  liberal 
dem ocracy were, an d  still are, regarded  a s  highly su spec t, w as the 
im m ediate s tru c tu ra l context th a t  the  new  Czech p a rliam en ta rian s 
found  them selves in an d  a  key factor to the  co n ten tio u sn ess of 
c h u rc h  restitu tions. The longer tim e sp an  preferred by s tru c tu ra lis ts  
is c rucial to u n d ers tan d in g  the  n a tu re  of the  c o n s tra in ts  and  
o pportun ities facing political elites. At the  sam e tim e the  political 
p rocess described  in th is  chap ter po in ts  to the  im portance  of giving
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due em phasis  to the  choices m ade by elites w ith in  those  co n stra in ts . 
In short, a  focus on the  sho rter-term  is unavoidable  if one w an ts  to 
know  how an d  why an d  in w hat way elites take  th e ir chances.
W hether, a t any  p a rticu la r m om ent, a  g rea ter em p h asis  on 
e ither s tru c tu re  or agency is called for can  only be a sce rta in ed  by 
close a tten tio n  to the  em pirical case in hand . In the  Czech Republic, 
for exam ple, the  model of econom ic developm ent em barked  on  by the  
previous regime d icta tes th a t post-C om m unist political p a rties  have 
no easily identifiable indigenous bourgeoisie w ith w hom  they  can  
forge an  alliance. Im portan t too are  the  co n s tra in ts  of m ore recen t 
in stitu tions; for exam ple, parties who w ish to en te r P arliam en t have 
no choice except to m eet the  5% th resho ld  estab lished  by the 
C onstitu tion . Nevertheless, these  co n stra in ts  often hold o u t scope for 
creativity .51
To re tu rn  to the  cen tra l focus of th is  ch ap te r, the  s tren g th  of 
the  first coalition G overnm ent en su red  Prim e M inister K laus the 
opportun ity  to im plem ent a  range of policy choices, including , if he 
h ad  w an ted  to, the  re tu rn  of property  to th e  ch u rch . There w as, in 
the  early days of the  first coalition, no g rea t c o n s tra in ts  e ither 
econom ic or political th a t  m ilitated ag a in st th is  a s  a n  option. Yet, 
K laus chose no t to do th is. Ironically, in 1996, w hen  K laus changed  
h is m ind, com m itting him self w holeheartedly to res titu tio n , it w as in 
a  context w here the  alternatives to th is  choice were far m ore lim ited.
Also notable w as K laus political style; there  is no evidence th a t 
h is elitist preferences an d  regularly  belligerent ap p ro ach  w as d ictated  
by any th ing  o ther th a n  h is  own personal choice. It w as K laus’s 
decision n o t to a ttem p t to soften the an im osity  of the  Social
51 For example, the period of Communism was extensive enough to ensure that, in most 
cases, even the basic building blocks of the old parties had been extinguished. Thus, in 
1989, political groups had no choice except to build or rebuild their party machines 
virtually from scratch. Nevertheless within that context, ODA and ODS attempted different
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D em ocrats by d iscussing  w ith them  the  G overnm ent’s in ten tio n s to 
re tu rn  property  to the  church . Equally, it w as h is  choice to an n o u n ce  
the  decision on res titu tion  w ithout any  d iscu ssio n  w ith  the  religious 
bodies (CTK (Czech News Agency), 29 Ju n e , 1996).
This final po in t leads to the  nex t ch ap ter. W hy were the  
ch u rch es  no t inform ed of im portan t governm ent decisions th a t  
affected them ? Did the  ch u rch es play a  p a r t  in the  d eb a tes  ab o u t 
restitu tion , or w as the  outcom e of the  conflict over re s titu tio n  wholly 
determ ined  by political elites? The nex t ch ap te r seeks to e stab lish  
the  ex ten t to w hich the ch u rch  w as a  p a rt of the  political p rocess an d  
the  ex ten t to w hich it w as excluded. In brief, w hy w as the  conflict 
over res titu tio n  processed  in the  way it w as?
solutions to the problem of sustaining viable their respective organizations.
104
C hapter Four
C hurch - S ta te  Linkages 1989-1998
1. Introduction
The preceding two ch ap ters  exam ined the  position of the  Czech 
C atholic C hurch  w ith respect to S chm itter’s first fea tu re  of civil 
society: independence from the sta te  (Schm itter, 1997:240). It w as 
a rgued  th a t  the ch u rch  h as  gained a  significant degree of 
independence since the  collapse of C om m unism , a n  independence 
th a t  nevertheless rem ains com prom ised by the  failure of the  ch u rch  
to secure  econom ic freedom. It w as show n th a t  th is  failure to gain 
independence is the  consequence ne ither of p rac tica l co n s tra in ts  nor 
of the  sheer weight of trad ition  b u t is the  outcom e of con tem porary  
political processes.
The p resen t chap ter deals w ith the  second ideal typical feature  
of civil society, w hat Schm itter calls 'collective ac tio n ’ (Schm itter, 
1997:240). Schm itter m eans by th is th a t  g roups in  civil society are 
“capable of deliberating ab o u t an d  tak ing  collective actions in 
defence or prom otion of their in te res ts  o r p a ss io n s” (240). The 
em phasis  here  on debate  and  deed  h a s  strong  affinities w ith H an n ah  
A rendt’s u n d e rs tan d in g  of autonom y. For A rendt, “the  possibility  of 
com m unity  is never sim ply given or essen tia l to h u m a n  beings b u t 
m u st, ra th e r, be bu ilt by speech and  ac tion” (Disch, 1994:32) 
Freedom , A rendt writes:
is prim arily  expressed  in action...[A]s re la ted  to politics 
[it] is n o t...a  freedom  of choice th a t  a rb itra te s  and  
decides betw een two given th in g s ...R a ther it is...the
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freedom  to call som ething into being w hich  did  not exist 
before, w hich w a s  not given. (Arendt, 2000:444 , 
em phasis  mine)
C ontem porary  u n d ers tan d in g s  of au tonom y echo A rend t’s s tre ss  on 
the  capacity  no t ju s t  to choose, b u t to create  a n d  act. Held, for 
exam ple, a rgues th a t  au tonom y “involves the  ability to deliberate, 
judge, choose an d  ac t upon  different possible co u rses  of action  in 
private a s  well a s  in public life” (Held, 1987:270). B row ning holds 
th a t  “au tonom y is the  h u m an  capacity  to exercise individuality  an d  
independence th rough  m aking choices how  to a c t” (Browning, 
2000:161). Taylor in sis ts  th a t  freedom  is “self-direction, i.e., the  
actual exercise of directing control over o ne’s life” (Taylor, 2001:205 , 
em phasis  mine). Kolakowski also focuses on “freedom  of choice” 
(Kolakowski, 1999:5) and , like Arendt, m akes c lear th a t  “freedom  is 
no t ju s t  the  ability to choose betw een possib ilities th a t  a re  a lready  
given; it is also the capacity  to create  s itu a tio n s  th a t  a re  new  an d  
quite  unp red ic tab le” (Kolakowski, 1999:95-96).
These in te rp re ta tions of freedom  hold d istinc tly  different 
concerns from the  in te rp re ta tions of liberty  or independence  
d iscu ssed  above in ch ap te r two. W here independence  or liberty  is 
concerned  w ith the  ex ten t to w hich one is free from  o th e rs ’ decisions, 
em bracing  even the  freedom  not to act, th e  freedom  u n d e r  d iscu ssio n  
here  is of a  m ore positive na tu re : freedom  in  action. In E as te rn  
Europe, th is  idea of freedom  in action h a s  received less a tten tio n  
th a n  the  idea of freedom  from the sta te , p e rh ap s  u n su rp ris in g ly  so, 
for th ese  were coun tries w here for forty years citizens were d irected  
“to w h a t they  should  do, how they  should  behave, w h a t they  shou ld  
believe in” (Czech B ishops Conference, 2000). As such , freedom  from  
h a s  gained a  prior a ttrac tion  over freedom  to. A rendt, w riting in  the  
shadow  of to ta litarian ism , noted precisely th is  tendency:
...to m easu re  the ex ten t of freedom  in any  given
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com m unity  by the  free scope it g ran ts  to apparen tly  
nonpolitical activities...Is it n o t true , a s  we all som ehow  
believe, th a t  politics is com patible w ith  freedom  only 
because  and  insofar a s  it g u aran tees a  possib le freedom  
from  politics? (Arendt, 2000:442) 52
2. Autonomy and Democracy
The aim s of th is  ch ap ter are  to estab lish  th e  degree to w hich the 
Catholic C hurch  in the  Czech Republic could be considered  to be 
au tonom ous an d  to a sk  how the  specific n a tu re  of the  au tonom y of 
the  Czech Catholic C hurch  can  be explained. Before proceeding to 
explore these  em pirical questions, the  following p a ra g rap h s  a ttem p t 
to clarify the  rela tionsh ip  betw een au tonom y a n d  dem ocracy.
One response  to the  question  of the  re la tionsh ip  betw een 
au tonom y an d  dem ocracy is to po in t o u t th a t  au tonom y an d  
dem ocracy are one and  the  sam e. The m ean ing  of au tonom y 
d iscussed  in the  preceding sections is equ ivalen t to the  core 
norm ative expression  (or m axim um  definition) of dem ocracy, since 
bo th  m ean  to self-govern. B oth concepts sh a re  a  com m on appeal, for, 
“insofar a s  we are  com m itted to dem ocracy because  we are 
com m itted  to respecting  people’s capacity  to sh ap e  th e ir own lives, 
o u r com m itm ent to dem ocracy and  to a  significant dom ain  of 
individual freedom  will share  a  com m on foundation” (Jones, 1995: 
296).
If a  com m itm ent to dem ocracy is necessarily  a  com m itm ent to 
autonom y, there  is still the  question  of w ha t th is  com m itm ent would,
52 Arendt’s understanding of freedom is also, as she points out “the very opposite of 
‘inner freedom,’ the inward space into which men may escape from external coercion and 
feel free. This inner feeling remains without outer manifestations and hence is by definition 
politically irrelevant” (Arendt, 1968:440).
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or should , look like in practice. O ur su p p o rt for the  principle of 
au tonom y, Held po in ts out, “h a s  to be linked  to a  d iversity  of 
conditions of enactm ent, th a t is, in stitu tio n a l a n d  organizational 
requ irem en ts, if it is to be fully en trenched  in  political life” (Held, 
1996: 297). How, th a t is, can  a  com m itm ent to the  au tonom y or self- 
governm ent of each  civic group be practically  reconciled w ith  the  
au tonom y or self-governm ent of all civic g roups?  How is it possible to 
ba lance the  m ultiplicity of preferences in m odern  societies? It is th is  
eclecticism  of social life th a t creates a  co n u n d ru m  for dem ocracy, a  
c o n u n d ru m  found betw een the  ideal of ‘a  people’ ru ling  itself ag a in st 
the  reality  of a  p lurality  of ‘peoples’. T hat th e re  a re  com peting no tions 
of w ha t is practically  involved in the creation  an d  shap ing  of one’s 
own life m eans th a t the  success of one group  in realising  its 
au tonom y m ay well involve the su p p ress io n  of a n o th e r g roup ’s 
po ten tia l.53
The following sections exam ine th ree  d iscrete  m odels th a t  
a ttem p t to provide a  solution to th is dem ocratic  co n u n d ru m . E ach 
m odel is formally com m itted to recognising the  principle of 
autonom y, an d  each seeks to realise th a t p rincip le in  a  different way. 
The first m odel seeks to do so by c ircum venting  the  dem ocratic 
conund rum , the  second by guarding  a g a in st it, a n d  the  th ird  by 
recognising an d  respecting  it. The c ircum vention  m odel is 
rep resen ted  in the  w orks of both  M arx an d  R ousseau . B oth posited  
the  notion  of a  com m on and  true  in terest, a n d  by doing so bo th  were 
able to claim  th a t freedom  for each  a n d  freedom  for all were 
com patible. This com m on in terest, R ousseau  argued , could be 
identified by citizens who come to the  decision-m aking  p rocess as 
a b s tra c t individuals able and  willing to se t aside  th e ir p a rticu la r 
in te res ts  in favour of w ha t is in the  com m on good. In general,
53 Of course, the idea that the conundrum is a problem should not be exaggerated, for if 
there were no plurality at all, there would be no need for democracy.
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R ousseau  an tic ipated  few difficulties in the  identification of su c h  a  
general good for if the people genuinely an d  equally  feel them selves 
to be a  com m on or unified body they will recognise th a t  w h a t is good 
for the  one body m u st logically be good for all bodies. (Held, 
1995:56-62; Russell, 1961:660-674; W arburton , 2001:111-121). 
N evertheless, R ousseau  accepted th a t in som e in s tan c es  there  m ay 
be d isagreem ent over how to advance the  ‘general w ill/ In these  
in stan ces , the  m ajority will decide on the  com m on good an d  those 
people unw illing to accep t w hat is really in  th e ir in te res t, “will be 
com pelled to do so by the  whole body; w hich m ean s no th ing  else 
th a n  th a t  [they] will be forced to be fre e ” (R ousseau, cited  in 
W arburton , 2001:115). The obvious problem s w ith  th is  are  pointed 
o u t by Jo n es , who following Mill, a rgues th a t  th is  “so-called ‘self- 
governm ent’ m ay tu rn  o u t to be the  governm ent n o t of m e by m yself 
b u t of m e by everyone else” (Jones, 1995: 296). Yet, Jo n e s  suggests 
the  dangers are even greater th a n  th a t posed  by w h a t is effectively 
m ajoritarian ism , for if individual freedom  is only realized in  a  
general will,
in w hich I share  (even though  I m yself m ay m istake  th a t 
will), why should  it m atte r th a t  I and  m y fellow citizens 
shou ld  be involved in the  expression  of th a t  will? 
P erhaps a  wise individual or elite will ju d g e  the  com m on 
good of a  popu lus, and  therefore its general will, m ore 
successfully  th a n  the  people itself. (Jones, 1995:297)
J u s t  su ch  a  belief in an  elite identification of ‘the  general good' were 
em bodied in the  in s titu tio n s of Soviet com m unism  by successive 
M arxists who shared  the  R ousseau ian  em p h asis  in freedom  
expressed  in ends ra th e r  th an  m eans, in ou tcom es ra th e r  th a n  
action. Marx, like R ousseau , sim ply circum vented  the  dem ocratic 
co n u n d ru m  by dissolving its root cause , p luralism . In h is  accoun t, 
p lu ralism  or difference w as purely  the  expression  of a  cap ita lis t
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order, the  transcendence  of w hich would be th e  d isso lu tion  of su ch  
difference. The true  dem os, the com m une, w as freed from conflict 
an d  th u s  freed from politics - th a t w hich p rocesses su c h  conflicts. 
W ith no conflict there  w as no need for in s titu tio n s  to m ediate  such  
conflict. In place of m odels of represen tative  decision-m aking , M arx 
proposed u ltim ately  only a  need for m anagem ent. P raising  th e  model 
of the  Paris C om m unes, he writes,
In stead  of deciding once in  th ree  to six years w hich 
m em ber of the  ruling c lass w as to m isrep resen t the  
people in Parliam ent, un iversal suffrage w as to serve the  
people, constitu ted  in  Com m unes, a s  indiv idual suffrage 
serves every o ther employer in the  search  for the  
w orkm en and  m anagers in h is b u s in ess . And it is well 
know n th a t com panies, like indiv iduals, in  m a tte rs  of 
real b u sin ess  generally know  how  to p u t  the  right m an  in 
the right p lace , and , if they for once m ake a  m istake, to 
red ress  it prom ptly. (Marx, cited in  Held, 1996:145, 
em phasis mine)
It is the  dangers of the  wrong m an  in the  w rong place an d  the  
difficulties in redressing  th is  th a t h a s  led to a  second m odel of 
dem ocratic au tonom y th a t recognises th e  undem ocratic  
consequences of m ajoritarian  or elite p rocedures, an d  consequently  
su p p o rts  m odels of state-society  re la tions th a t  p ro tec t m inorities and  
subg roups from o ther groups and  individuals. T his m odel recognises 
th a t  “for those on the  losing side, particu la rly  if they  are  alm ost 
alw ays on the  losing side (as som etim es h a p p e n s  in  ethnically  or 
religiously divided societies), dem ocracy m ay be a s  oppressive a s  any  
o ther form of ru le” (Jones, 1995:297). R a ther th a n  negate the  
preferences of sm aller social groups, liberal m odels of civil society 
seek  to balance these  preferences th ro u g h  the  ju stifica tion  and  
pro tection  of a  public au tho rity  th a t  can  a rb itra te  betw een the
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groups, o rder their in te rests , and  en su re  a  level of stab ility .54 This 
public  au tho rity  is generally deem ed the  s ta te . J o h n  K eane, for 
exam ple, while insisting  on the  im portance of a n  “in d ep en d en t civil 
society of au tonom ous public spheres”, w arn s th a t:
w ithou t the  protective, red istribu tive  an d  conflict- 
m ediating functions of the  s ta te , struggles to tran sfo rm  
civil society will become ghettoized, divided a n d  
s tag n an t, or will spaw n their own, new  form s of 
inequality  and  unfreedom . (Keane, 1988:15)
The im portance of th is  second m odel lies in  its  recognition of 
difference and  of the  consequen t p rac tical difficulties involved in 
pro tecting  civil autonom y. Yet, a s  a rgued  in  C h ap te r One, th is  
recognition of difference often becom es an  anxie ty  ab o u t difference 
an d  the  need  to guard  ag a in st its dangers, for if society becom es, a s  
D eakin  a sk s  “a  vertical m osaic”, w h a t th en  is to hold “the  individual 
pieces in place?” (Deakin, 2001:71). In th is  m odel, difference 
certain ly  m u s t be recognised, b u t th a t  does n o t m ean  it h a s  to be 
actively encouraged. Here, difference is trea ted  like the  poor, 
u n fo rtu n a te , b u t alw ays w ith u s , an d  like the  poor, it m u s t be 
p ro tected  an d  regulated, for its own good a s  well a s  the  good of 
o thers. While the  form al concerns in the  m odel are  w ith  the  needs of 
the  different, the  substan tive  concerns are  m ore regularly  w ith  the 
needs of the  ‘undifferen t’ - th a t  public au th o rity  th a t  is taxed  w ith 
the  b u rd en  of m ediating difference. The em p h asis  on the  needs of 
m anagem en t produce a  preference for diversity th a t  can  be m ediated  
th rough  the  sta te , ra th e r  th a n  expressed  in civil society or ou tside  
the  sta te ; a  tendency, as w ith F ish  for exam ple, to regard  the  key 
in s titu tio n s  of civil society a s  those th a t  can  “lobby s ta te  officials”
54 Perhaps this is why Schmitter finds it necessary to talk not of independence from the 
state, but relative independence. (Schmitter, 1997).
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a n d  provide a  “stable, organised rep resen ta tio n  of in te re s ts” to 
governm ent. (Fish, 1996:272 and  268)
The th ird  m odel is sim ilar to the  liberals in th a t  it also sees a  
role for the  sta te . However, it is a  m u ch  sm aller role th a n  th a t  
advanced  by liberals. R ather th a n  overtax itself, “the  s ta te ,” H irst 
suggests, can  be “a  residual agency, responsib le  for those  a sp ec ts  of 
law an d  order th a t associations could no t provide for them selves” 
(Hirst, 1995:92). The possibilities for assoc iationa l au tonom y are 
provided by those h istorical and  em pirical exam ples of 'm u tu a l 
ex tra territo riality ’ - “the  parallel existence of self-governing 
com m unities sharing  the  sam e space b u t applying ru les  in m a tte rs  of 
com m unity  concern  to the ir m em bers alone” (Hirst, 2000:117).55 In 
term s of m axim ising autonom y, th is  m odel is significant because  it 
po in ts to possibilities of governm ent in  civil society  a n d  n o t th rough  
the  sta te . Here, associationalists  accept, “the  need  for som e k ind  of 
organized governm ent [but prefer] a  decentralized  system  w ith 
lim ited pow ers” (Hirst, 1995:92). T hrough H irst’s m odel we see th a t  
d irect or ind irect dem ocracy does n o t have to be an  e ith e r /o r  
scenario. Too often in d iscussions we are  told th a t  it is n o t possible 
to have d irec t dem ocracy. For exam ple, Wolff a rg u es  “som e have even 
argued  th a t  the  only form of governm ent co n sis ten t w ith  due  respec t 
for au tonom y is a  d irect dem ocracy [but] in practice, such  a s ta te  
w ould be im possible to a ch ieve  (Wolff, 1995:107, em phasis  mine). 
P erhaps not, b u t there  is of course no reaso n  w hy we c an n o t have 
some. D irect dem ocracy can  be approxim ated  u n d e r  represen ta tive  
dem ocracy th rough , for exam ple, c reating  m ore oppo rtun ities  for 
o rgan isations to govern them selves. This is th e  claim  of the  Czech 
ch u rch  who claim  th a t the ir claim  to control th e  c h u rc h ’s econom y 
does n o t conflict w ith or deny the  claim s or au tonom y of o thers. This
55 Hirst gives as cases of mutual extraterritoriality the “Pillars system in the Netherlands” 
and the “Ottoman millets system” (Hirst, 2000:117).
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is very m uch  the  model supported  by the  Czech B ishops, a  model 
th a t  they see a s  critical to autonom y. “We have n o t yet lea rn ed ,” they 
argue
to draw  a  clear d istinction betw een the  s ta te  a n d  its 
irreplaceable functions on one side an d  civil society  on 
the  o ther...non-governm ental civic bodies su p p o rt an d  
develop h u m an  freedom  an d  only in  these  form s is it 
possible to overcome the excessively en larged  a n d  ill- 
functioning relics of the form er to ta lita rian  sta te . (Czech 
B ishops Conference, 2000: Section 30)
This com m itm ent to au tonom y receives su p p o rt from  th e  B ishops’ 
com m itm ent to the  principle of subsid iarity . In c o n tra s t to the  
collectivist a rrangem en ts of the  previous regim e w here, “everybody 
an d  nobody w as responsible a t the  sam e tim e” (2000:Section 31), 
they  propose th a t  “every level in the  h ierarchy  of social life should  
act, a s  m uch  as  possible, au tonom ously  a n d  responsib ly  a t i t ’s own 
level of decision m aking and  a sk  for help from  th e  h igher level only if 
it h a s  insufficient power to solve a  p a rticu la r ta sk ” (2000:Section 33). 
At the  sam e tim e, the  B ishops invoke a  m odel of subsid ia rity  th a t 
can  recognise the  in te rdependen t n a tu re  of social action . “The effort 
to develop responsibility, w hich respec ts  the  principle of subsid iarity , 
m u s t,” they  argue, “go h an d  in h a n d  w ith  th e  developm ent of 
solidarity  in m inds an d  action ... S ubsid iarity  a n d  solidarity  are 
m u tua lly  interlinked. Only if they are  balanced , can  the  com m on 
good be fulfilled” (2000: Section 33).
In sum , we can  suggest two sp h e res for civic autonom y; first, 
civic action  in spaces quite rem oved from  public  au th o ritie s , an d  
second, civic action w ith, or th rough , public  au tho rities. 
E isen s ta d t’s d iscussion  of civil society is consp icuous for its  equal 
em phasis  on both  sorts of civil activity. O n the  one h a n d , he no tes 
the  im portance of a  “m ultiplicity of au to n o m o u s public  a re n a s  w ithin
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w hich various associations regulate their ow n  activities a n d  govern  
their ow n m em bers? (E isenstadt, 1995:240, em p h asis  mine). Yet he 
goes on to argue that:
It is no t ju s t  the existence of m ultip le au to n o m o u s social 
sec tors... th a t  is of crucial im portance for the  foundation  
an d  con tinuous functioning of dem ocracies. R ather, it is 
the  existence of in stitu tiona l a n d  ideological links 
betw een these  sectors and  the  sta te .
The m ost im portan t of these  links, E isen s tad t m ain ta in s , “have been 
the  m ajor institu tionalized  netw orks of political rep resen ta tio n  
(legislatures and  political parties)” (E isenstad t, 1995:240). D espite 
the  ostensib le  im portance of links betw een the  s ta te , political parties , 
an d  civil society, m any w ritings on the  em ergence of civil g roups in 
E as te rn  E urope regularly  fail to consider th e  actual capacities of 
these  groups to have the ir voices heard  a t  the  legislative level. One 
reason  for th is  is the  tendency to place a  s tre ss  on the  q u an tity  of 
assoc iations a s  an  adequate  m easu rem en t or ind ica to r of civil 
society. For exam ple, the  Am erican in s titu tio n  Freedom  H ouse 
provides m uch  usefu l com parative d a ta  on o rgan isa tions in E aste rn  
Europe, b u t because  of its generalising aim  does n o t se t o u t to study  
p a rticu la r organ isations in any  detail. C onsequently , there  is a  lack 
of a tten tio n  to the question  of w hat it is civic o rgan isa tions do, w ha t 
links these  organizations have w ith politicians a n d  w h a t role they 
play in the  creation  of governm ent policy, (see for exam ple 
K aratnycky e t al, 1997:151, 339).56 The lack  of re sea rch  in th is  a rea  
h a s  been  noted by Reschova and  Syllova. In a n  article  a b o u t the 
Czech Parliam ent, they write, “u p  to now, however, it h a s  n o t been
56 Karatnycky notes that in 1988 there were some 2,000 registered associations in the 
Czech Republic and nine in Slovakia. Less than eight years later these figures stood at 
approximately 27,000 and 10,000 respectively. (Karatnycky, 1997:151 and 339).
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clear how different in te res t g roups influence the  parliam en t” 
(Reschova an d  Syllova, 1996: 91). 57
3. The Church’s Role in Decision Making
How au tonom ous is the  Czech Catholic C hu rch?  To w h at ex ten t does 
it govern itself? In C hap ter two I pointed to the  recen t expansion  of 
the  sphere  w ithin w hich the ch u rch  can  a c t u n o b s tru c te d  by the  
s ta te . U nder the  new  dem ocratic regime, p rie s ts  an d  b ishops can  
w rite the ir own serm ons, organize m eetings, teach , a n d  ap p o in t their 
own officers - all w ithou t having to seek approval from  the  s ta te . In 
th e ir own sm all dom ain of the ir life the  c h u rc h  governs itself an d  is 
free. However, w hen it com es to partic ipa tion  ou tside  of the  religious 
sphere , w ithin those spaces m ore com m only th o u g h t of a s  political 
or public, the  c h u rc h ’s activity becom es far m ore con ten tious.
This section of the ch ap ter is concerned  w ith  those  public 
political issu e s  th a t ind ispu tab ly  are  of concern  to the  ch u rch : the 
deba tes ab o u t restitu tion , the  developm ent of a  new  ch u rc h -s ta te  
law, an d  the  s ta te ’s re la tionsh ip  w ith the  Holy See. The ch ap te r 
seeks to estab lish  w ha t access the  ch u rch  h a s  to P arliam en t and  
political parties; those political spheres a n d  g roups w ith in  w hich 
d iscu ssio n s take  place ab o u t issu es  of d irec t concern  to the  chu rch . 
The previous ch ap ter concen tra ted  on how the  conflict over 
res titu tio n  of ch u rch  property  w as conducted  prim arily  betw een 
politicians, b u t m ade little reference to w h a t role the  c h u rc h  played 
in the  various debates over funding or to the  im pact the  c h u rc h  had , 
if any, on eventual outcom es. In th is  ch ap te r I a rgue  th a t  the 
c h u rc h ’s im pact on policy was, in fact, m inim al. We c an n o t know  to
57 Their own article unfortunately throws little light on the topic. For example, they 
remark “trade unions did not wish to link their programme with any political parly” with no 
accompanying attempt to explain why. (Reschova and Syllova, 1996:91)
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w hat ex ten t the  re su lts  of the  political b a ttle s  over re s titu tio n  w ould 
have been  different if the  ch u rch  h ad  been involved. N onetheless, a  
consideration  of how and  why the  c h u rc h  w as k ep t o u t of the 
decision-m aking circles should  throw  som e light on w hy the  issu es  
were p rocessed  in the  way they were.
P art of my interviews w ith the  B ishops of the  Czech Catholic 
C hurch  concerned the ir rela tionsh ips w ith local po liticians, and  
political pa rties (Appendix A). The B ishops in  the  regions ou tside  of 
Prague described  these  rela tionsh ips a s  local, irregu lar, n o n ­
institu tionalized , adequate , often good, a n d  occasionally  productive. 
B ishop Koukl from Litomerice explained:
Official m eetings are  held on a  h igher level. In m y 
diocese everything is on the local level. T here a re  organ  
concerts. The rela tionsh ip  is m ore friendly [now]. People 
are closer to each other. B u t there  a re  no 
institu tionalized  m eetings...The re la tionsh ip  w ith  local 
politicians is very good now. (interview, 1998)
Similarly, B ishop Liska from Ceske Budejovice said ,
W ith S tate  politicians, I personally  do n o t get in  touch  
very m uch . I get along well w ith those  local ones, on  the  
local level of town. And all problem s a re  u su a lly  solved 
well. Of course those are people I know , w hom  I m eet in 
m ass, etc. B ut the  sam e good re la tionsh ip  I have w ith 
the  chairm en  of all tow ns w hen I go to th e  dioceses, 
(interview, 1998)
Likewise, B ishop Lobkowicz from O strava com m ented:
My local politicians here in my tow n...I can  say  the  
re la tions betw een the  m ayor an d  m e are  good...(No) He is 
n o t (Catholic). He is from ODS, b u t  he  is a  very nice 
m an. No (He is no t religious) he is very good, fine, b u t I 
th in k  he is a the ist, perhaps.(interview , 1998)
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B ishop H rdlicka from Olomouc:
R egular m eetings are m ore on a  social basis , th a n  on 
som e shared  w ork issues. We m eet ra th e r  on c u ltu ra l 
occasions. And th is  rela tionsh ip  is co rrect a n d  adequate .
B u t it could be m uch  m ore fertile, (interview, 1998)
In sum , for the  B ishops from the  regions, co n tac ts  w ith  policy 
m akers on a  na tional level were m inim al and , w here it did occur, w as 
often of a  social n a tu re . B ishop L iska’s descrip tion  of h is 
re la tionsh ip  w ith political pa rties a t the  n a tio n a l level w as indicative 
of th a t  general trend . Trying to answ er m y question  of h is 
re la tionsh ip  w ith parliam entary  rep resen ta tives, he  described  it in 
the  following way:
I receive every year an  invitation to the  ball of som e 
political parties. We th en  s it a t the  tab le  an d  talk . 
Politicians do come here [to Ceske Budejovice], b u t  they  
are  no t political visits - political negotiations. They are 
m ore likely friendly m eetings concerning  local affairs, 
b u t big politics they do n o t d iscuss. The B ishops 
Conference -  Mr. (sic) C ardinal Vlk yes. [he d iscu sse s  
‘big’ politics], (interview, 1998)
B ishop Ljavinec’s rem arks also gave som e ind ication  of w here 
decision m aking w as cen tred  in the  C hurch . D iscussing  the  C h u rc h ’s 
re la tions w ith politicians, he rem arked: “D aniel H erm an unofficially 
ta lk s  to people... an d  I should  add  no t ju s t  on re s titu tio n  b u t on 
o ther issu es  - only in a  private  sphere” (interview, 1998, em phasis  
m ine).
The two local B ishops who m ight be expected to have wider 
political con tac ts  were Bishop D uka  an d  B ishop Lobkowicz. D uka 
fam ously once shared  a  p rison  cell w ith Havel, a n d  is a n  ex-m em ber 
of the  C hurches Trium virate designed to co n su lt w ith  the  
G overnm ent on R estitution. B ishop Lobkowicz is a  m em ber of the
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Lobkowicz family, a  prestig ious Czech fam ily from th e  old Czech 
nobility. These two younger B ishops h a d  a  g rea ter in te re s t in, an d  a  
m ore detailed  grasp  of, policy issu es  th a n  th e ir colleagues. Yet, while 
it w as clear th a t they had  b roader political connections, these  
connections were nevertheless sim ilar to those  of th e ir colleagues in 
th a t  they  too were of a  private and  personal charac te r. And while the 
m ore friendly style of m eeting a t  the  local level w as p e rh ap s  
adequate , it clearly h ad  its  d raw backs w hen  it cam e to co n tac t w ith 
na tional politicians. B ishop Lobkowicz h a d  a  n u m b er of political 
contacts:
It is the  case th a t  I know several p a rliam en ta rian s . On 
the  social level it is very good. I m eet M inisters, they  are  
very good an d  friendly - inform ally. It is ju s t  
coincidence th a t  also my b ro th er is a  m em ber of 
Parliam ent. And the  m em ber of the  P arliam en t of th is  
region I know m any years, h is  m o ther I know, h is  son, 
b u t I m ean  it is m ore personal th a n  s tru c tu re d . So it 
depends on the Bishop on h is  p e rsonal rela tions, 
(interview, 1998)
Yet a t  the  sam e tim e he w ent on to com plain  a b o u t the  “m any 
questions th a t  need to be solved” an d  rem arked , w ith visible 
frustra tion :
I a sked  already th ree  tim es the  new  M inister for Schools 
for a  m eeting - E duard  Z em an - and  twice a t  th e  la s t 
m om ent he said  “Excuse me, we have to find a n o th e r 
tim e.” I had  stopped all appo in tm en ts for th ree  days in 
o rder to travel to Prague, (interview, 1998)
The sense  th a t  rela tionsh ips w ith politicians depended  u ltim ately  on 
personal con tac ts  w as affirmed by o ther B ishops. B ishop D uka 
rem arked , ra th e r  sadly: “The re la tionsh ip  th a t  I h a d  w ith  the 
previous governm ent I do not have w ith the  p re sen t one. The whole
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governm ent changed. My friends, friends from  the  u n d erg ro u n d , are  
no t in  p resen t governm ent” (interview, 1998). And B ishop H rdlicka 
explained: “It is m ore a  m atte r of h u m an  re la tionsh ip  - the  ability  to 
have a  dialogue, to show a  good will. The p re sen t M inister of C u ltu re  
h a s  very negative a ttitu d es  tow ards the C hurch . The previous one 
w as a  believer. So the differences occur here” (interview, 1998). The 
m a tte r  w as sum m ed u p  by Bishop Maly:
U nfortunately, in ou r Republic, institu tionally , there  
does n o t exist any th ing  w hich would organize m eetings 
of the  politicians an d  the  ch u rch  h ierarchy . T here are  
individual con tacts on the  b asis  of th e  w ish  of one of 
those  sides, b u t there  is no s tru c tu re  for th is  m eeting 
an d  th a t is, I th ink , a  pity, because  it w ould be good if 
there  would exist som e kind  of platform  w here politicians 
would m eet w ith the represen ta tives of the  c h u rc h  to 
d iscu ss  the  m atte rs  of society. Of cou rse  it is no t a  
m a tte r  ab o u t who is going the win the  m ighty  fight, b u t 
politicians a re n ’t in te rested  in u n d e rs tan d in g  the  voice of 
B ishops of chu rches, (interview, 1998)
The lack  of in stitu tionalised  powers for the c h u rc h  h a d  its  effects in 
o ther ways. To re tu rn  to the  issue  of res titu tion , it is c lear th a t  the  
Catholic C h u rch ’s capacities to p u rsu e  w hat S chm itter describes a s  
its “in te res ts  and  passio n s” (1997:240) are greatly  w eakened by, on 
the  one h an d , the  lack of an  institu tionalized  re la tionsh ip  betw een 
the  na tional ch u rch  and  the  Czech S tate  and , on  the  o th e r h an d , the  
lack  of an  institu tionalized  rela tionsh ip  betw een the  Czech S ta te  an d  
the  V atican. The ch u rch  w as given little if any  space to co n trib u te  to 
official a ttem p ts  to resolve the conflict over R estitu tion . In the  period 
of the  first post-C om m unist Governm ent, a  s ta te -c h u rc h  com m ission 
h a d  been p lanned  to d iscu ss  questions of the  financing  of chu rches. 
The C hurches had  nom inated  th ree  m em bers, C ard inal Vlk, B ishop
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D uka (who a t  the tim e w as Fr. D uka, the  Provincial of the  Czech 
Dom inicans) and  Pavel Sm etana, the  Senior of th e  P ro testan t 
C hurch . However, a s  B ishop Lobkowicz explained to me:
They were never p u t together, th is  com m ission  does n o t 
exist u n til now ... always there  w as su c h  a  political 
unw ill to d iscu ss th is  and  p e rh ap s  I c an  say, it w as the  
position of ex-prem ier Klaus. It w as a  political unw ill to 
solve, to resolve these  questions, (interview, 1998)
B ishop Koukl supported  th is  view: “there  were som e a ttem p ts  to 
m ake a  com m ittee, s ta te  - church . B u t K laus alw ays refused” 
(interview, 1998). Almost one year in to  K laus's first period of 
G overnm ent, the  chu rch , gradually  becom ing aw are of the  real 
d istinc tion  betw een “freedom  from” an d  “freedom  to ,” h a d  begun  to 
m ake public its concerns. In a  s ta tem en t they  declared  th a t  it w as 
no t enough  ju s t  to legalize the C h u rc h es’ activities. They were 
concerned, they  said, th a t they had  n o t been  allowed to partic ipa te  
officially in a  dem ocratic decision m aking  p rocess w hich affected 
them  greatly and  asked  a t least to be consu lted  before any  final 
verdict on res titu tion  w as announced , (reference? M arch: 1993). By 
1997 concern  had  tu rn ed  to m ore po in ted  d isapproval w ith the 
C ardinal publicly criticizing K laus’s G overnm ent for failing to engage 
in d irect ta lk s w ith the C hurch  on the  re s titu tio n  of lan d s  and  
build ing seized by the  com m unists. (The Tablet, 8 Feb: 1997). By the 
tim e of m y interviews w ith C hurch  leaders in  Novem ber 1998 the 
s itua tion  h ad  no t improved. With a  c lear a ir  of grievance, B ishop 
Ljavinec, com plained: “they  need to talk; n o t th e  G overnm ent coming 
an d  saying th is  is w ha t we are going to do ... The Catholic C hurch  
w as d isregarded  in these  d iscussions,” (interview, 1998).
The issue  of R estitu tion  h a s  a ttrac ted  m ore m ed ia  coverage 
th a n  any  o ther 'religious issu e ’. Yet, m any  of the  B ishops were 
anx ious to draw  me away from th is  question  focusing in s tead  on the
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w ider question  of the in stitu tiona lisa tion  of ch u rch  s ta te  
re la tionsh ips. Daniel H erm an w as keen  to explain  th a t  restitu tion  
w as n o t the  m ost im portan t issue; the m ost im p o rtan t issue  w as to 
w ork o u t a  general m odel for ch u rch  s ta te  relations:
For u s  it is no t the m ain  question , th e  re s titu tio n  of the  
property. For u s  it’s m ore im portan t the  p rincip les...the  
legal recognizing of the  chu rch . The econom ic 
independence its very very im portan t, b u t if it is based  
on the  res titu tion  or on the  ren t from  the  p roperty  w hich 
will be n o t res titu ted  - i t’s for u s  n o t the  m ain  question .
It’s only practically  the  m odel - th is  [church-state] m odel 
m u s t be developed, (interview, 1998)
B ishop D uka agreed:
This problem  h a s  to be approached  in  th e  contex t of a  
new  tax  law w hich would give the  c h u rc h  access to 
certa in  resou rces [the p lan  th a t people shou ld  be able to 
e a rm ark  p a rt of the ir taxes for c h u rc h  p u rposes].58 It is 
also connected  w ith the  proposed new  pro tection  of 
M onum ents Law envisaging a  new form of cooperation  of 
governm ent, town halls an d  ch u rch , in salvaging the 
cu ltu ra l heritage. These laws could be m ore im portan t 
for the  ch u rch  th a t the  res titu tio n s  of h e r p roperty  in 
certa in  respects. (Esras, 1993b)
The c h u rc h ’s capacity  a s  a  political acto r w as also  greatly  lim ited by 
the  poorly institu tionalized  rela tionsh ip  betw een the  Czech S tate  an d  
the  Holy See. The Czech case is an  anom aly  in  E as te rn  Europe; 
Poland, H ungary, an d  Slovakia have all concluded trea tie s  w ith the  
V atican, yet negotiations in the  Czech Republic have n o t begun. (The
58 The Klaus Government was entirely against the proposed provisions for earmarking 
taxes.
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Tablet, 8 February , 1997). Daniel H erm an explained to m e how vital 
it w as to have th is  m atte r resolved:
We - the  ch u rch  in the  Czech Republic - a re  only p a rt of 
the  U niversal C hurch . And we are n o t the  [sole] m akers 
of the  legal system  of the chu rch . The m ak er of the  
s ta te ’s law in the Czech Republic an d  the  m aker of the  
ch u rch  law m u st d iscu ss  w ith one ano ther. We, or the  
Czech B ishop’s conference are n o t [solely] responsib le  to 
d iscu ss  w ith the  sta te  ab o u t th is  C anon  Law. (interview,
1998)
4. Explanations for the Minimal Role the Catholic 
Church has had in Policy Making
The Czech Catholic C hurch  h a s  had , an d  co n tin u es  to have, a  
negligible involvem ent in d iscussion  an d  decision-m aking  a t  e ither 
w ith the  s ta te  or in or th rough  those conventional of "political 
society.’59 There are a  nu m b er of possible exp lanations w hy the  
C hurch  h a s  little influence in the m ajor policy decisions th a t  affect 
them . These explanations can  be divided in to  cu ltu ra l a rg u m en ts  
w hich see the  legacy of C om m unism  as th e  m ain  cau sa l factor, and  
s tru c tu ra l a rgum en ts w hich place a  g rea ter em p h asis  on th e  legacy 
of the  recen t "transition’. The following sections seek  to estab lish  
w hether these  exp lanations can  accoun t for the  lim ited partic ipa tion  
of the  C hurch  in policy-m aking a renas.
59 Casanova, for example, differentiates the “polity” into “three differentiated arenas: the 
state, political society and civil society” (Casanova, 1993:61). See also Cohen and Arato 
(1992), Chapter One.
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4.1 Cultural Argument: The Communist Legacy o f Weak 
Organizations: Distrust and Anti-Politics
A com m on explanation  for the w eakness of organ izations, w here 
w eakness is m easu red  by low visibility in the  policy m aking  process, 
is a  com m unist legacy of public d is tru s t in  o rgan izations and  a  
d is ta s te  for politics. The a rgum en t here is sim ply th a t  p o st­
com m unist civic organizations are w eak because  they  c an n o t a ttra c t 
m em bers because  people are  susp ic ious of them . Cook, for exam ple, 
in h e r resea rch  on w orkers’ organizations, a rg u es  th a t, “a lthough  
Solidarity generated  enorm ous respec t in Polish society, for w orkers 
generally, there  is a  feeling th a t trade  u n io n s  are  too rem ote an d  
u n tru s tw o rth y ” (Cook, 1995:115-118). Sim ilarly, O lson rem ark s th a t 
in  the  Czech Republic, “n o t only political parties , b u t  any  form of 
vo lun tary  group organization, is now d is tru s ted ” (Olson, 1997:153).
The explanation  for th is  s ta te  of affairs is firmly located by 
various com m enta to rs in the  no t too d is tan t p ast. O lson a rgues th a t 
“a n  anti-o rgan ization  inheritance” is one of the  m ajor legacies of 
com m unism . (1997:153) Sm olar sim ilarly m a in ta in s  th a t  “everyday 
life u n d e r socialism  tau g h t people to survive a s  ind iv iduals an d  to 
fear any  association  w ith independen t collective ac tion” (Smolar, 
1996:33). And Toth argues th a t, “the  way th a t  o rganizations operated  
(such a s  the  official w om en’s organization an d  the  trad e  unions) 
m ade people d is tru s t organizations of all k in d s” (Toth, 1993:220).
Certainly, the  ru sh  to jo in  organizations w as lower th a n  th a t 
expected by m any ju b ila n t sup p o rte rs  of the  new  dem ocratic  regim es. 
Yet, there  is little evidence to su p p o rt the  view th a t  som e essen tia l 
anh-organizational a ttitu d e  is the  cau sa l factor in the  con tem porary  
p a tte rn in g  of em erging organizations.60 Indeed David O lson him self
60 There has been a decline in the activities of some of the non-state organizations that 
were particularly active during the latter phases of communism; environmental groups and
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no tes th a t, “resea rch  on group form ation a n d  activity [in E as te rn  
Europe] is only in  the  beginning stage” (Olson, 1997:157). In the  case  
of the  Catholic C hu rch  the  a rgum en t of an  an ti-o rgan iza tion  cu ltu re  
a s  a  legacy of C om m unism  seem s to be of little value. C ertainly, the  
n u m b er of people who claim  m em bersh ip  of th e  C atholic C hu rch  is 
greatly reduced  from its pre-C om m unist figure.61 Yet, th e  coun try 's  
1992 c en su s  show s th a t some 40% of people in  the  Czech Republic 
identify them selves a s  Catholic. The B ishops w ere keen  to  reduce  th is  
figure to w ha t they  considered a  m ore reasonab le  estim ate  of 5%, on 
the  b asis  th a t  the  governm ent figure of 40% w as m erely “a  theoretical 
figure no t expressing  the  real balance of forces” (Fr. Fiala, cited in 
E sras , 1993c). Nevertheless, the G overnm ent's official s ta tis tic s
peace movements are notable examples. Leslie Holmes (1997) concludes that, “The evidence 
so far suggests that [these] have in general become less  active in early post-communism  
than they were in late communism” (1997:279). However, in the cases of the environmental 
and peace movements an anti-organization factor does not seem to be at work. A more 
compelling suggestion is that the ranks of these organizations were greatly depleted by the 
exodus of many of the more able personnel who took up positions in state administration or 
became professional politicians. (See for example Szacki et al., 1993) Interestingly, the 
opening up of the State also threatened the Church with loss of members. One of the 
interviewees for this thesis Vaclav Maly, a leading dissident under Communism, recounted 
in an interview with a Prague Newspaper that the most difficult choice he ever made was 
whether to remain in the Catholic Church or to enter politics professionally. (The Prague 
Post, 23 November, 1997). Most commentators would agree that Maly’s standing in the early 
days of post -communism was such that he could have commanded virtually any position in 
the new Government. An anti-organizational factor could be more at work in the case of 
feminist groups which received a particularly bad press after the collapse of the Communist 
State. Furthermore, the dominance of the State in these organizations and “ its particularly 
harsh stance towards any moves to develop autonomous women’s groups” left women in 
particular with “few political skills and experience in independent organizing” (see Adamik, 
1993; Fodor, 1994).
61 Before World War II, a mere 5.8% of people in Czechoslovakia claimed to have no 
church membership compared to a June 1991 figure of 29.5% (39.7% in the Czech Republic 
and 9.7% in the Slovak Republic). The Catholic Church before the War had almost 11.000 
members down by almost 3,000 to a post communist figure of 7,217,921. .Statistics from 
the newspaper Svobodne Slovo, cited in Peter Martin, (1991)
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suggest th a t  the  public were n o t unw illing to be assoc ia ted  w ith the 
ch u rch , if only in a  vague way.
The a rgum en t of an  ‘an ti-organization  c u ltu re ’ is m oreover a t 
odds w ith staffing levels, a s  d istinc t from  n u m b ers  of ‘believers’. 
C om m unism , unquestionab ly , h ad  a  deadly  effect on rec ru itm en t 
figures, greatly w eakening the  organizational s tru c tu re  of the  
C hurch . A dm issions to the  few sem inaries allowed to rem ain  open 
were controlled by the  sta te , th u s  keeping the  n u m b er of personnel 
artificially low. The consequences of those policies a re  experienced in 
a  very real way today. Eva Sharpova, a  Czech jo u rn a lis t, described 
th e ir effects in one of the  religious orders. “The w orst problem ,” she 
says,
is th a t  they  were deprived by C om m unism  of a n  en tire  
generation. The o ldest of the  active s is te rs  are  in  the ir 
late  th irties, the  M other Superior is over sixty, an d  the  
generation  who would be in their forties a n d  fifties, a t 
the  peak  of the ir perform ance, is m issing. (E sras, 1993a)
C om m unism  also h ad  the  effect of thw arting  the  m ore com m on 
E uropean  developm ent of having lay m em bers play a  m ore active 
role in the  C h u rch .62 B ishop Maly explained:
D uring the  C om m unist period only the  p ries ts  could  do 
som eth ing  in the  chu rch . The laym en saw  only w h a t w as 
done a ro u n d  the  a lta r  and  it led to a  certa in  passiv ity  of 
laym en. Everybody w as, everything w as, co n cen tra ted  on 
the  person  of p riest and  only the p ries t w as active in the  
ch u rch  an d  it is necessary  to change it, to give m ore 
space for laym en...in  ou r country , the  c h u rc h  needs 
above all be tte r cooperation betw een p ries ts  a n d  laym en.
62 It is common in the Catholic Church in Western Europe for some lay members to play 
a more active role, for example, distributing communion at the mass and sitting on finance 
committees, and other bodies.
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(interview, 1998)
Fr. Miloslav F iala shared  th is  view: “There is a  problem ...w e have no t 
been  sufficiently active in trying to engage the  cooperation  of Catholic 
laym en in social activities, in p a rish  councils. The legacy of th e  p a s t - 
the  passive lay person  still prevails” (E sras, 1993c). T hough 
C om m unist policies had  the ir effect on personnel n u m b ers , it is 
difficult to su s ta in  the  proposition th a t  a n  an ti-o rgan iza tional 
a ttitu d e  inherited  from C om m unism  co n tin u es to w eaken  the 
chu rch . All ind icators are  to the  contrary . The C h u rch  ap p ea rs  
genuinely con ten t w ith its sm all b u t growing n u m b er of novices. Fr. 
Fiala, a lthough  concerned ab o u t the  re la tionsh ip  betw een the  ch u rch  
and  lay people, rem arked  tha t: “there  are  118 s tu d e n ts  of theology 
here in Prague a t  p resen t an d  an o th er 188 a t  Olom ouc. T hese are 
respectab le  num bers , rarely  a tta ined  betw een the  two w ars” (Esras, 
1993c). B ishop Koukl d iscussing  the  im pact C om m unism  h a d  in 
reducing  the  nu m b er of p riests added “b u t we are  fo rtunately  
growing since C om m unism  fell” (interview, 1998). And B ishop 
Lobkowicz optim istically com m ented:
In the  p a s t during  C om m unism , people alw ays prayed 
for new  vocations....bu t they  [the State] w ould n o t accep t 
them , because  it w as th is  Num erus C lausus.63 Now it is 
really a  m iracle, because  always the  p ries t vocations 
cam e from C hristian  families and  rich  fam ilies. We have 
no rich  families and  no C hristian  fam ilies, an d  yet 
[nevertheless] we have ou r own vocations.” (interview,
1998)
Finally, a s  suggested in ch ap te r two, C om m unism  provided the  
Catholic C hu rch  w ith an  opportun ity  to im prove its  s tan d in g  in  the
63 The state allowed only a strictly limited number of students to attend the theological 
colleges
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public eye. The consequences of th is  were a p p a re n t after the  collapse 
of C om m unism  w hen Tom as Halik w as able to no te  w ith som e 
su rp rise , “in spring 1990 the  ch u rch  h ad  a n  au th o rity  in B ohem ia 
su ch  a s  it h ad  never h ad  for cen tu ries a n d  practically  the  entire  
Czech na tion  sp en t the  Pope's visit a s  a  big freedom  party” (R euters 
E as te rn  Europe, 16 May, 1995).64 S tud ies by G allup of m any  
coun tries including Czechoslovakia show ed religious belief in  m any  
coun tries closely paralleling th a t  of W estern  E urope w ith a n  average 
of 49% of responden ts describing them selves a s  religious a n d  in the 
m ain  Catholic (Associated Press, 30 O ctober, 1990). C ard inal 
T om asek w as one of the  m ost p o p u lar public  figures in 
Czechoslovakia and , im portantly , re la tions w ith the  new  political 
elites were good. The C hurch  found th a t  m any  friends m ade in 
p rison  or th rough  organizations like C h arte r 77 were now  either 
m em bers of Parliam ent, som e were even m em bers of th e  new 
G overnm ent Cabinet.
A second s tra n d  of the  C om m unist legacy a rg u m en t proposes 
th a t  organizations are  w eak because  they  a re  anti-political. The 
a rg u m en t here  is th a t the  m em bers of con tem porary  E ast-E u ro p ean  
organ isations, because  of the  experience of C om m unism , shy  away 
from being political and  from engaging in  politics. Andrew  G reen 
argues, for exam ple, th a t “the  deliberately non-political s tan ce  of 
associations, a  d irect resu lt of the  anti-po litics a ttitu d e  developed 
du ring  the  com m unist regime, effectively co n stra in s  the  developm ent 
of d irect rela tions w ith political p a rties” (Green a n d  Leff, 1997:75). 
And David Olson claim s th a t the reason  w hy “econom ic based  
in te re s t g roups have no t affiliated w ith political parties , proclaim  
the ir lack  of p a rtisan sh ip  and  seem  re lu c ta n t to create  even the  
im pression  of p a rtisan  preferences or a c tio n s ...is p a rt o f  the  rejection
64 Halik is a leading clerical figure, a former Secretary of the Bishops Conference, close 
colleague of President Havel, and a sociologist at Charles University,
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o f  political participation in the com m unist p erio d ’ (Olson, 1997:160, 
em phasis  mine).
N either G reen nor Olson offer evidence for these  p o in ts  of view. 
B ut, the  applicability of the  argum en t to th e  case  of th e  Catholic 
C hu rch  is highly limited. The com m ents from  the  B ishops in the 
first section of th is  ch ap te r dem onstra te  ju s t  how  keen  th e  ch u rch  is 
to m ake con tac t w ith politicians. The leader of the  C atholic C hurch , 
C ard inal Vlk, an d  the  Spokesm an for the B ishops Conference Daniel 
H erm an, spend  a  large proportion of th e ir tim e m onitoring, 
rem ark ing  on, and  countering  sta tem en ts  from  politic ians critical of 
the  chu rch . Furtherm ore, the Catholic C h u rch  is a n  organization 
th a t  h a s  garnered  resources and  directed them  tow ards political 
ends. The fact th a t it h a s  in place a  highly vocal p re ss  secretary  
regularly  a ttem pting  con tac t w ith the  p ress  offices of th e  na tional 
a n d  local papers is indicative of th is. The C h u rch  h a s  in place a  
s tru c tu re  strong  enough to p ress legal claim s, regard less of w hether 
those claim s are successfu l or not. For exam ple, it h a s  p u rsu e d  a  
n u m b er of cou rt cases an d  taken  the  issu e  of re s titu tio n  to the  
E uropean  Com m ission. Finally the  backing  th a t  an y  national 
Catholic C hu rch  h a s  from the V atican w eakens greatly  th e  a rgum en t 
of a n  ‘an ti-po litical’ organization.65
65 The political power of the Vatican is however weakened by the lack of an 
institutionalized agreement between the State, the Holy See and the National Church. The 
Pope could appeal to Havel and make public speeches but without a place at the table in 
any negotiations there was no guarantee of the Holy See being listened to all. Nevertheless 
the Pope seems to have dedicated himself to using every possible opportunity available to 
him to raise the issue of the restitution of Church property. On a visit to Rome, in March 
1993, Havel met the Pope and reported that the issue of restitution of property to the 
Catholic Church had been spoken of. The Pope said “I would like to stress the subject of the 
restitution of property unjustly taken by the atheist regime from the Catholic Church as well 
as from other Christian denominations and from our Jewish brothers,” He asked Havel to 
hurry up the process of returning the property to these organizations (citation from Reuters 
Eastern Europe, 20 March 1994; see also The Tablet, 19 March 1994. When the Pope
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The final ‘cu ltu ra l’ a rgum en t th a t a ttem p ts  to explain  the  w eak 
com m unications betw een chu rch  and  s ta te  is m ade by reference to 
the  official policy of a theism  p u rsu ed  by th e  C om m unist State. 
A ttention is firmly draw n away from the  in te rn a l dynam ics of 
organizations an d  focuses instead  on the  legacy of th e  com m unist 
a ttac k s  on religion. This legacy, it is p roposed, im pacts on the 
C hurch  in two m ain  ways. First, it h a s  m ade people a n d  politicians 
su sp ic ious of the  Catholic C hurch  an d  of the  V atican. Second, it h a s  
m ade people ignoran t of how religious o rganizations function  in  the 
m odern  world.
The explanation  is a  popu lar one am ong the  B ishops. 
C om m enting on the poor links betw een S ta te  a n d  C hurch , B ishop 
Maly said, “Of course the  politicians do lean  on public  opinion w hich 
w as educa ted  for th ree  generations du ring  C om m unism  in  prejudice 
ag a in st the  ch u rch  an d  th a t is why the  in s titu tio n a l problem  is no t 
solved by now” (interview, 1998). And on the  issu e  of a  trea ty  
betw een the  S tate  an d  the  Holy See he rem arked: “H a ha , i t ’s the 
sam e question , like before, b ias in the  m inds of politicians a n d  they
visited the Czech Republic in May 1995 he used the opportunity of a visit to Klaus to raise 
the question of property the Church had a claim to. (The Associated Press, 18 May 1995). 
In 1996, a pilgrimage of 5,000 Czech Catholics to Rome provided another opportunity to 
remind his followers of the outstanding issues between Church and State. He noted that 
outstanding issues of religious education in schools, the role of the Church in the army, the 
health sector and prisons needed to be resolved and appealed for the cooperation of political 
leaders. Listing the numbers of building and the acres of land that had been taken by the 
communists the Pope said that these were “indispensable for carrying out the pastoral 
activity of the church”. (The Tablet, 22 June 1996). By 1996 talk of cooperation had turned 
to criticism. The Tablet reported that the Pope in his 1996 visit with Bishops had “deplored 
the failure of the Government to stabilize relations between the Church and the State, or to 
settle the issue of restitution of Church property confiscated” (The Tablet, 3 May 1997). In 
May 1996 amidst the controversy over St. Vitus Cathedral, the Vatican offered to take part 
in the negotiations with the state as a way, they suggested, towards overcoming tensions. 
(Luxmoore, 1997). However, without a formal arrangement between the State and the Holy 
See there were limits to the Vatican’s attempts at involvement.
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d o n ’t like to see V atican au tho rities involved in th is  question” 
(interview, 1998). This viewpoint w as sup p o rted  by B ishop Liska who 
rem arked: “O ur public society is m ore h and icapped  from  those  40
years  of C om m unism  th a n  it adm its. They k e p t they  th rew  away
the  exterior form and  kept in large am o u n t the  com m un ist regime 
m entality  ag a in st the ch u rch ” (interview, 1998).
Politicians too point to the  a ttitu d e s  of pa rliam en tary  
colleagues. Ja rom il Talir from KDU-CSL, explained the  obstacles to 
the  creation  of a  C oncordat or trea ty  w ith  the  Holy See in  the  
following way: “th is  all com es from the  conditions th a t  they  do no t 
w an t C hurch  to have th is role in society of s ta tin g  m oral ru les. And I 
th in k  th is  is the  reason  why the stance  of those  pa rties  to th is 
problem  is like th is” (interview, 1998). And finally, Fr. H erm an 
com m ented  passionately:
So why? B ecause som e m em bers of o u r  G overnm ent 
don 't understand  the  style of chu rch , or the  system  of 
c h u rch  life. It takes time, they d o n ’t un d ersta n d  it. They 
know, or som e of them  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  C h u rch  like an  
organization for the, I don ’t know, for th e  gardeners. B u t 
there  is the  diplom atic m ission, the  em bassy  of the  Holy 
See. I d o n ’t, I c a n ’t understand  how it is possible w hy 
they  are no t able to u n d e rs tan d  it b u t  i t ’s the  reality, 
(interview, 1998)
There are  good reasons why m any  of th e  B ishops m ight feel 
th a t  a  C om m unist inherited  anti-C atho lic ism , or a  lack  of
u n d e rs tan d in g  of Catholicism , is beh ind  th e  failure to have its 
o u ts tan d in g  concerns addressed . In the  first in s tan ce  there  a re  good 
reaso n s  (as d iscussed  in chap ter two) to su p p o rt the  c h u rc h ’s 
asse rtio n  of “anti-clerical b ias” in the  re s titu tio n  process. (Agence 
F rance Presse, 18 May, 1995). Furtherm ore, a  n u m b er of s ta tem en ts  
by the  Czech Prime M inister were, d isquietingly  for the  C hurch ,
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suggestive of an  anti-C atholic s tra in  am ong the  R epublic’s leading 
political party . One of the  first of K laus’s rem ark s cam e in Ju ly  1993, 
on the  occasion of a  m ass com m em orating St. M ethodius a t  St. 
V elehrad. (Pehe, 1994:19). On the  sam e day, K laus w as a tten d in g  the 
feast day of the  reform er J a n  H us w hich the  G overnm ent had  
organized to be on the  sam e day a s  the  St. M ethodius celebrations. 
Czech Television gave four h o u rs  of live coverage to th e  Catholic 
celebrations a t  Velehrad. This caused  a  fu rious reaction  from  Klaus 
who, in a n  article for a  leading Czech daily, criticized the  b ro ad casts , 
alleging favouritism  tow ards Catholics, a n d  conclud ing  th a t, “the 
Catholic C hu rch  h a s  begun playing a  role in society th a t  does no t 
correspond  w ith its  real s tand ing” (Kettle, 1995:22; see also  The 
Tablet, 31 Ju ly , 1993).66 C hurch -S ta te  re la tions were once again  on 
shaky  g rounds w hen K laus described the  C hurch  a s  “a  k ind  of 
R am blers A ssociation”. (The Tablet, 30 O ctober, 1993; CTK (Czech 
News Agency, 15 O ctober 1993). He tried  to salvage the  ensu ing  
political debacle by explaining th a t while the  C hurch  w as necessary , 
“it shou ld  n o t play a  dom inan t role” in  Czech society. (Reuters 
E as te rn  Europe, 20 M arch, 1994)
On the  surface of it there  ap p ea rs  to be som e evidence to 
ju stify  the  ‘anti-C atholic a rg u m en t’ N evertheless, it is im p o rtan t to 
guard  ag a in st an  explanation th a t proffers th is  a s  th e  single cau sa l 
factor for poor C hurch-S tate  links. While it is tru e  th a t  the  Catholic 
C hurch  o u t of all groups seeking the  re tu rn  of th e ir p roperty  h a d  the  
m ost to gain from restitu tion , it w as no t the  only group  th a t  felt 
d iscrim inated  against. R estitu tion  clearly privileged indiv iduals and  
any  c la im an t therefore th a t w as an  organization w as m ore likely to 
lose out. T hus, a lthough  the  ch u rch  were the  m ajor losers in 
restitu tion , it would nevertheless be reasonab le  to a s se r t  th a t  th is
66 The dispute was weakened by the release, in the middle of the dispute, of Government 
statistics showing that 40% of Czechs considered themselves to be Catholic.
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w as due to a  b ias ag a in st organizations a s  opposed to one directed 
solely a t  Catholics. Furtherm ore, w here K laus h a s  criticized the 
Catholic C hurch , it is notew orthy th a t  for the  m o st p a r t  h is  rem arks 
a re  d irected no t tow ards Catholicism  p e r  se  b u t  tow ards the  possible 
role of the  Catholic C hurch  in Czech society. K laus h im self h a s  
a ttem p ted  to m ake the  d istinction. In a  radio interview  he no ted  th a t 
the  conflict over res titu tion  is,
n e ith e r a  question  of C hristian ity  or C h ris tian  ideals an d  
values, no r of the  good and  the  p rosperity  of society ...It 
is exclusively an d  only a  concern  of p roperty  - an d  
certa in  advantages, political an d  otherw ise linked w ith 
th a t  (The Prague Post, 2 Ju n e , 1993)
Finally, a  glance a t the  wider p ic tu re  show s th a t  all g roups in
civil society, an d  no t ju s t  the  Catholic C hurch , experience difficulties 
gaining access to decision-m aking circles, (see for exam ple, Novotny, 
1995)67 B oth the  m edia68 an d  trade  u n io n s  69 have been  the  sub ject 
of n u m ero u s a ttac k s  by K laus in the  period 1992-1998 w ith
environm ental organizations, h is p a rticu la r bete noir. Novotny’s
polem ic ag a in st K laus covers wide g round  in h is  critic ism  of ODS’ 
efforts to block access to G overnm ent by bo th  ind iv iduals and
67 Novotny notes however that “this centralisation and the excessive control of power was 
not an obstacle to the penetration by (certain) lobbies into the organizations of the state”. 
He gives the example of Philip Morris Tobacco Company, Westinghouse Society etc. 
(Novotny, 1995:124-125)
68 Klaus’s first moments of a speech at the London School of Economics on 17 June 
1997 were devoted to expressing surprise that the media were present and assembled in the 
first two rows. He apologised elaborately to the rest of the audience for having to lower the 
tone of this speech so that the journalists would be able to understand him.
69 Green and Leff commenting on the endless conflict between Government and the 
Trade Unions note “it is clear that the point of contention is not individual policy 
disagreements, but the status of the unions themselves ... the domination of the CDSP by 
the government has meant that there is no effective institutional channel for pressing labour 
concerns” (Green and Leff, 1997:83). The CDSP is the Tripartite Social Partnership.
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organizations. Noting the lack of decen tra lization  to local 
governm ent, the reduced  role for “the synd ica tes a n d  the  professional 
ch am b ers”, the  tendencies “to control the  m edia”, th e  refusa l to 
appo in t a n  O m budsm an, the  a ttem p t to “abo lish  the  possibility  of 
the  control of the  process of privatization by a  tr ib u n a l a n d  the  
possibility  of the  ju rid ica l control of its function  by the  public  secto r,” 
Novotny concludes: “the  centralization exercised by the  ODS of K laus 
rem inds u s  of the  fam ous ph rase  ‘L’E ta t C ’e s t m oi”’ (Novotny, 
1995:124-125). This is a  view th a t receives su p p o rt from  G reen and  
Leff. Their article is devoted to an  analysis of the  Czech legislative 
fram ew ork, a  fram ew ork they argue provides little “ou tside  access  to 
the  p rocess of policy form ation an d  im plem enta tion” (Green an d  Leff, 
1997:78). They write:
The legislative process itself offers little add itional access 
to the  policy process. The opportun ity  for ex ternal in p u t, 
w hich could occur a t the  com m ittee level, is itself 
un institu tionalized : involvem ent by o u ts id ers  occurs 
only by invitation of the com m ittee m ajority , a n d  is often 
lim ited to being presen t; only rarely  does a n  ou tside  
acto r have the opportun ity  to an sw er q u estio n s or 
provide inform ation of any  kind. (Green a n d  Leff, 
1997:77; see also Olson and  Norton, 1996b)
4.2 The Structural Legacies of the ‘Transition’
The c h u rc h ’s inability to have an  im pact on policy m ak ing  e ither 
th rough  d irect linkages w ith the  sta te  or via the  influence of political 
pa rties is p e rh ap s  m ost usefully  exam ined in the  con tex t of a  politics 
of exclusion experienced by virtually all civic o rgan isa tions in the  
Czech Republic. The success of th is  politics of exclusion, I a rgue, is 
u ltim ately  explained by reference to the  s tru c tu ra l legacies of the
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transition . As argued in the preceding pages, the  p ro sp ec ts  of a  
rational, coheren t resolution to res titu tio n  w ere greatly  reduced  by 
the  speed of the  ‘tran s itio n ’ and  its  im pact on the  parliam en tary  
a rena . This argum en t can  be extended to explain  the  lack  of access 
civic organizations have to the  s ta te , e ither directly or via the 
m ediation  of political parties. In the  case  of the  new er political 
parties , the  a rgum en t needs no revision to explain th e  paucity  of 
links th a t  pa rties  have w ith social groups: th e  very speed  w ith which 
C om m unism  collapsed in Czechoslovakia, a n d  the  rap id ity  of the 
tran s itio n  to a  parliam entary  dem ocracy, did n o t give asp iring  
politicians enough tim e to develop constituenc ies w ith in  society. This 
readily acco u n ts  for the  existence of p a rties  like the  ODS an d  ODA 
who have little con tact w ith civic o rganizations and , in  com parison  
w ith the  C om m unists or KDU-CSL, a  m odest p a rty  m em bersh ip .
One problem  w ith th is  descrip tion  is th a t  it fails to explain why 
those pa rties  th a t are  no t new  parties, for exam ple, the  C om m unist 
Party  or KDU-CSL nevertheless experience sim ilar difficulties to ODS 
an d  the  ODA in consolidating the ir constituenc ies . I p ropose th a t, in 
the  case  of these  older estab lished  p arties , th e  im pact of the 
tran sitio n  is relevant no t so m uch  for its  im pact on the 
parliam en tary  a rena , b u t m ore for its  im pact on Czech social 
s tru c tu re . Here, constituencies in Czech society w hich were once 
regarded a s  stable, have been throw n into  d isa rray  by the  rapid  
change engendered  by the  events of 1989. R ansdorf, th e  Vice C hair 
of the  C om m unist Party, com m enting on the  w eak links h is  party  
h ad  w ith trade  un ions rem arked: “It is n o t so sim ple because  th is 
period of socio-economic change w as a  tim e of huge social 
transfo rm ation . Can you im agine th a t  40 per cen t of people in our 
coun try  changed  their jobs?...So  Czech social s tru c tu re  is n o t a s  in
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o th er coun tries of E aste rn  E urope....no t so se ttled” (interview, 
1998).70
A part from the im pact on electoral c o n stitu en ts , the  de­
s tru c tu ra tio n  in society also h as  its effects on  C om m unist pa rty  
m em bers, a  p rocess th a t h a s  im plications for the  iden tity  of the  party  
itself. Alm ost a s  com pensation for h is p a rty ’s failure to estab lish  
links w ith trad itional w orker groups, R ansdorf com m ented: “B u t we 
try  to sp read  ou r influence in all s tra ta  of population . We have also 
m any, m any en trep ren eu rs  in ou r s tru c tu re  b ecau se  m any of o u r 
m em bers an d  form er m em bers of the  party  have no chance  to survive 
only to becom e en trep ren eu rs” (interview, 1998).
In the  case of a  long estab lished  party  like the  C om m unist 
Party, it is likely th a t the  effects of the  speed of tran s itio n  were first 
felt in the  social sphere and  then  la ter in the  political a rena . W here 
the  new  parties began w ith u n certa in  identities a n d  th e n  w ent on to 
face the  difficulties of estab lish ing  constituenc ies in a  society 
suffering severe social dislocation, the scenario  w as the  reverse for 
older parties. The older parties s ta rted  w ith c lear iden tities a n d  a  
certa in  confidence a s  to their constituencies, a  confidence th a t  
g radually  becam e d isrup ted  as the  changes in society w orked the ir 
way to the  party  level. On the whole th is  w orked a g a in st the  qu ick  
an d  easy  form ation of links betw een social g roups an d  political 
parties.
This in teraction  betw een a  shifting social s tru c tu re  and  the  
speedy developm ent of Parliam ent does m u ch  to explain the  poor 
re la tionsh ip  the  ch u rch  h a s  w ith political parties. Im m ediately after 
1989 the  m ost n a tu ra l allies of the  Catholic C h u rch  were the  two
7°‘In the year between May 1994 and May 1995, the proportion of Communist voters who 
described themselves as workers fell from 22.5 per cent to 15.9 per cent, and as employees 
from 27.5 per cent to 14.3 per cent, while those above the pension age rose from 28.0 per
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C hristian  parties: the  C hristian  D em ocratic Party  (Vaclav B enda’s 
CDP) an d  the C hristian  D em ocratic U nion-Czechoslovak People’s 
Party  (Lux’s KDU-CSL). The C hristian  D em ocratic Party  w as a  
b reakaw ay p arty  from Civic Forum  and , a s  such , w as one of the  
‘new ’ political a sp iran ts . It failed to survive, a s  did m any  of the  new  
groups on the  political scene across E aste rn  Europe; a  w eak party  
w ith few roots in society, it m erged w ith the  ODS a t  th e  end  of 
K laus’s first election term .
However, the  KDU-CSL, also a  C h ristian  party , h a d  little in  
com m on w ith the ir nam esake, the  C hristian  D em ocratic Union 
(CDP). Far from being a  new organization, the  KDU-CSL h a s  the  
d istinc tion  of being one of Czechoslovakia’s o ldest surviving political 
parties. W here o ther pa rties  after 1989 h ad  to re-evaluate  th e  profile 
of th e ir co n stitu en ts , by all ind icato rs the  KDU-CSL were a n d  a re  in  
a  stronger position th a n  o ther pa rties to m a in ta in  th e ir trad itiona l 
voter base. The sup p o rte rs  of KDU-CSL, un like  the  su p p o rte rs  of the  
C om m unists, are  less likely to be forced by a  revolutionized labou r 
m ark e t to radically re th in k  the ir social identities. KDU p arty  
m em bersh ip  h a s  rem ained reasonably  stab le, an d  m em bersh ip  a t  the  
Parliam entary  level w as relatively u n to u ch ed  by the  phenom enon  of 
political tourism . Indeed, of all the  Party  c lubs in  the  Czech 
Parliam ent KDU-CSL reveals itself to be the  m ost stab le , losing none 
of its  parliam en tary  m em bers in the  lengthy period after the  1992 
election w hich w as characterized  by end less sp lits  a n d  defections 
am ong parties. All told, the  conditions described  earlier a s  w orking 
ag a in st estab lish ing  linkages betw een pa rtie s  an d  social 
constituenc ies were no t relevant in the  case of a  p a rty  like KDU-CSL.
N evertheless, despite  fo recasts of a  m u tu a lly  beneficial 
rela tionsh ip , w hich to an  ex ten t were fulfilled in the  early  years  of the
cent to a huge 59.1 per cent.’ Figures from Rude Pravo, cited by Steve Kettle, ‘Church-State 
Standoff (1995a).
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new  dem ocracy, the  contem porary  evidence is th a t  bo th  the  KDU an d  
the  C hurch  are anxious to an n u l any  percep tion  of a  close 
re la tionsh ip  betw een each  other. Ja ro m ir Talir, KDU’s ex- M inister of 
C u ltu re  com m ented:
I have to say th a t  th is  problem  is difficult for o u r party .
O ur political rivals are  trying to in troduce  o u r p a rty  a s  a  
pa rty  w hich does no t have any o th er political p rogram s, 
ju s t  th is, (interview, 1998)
And Daniel H erm an, spokesm an for the  B ishops Conference 
explained:
You know th is  link  (with KDU-CSL) is very very bad  for 
u s  ... it is also based  on experience ...tha t to co-operate 
only w ith one party  will be coun terproductive ... today we 
know  th a t, b u t n ine years ago, it w as w ithou t any  
experience, any  precedent, (interview, 1998)
E qually for Talir, KDU-CSL’s efforts to rep re se n t the  in te re s ts  
of the  C hu rches h ad  b rough t certain  d isadvantages:
W hen KDU p u sh e s  on th is  problem , its  political rivals 
u se  th is  for its discreditation. In all e lections all o u r 
rivals are  saying to voters no t to vote KDU-CSL, th is  is a  
p a rty  only for old people, for C atholics a n d  they  do n o t 
know  anyth ing  else th a n  to take  care  of the  
restitu tions, (interview, 1998)
C onditions were good for the  KDU-CSL for m aking  links w ith 
groups in  civil society; they were no t one of the  m any  ‘new  p a rtie s ’, 
no r were the ir co n stitu en ts  d ram atically  affected by the  social 
upheaval w rought by the collapse of a  com m and  econom y. The 
problem  for KDU-CSL lay no t w ith its own p a rty  iden tity  b u t w ith  the  
lack of identity  for the ir com petitors in  P arliam en t who were 
struggling to build  coheren t party  profiles. And w h a t u ltim ately  m ade
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the  creation  of links betw een KDU and  the  c h u rc h  difficult w as the 
energy devoted by o ther pa rties  to portraying  co-operation  betw een 
the  KDU an d  the  C hurch  in a  bad  light.
4.3 State-Church links: Politics in a Vacuum
Political parties  in the  Czech Republic a re  a  w eak m ean s for 
organizations to have an  im pact on political society. Yet, th is  in itself 
does n o t preclude the  possibility of an  invitation  from  the  s ta te  for 
organizations to participate  m ore directly in  the  policy m aking 
process, e ither th rough  the  creation of C om m issions or by 
rep resen ta tio n  on Parliam entary  Com m ittees. T h ro ughou t the  Klaus 
period, in itiatives in th is  regard were n o t tak en  in  the  Czech 
Republic. It is no t possible however to a ttr ib u te  th is  to a  b road -based  
political opposition to organisations. V irtually all p a rtie s  w ith the 
exception of the  Civic Dem ocratic Party  (ODS) were keen  to deepen 
dem ocracy by encouraging the developm ent a n d  partic ipa tion  of 
in te res t groups. In fact, the  an ti-o rgan isa tion  s tan ce  w as only ever 
strongly adopted  by Klaus. K laus’s views on politics are  well known; 
he rejects civil society arguing  that:
... we voted for som ething else. We voted for a  dem ocratic  
society whose bedrock is individual freedom ...The 
advocates of civil society th in k  it n ecessa ry  to increase  
the  role of d irect dem ocracy. I disagree (Havel a n d  K laus, 
1996:18, em phasis mine)71
He h a s  m ade the  poin t clear elsewhere: “My polem ic is a b o u t a  
m arke t w ithou t adjectives, a  s ta n d a rd  system  of political parties, 
w ithou t a  national front or civic m ovem ents” (Klaus, 1994b). “It is 
only these  [parliam entary] in s titu tio n s”, K laus a rgues, “th a t  can
71 V.Klaus in a discussion with President Havel aired on Czech Television on 25 May 
1994. Reprinted in part in Journal o f Democracy,7 / I  (Jan 1996) p. 18
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rep re sen t u s , the  citizens, because we elected them  in  dem ocratic 
election.” He th en  adds, som ew hat rhetorically: “Should  the
sta te ...allow  people to sponsor non-profit-m aking o rgan isa tions an d  
be relieved from taxation  an d  th u s  deprive the  s ta te  of taxes th a t  are  
tru ly  beneficial for the  m ajority?” (Klaus, 1994a). His goal -  “to stop  
deep-rooted governm ent interference in th e  econom y, to block 
p o p u lar red istribu tional practices, to dissolve d an g ero u s lobbying, 
ren t-seek ing , pro tection ist organ isations a n d  p re ssu re  g roups an d  so 
on” (Klaus, 1991).
K laus's views are supported  by M iroslava Nemcova, the  ex- 
M inister responsible  for chu rch  affairs in the  ODS dom inated  
governing coalition.
According to my belief, civil society a rises  from  the 
vo lun tary  and  free w ant of citizens, w ho...w ith  u se  of 
the ir own sources will try  to som ehow  fulfil, o rganise  an d  
finance their goal. And th is  p rocess s ta r ts  by itself, 
w ithou t som eone - the S tate  - som ehow  instiga ting  or 
p u ttin g  in  place th is  process. I th in k  the  Civil Society 
shou ld  come o u t from th is, the  free desire  of citizens.
They should not strive fo r  a part in S ta te  pow er. S ta te  
power a rises from election, decisions of free citizens, who 
elect in a  dem ocracy dem ocratic  rep resen ta tives, 
(interview, 1998).
Given the  dom inance of ODS in  th e  G overnm ent from 1992- 
1997, K laus’s efforts a t tran sla ting  h is  p a rtic u la r  m odel of society 
into reality  have been rem arkably  successfu l. ODS’ pow er to block 
m oves to w iden access to G overnm ent w as unchallenged . A ttem pts 
by coalition or opposition groups to c reate  oppo rtun ities for citizens 
or g roups to a ir their concerns were p e rs is ten tly  opposed  by K laus. 
Indeed, the  coalition agreed on a  n u m b er of occasions th a t  the  
parties w ould negotiate on the ch u rch  p roperty  issu e  b u t the  ODS
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lack  of com m itm ent en su red  th a t the  S ta te -C h u rch  Com m ission 
rarely  m et.
5. Conclusion
“D em ocracy,” D iyzek and  Holmes rem ind u s  “is n o t j u s t  som ething 
th a t  arrives a s  a  universal package in 1989, e rasing  the  p a s t” 
(Diyzek an d  Holmes: 2000:1044). “W hat dem ocracy  m eans in 
p a rticu la r p laces depends to a  considerable ex ten t on th e  prevailing 
constella tion  of d iscourses, a s  well a s  the  configuration  of 
constitu tiona l an d  m aterial c ircum stances” (Dryzek a n d  Holmes, 
2000:1064). In E aste rn  Europe, the  often und ifferen tia ted  category of 
civil society h a s  increasingly becom e a  p rism  th ro u g h  w hich 
resea rch e rs  analyse the developm ent, growth, a n d  in s titu tio n s  of 
au tonom ous action. As a  political idea, civil society is sub ject to 
significantly different in te rp re ta tions ab o u t the  appropria te  
rela tionsh ip  betw een the  citizen an d  the  sta te . In the  Czech Republic 
th is  space for opposing in te rp re ta tions is g u a ran teed  by a  
constitu tion  th a t d ictates only th a t the  sta te  “m ay n o t be bound ...by  
a  p a rticu la r religious faith”. An ‘active’ or ‘passive’ n eu tra lity  tow ards 
religious o rganisations is ne ither endorsed  no r p roscribed . As such , 
w ha t s ta te  im partiality  m ight m ean in practice h a s  becom e politically 
con tested . In the case of ch u rch -s ta te  re la tions in  the  Czech 
Republic, success in applying the  ‘passive’ ap p ro ach  is explained by 
political failure to m ake m eaningful headw ay in the  
in stitu tiona lisa tion  of a  civil society; a  failure th a t  b ro u g h t w ith it 
n u m ero u s  a ttac k s  on m any independen t o rgan isations, an d  n o t ju s t  
the  o rganisation  of the  Catholic C hurch.
This failure to streng then  Czech civil society is clearly located 
in the  political program  of the K laus ad m in istra tio n  a n d  the ir post- 
C om m unist concerns to lim it power to the  Parliam ent, an d  m ore
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particu la rly  to the  executive, w here they  h a d  a  d o m in an t position. 
Yet K laus's success in achieving h is program  is m ore th a n  sim ply 
ideological. The rap id ity  of the  'tran s itio n ' d isru p ted  the 
Czechoslovakian social s tru c tu re . The resu lting  s tru c tu ra l vacuum  
allowed the  easy  im plem entation of a  rad ical ideology by a  political 
en trep ren eu r who faced little opposition from  p arliam en ta ry  
colleagues unab le  to find ‘p a rtn e rs ’ in a  p o st com m un ist a tom ised  
society.
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C hapter Five
The C atholic C hurch and th e  S p irit o f 
Dem ocracy: Religious E lites in  th e  Post- 
C om m unist Czech Republic
1. Introduction
The fourth  an d  final elem ent of S chm itter’s m odel of civil society is 
th a t  assoc iations “agree to ac t w ithin p re-estab lished  ru les  of a  ‘civil’ 
n a tu re ” and , m oreover, th a t they practice th is  ‘civility”’. (Schm itter, 
1997:240).72 Schm itter does no t elaborate on  the  te rm  ‘civility’,
72 The idea that ‘civility’ should be considered an element of civil society is a subject of 
debate. Hefner maintains that “democratic institutions ..depend upon associations and 
values more varied than those of philosophical individualism alone.” (Hefner, 1998b:32) He 
points to other models that fail entirely to include any normative or ethical dimension on the 
grounds that in modem day pluralistic societies “no more than a proceduralist emphasis is 
possible” (Hefner, 1998b:31).Taylor remarks that “regardless of who is ultimately right in 
the battle between procedural ethics and those of the good life ...the retreat to the 
procedural is no solution to the democratic dilemma ... The procedural route supposes that 
we can uncontroversially distinguish neutral procedures from substantive goals. But it is in 
fact very difficult to devise a procedure which is seen as neutral by everyone...these 
principles can be realized in a number of different ways, and can never be applied neutrally 
without some confronting of the substantive religious-ethnic-cultural differences in society” 
(Taylor, 2002:102). Laurence Whitehead points out that those who do include the ethical 
dimension thereby “admit a third category of ‘uncivil citizens’ or persons enjoying political 
rights but not submitting themselves to the constraints imposed by ‘civil society’” (1997:95). 
Perhaps, Whitehead’s point can be addressed by the positing of civil society as a 
subcategory of associational society? At the least, it is more easily addressed by models 
such as Schmitter’s which allow for civility to be treated as an ideal type. Apart from 
anything else a concern with ethical issues is necessitated by the fact that these ethical or 
normative questions have a key role in the constitution of organizations and how 
organizations conceive of themselves. For example, it is impossible to think of the 
environmental movement in terms of the ‘rights’ of cyclists versus the ‘rights’ of motorists.
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add ing  only th a t  it conveys “m u tu a l respec t” (240), a n  aw areness, 
th a t  is, of “the  existence of the u n it as a  w hole”, a n d  resp ec t for “the  
dem ocratic  p rocess.” (247). This idea of resp ec t is, I suggest, 
adequa te  to the  ta sk  of covering the m ajor, ‘a lte rn a tiv e ’ d im ensions, 
or principles, of civility73 th a t are em phasised  by, for exam ple, Shils 
in h is d iscussion  on public-m indedness (Shils, 1992),74 Taylor on 
partic ipa tion  (Taylor, 2000), and  Jo h n  Dewey on  p lu ra lism  and  
to lerance (Caspary, 2000)75. In brief, it can  be agreed th a t  one canno t 
respec t o thers if one is always m otivated solely by self-in terest, if one 
is perm anen tly  angling for a  free-ride on the  sh a red  benefits or goods 
created  from the efforts of o thers or if one re fu ses to adm it or to 
recognise th a t  o th e rs’ cu ltu re , values, an d  th o u g h ts  can  be different 
to one’s own.
The cen tra l a im s of th is  ch ap ter are: to consider the 
rela tionsh ip  betw een civility and  dem ocracy; to es tab lish  w he ther the  
Catholic C hurch  in the  Czech Republic shou ld  be considered  a  ‘civil’ 
o rgan isation  and , if so, to a sk  how the civility of Czech C atholicism  
can  be explained.
The environmental movement is not simply a rights based discourse. It is also an ethical 
discussion about our responsibilities to future human communities.
73 See Orwin (1992) for a good discussion on the distinction between civicness and 
civility.
74 Shils states “the attitude and ethos that distinguish the politics of a civil society is 
civility, i.e., a solicitude for the interest of the whole society, a concern for the common 
good.” (Shils, 1992:1). See also Sandal (1982); Walzer, (1983); MacIntyre (1981); Caspary, 
(2000); and De Toqueville,(1994). De Tocqueville argues, “citizens who...take part in public 
affairs must turn from the private interests and occasionally look at something other than 
themselves.”
75 Dewey argues “To cooperate by giving differences a chance to show themselves...is a 
means of enriching ones own life experience...[this] is inherent in the democratic personal 
way of life” cited in Caspary, 2000:14. See also, Bohman, (1996); and Rouner, (2000).
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1.1 Civility and Democracy
Dem ocracy, it is argued, depends u pon  n o t only “p rac tices an d  
in s titu tio n s” b u t also “certain  ideas, sen tim en ts , a n d  h a b its” 
(Banfield, 1992:23). These sen tim en ts an d  ideas are  often referred to 
a s  the  civic v irtues, or civility, a  com m itm ent to th e  no rm s of 
p lurality , tru s t , tolerance, and  concern  for th e  public  good, (see for 
exam ple Bellah et al, 1991; Etzioni, 1995; Sandel, 1982). The 
con tribu tion  of these  norm s to m aking dem ocracy w ork are  held  to 
be the ir facilitating role in  the  success of collective pro jec ts enac ted  
from various poin ts in the  political com m unity . O bvious p laces for 
the  origin of collective projects are  the  se a ts  of P arliam en t or 
executive power. A uthors such  a s  P u tn am  a n d  de Tocqueville 
em phasise  the  positive role of custom s of civic involvem ent for the  
g rea ter perform ativity of representative  governm ent (de Tocqueville, 
1994; P u tn am  et al, 1993). They hold th a t, if p revalen t in  the  citizen 
body, v irtues of tru s t  and  participation  help  those  w ho are  charged  
w ith governing to carry  o u t their task s. It is, for exam ple, sim pler to 
carry  o u t a  project su ch  as a  c en su s  if people a re  willing to 
partic ipa te  in the  schem e, to fill in  th e ir form s an d  p o st them  off. It 
would be ted ious, if no t im possible, if in  every governm ent project, 
th e  co u rts  were the  regu lar resort, a s  in the  case  of the  UK poll tax, 
to secure  a n  adequate  level of cooperation. Evidently, a s  Tocqueville 
argued , a  strong  civic society can  m ake for strong  governm ent. Yet, 
th a t  said, it would be difficult if som e ind iv iduals or g roups alw ays 
cooperated an d  con tribu ted  and  o thers never did. It is far easier, 
Taylor argues, to m ake, for exam ple, a  com m itm ent to paying o n e’s 
tax  if you are  confident th a t o thers are  doing likewise. Taylor argues, 
therefore, th a t  “free societies require  a  high level of m u tu a l t ru s t .” 
(Taylor, 2000:93)
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Participation  and  tru s t  oil the  w heels of p ro jec ts from above, 
yet these  norm s have, a t the  sam e tim e, functions b roader th a n  
those  th a t  u ltim ately  feed into the  sta te  or the  realm  of form al 
G overnm ent. The civic v irtues also play the ir role in  facilitating w ha t 
Hall describes a s  societal ‘self-organization’ (Hall, 1998:54). Here, 
v irtuous o u tp u ts  are reta ined  w ithin the  realm  of civil society an d  
feed back  into the  com m unity, serving as  a  resou rce  for p ro jects of 
self-governm ent. Indeed, tru s t, com m itm ent, a n d  partic ipa tion  are 
fundam en ta l to these  k inds of in terac tion  since they  lack  th a t  la s t 
recourse  to violence or dom ination th a t  underw rite  the  schem es of 
form al represen tative governm ent.
If partic ipation  needs to be activated  by t r u s t  - confidence th a t 
o thers will also partic ipate  - it equally needs a n o th e r  k ind  of tru s t: 
t ru s t  th a t  there  is a  benefit in, or som e value to be h ad  from, 
cooperating or participating  w ith o thers. People, Taylor po in ts out, 
can  hard ly  be expected to partic ipa te  in decision-m aking  if they  
believe th a t  the ir voices are never heard  an d  th a t  th e ir preferences 
never count. T ru st certainly lubricates cooperation b u t it also needs 
a  recognition of the reality of plurality . Taylor a rg u es  tha t:
If a  sub-group  of the  ‘n a tio n ’ considers th a t  it is no t 
being listened  to by the rest, o r th a t they  a re  u n ab le  to 
u n d e rs ta n d  its poin t of view, it will im m ediately consider 
itself excluded from jo in t deliberation. A people m u s t be 
so constitu ted  th a t its m em bers are  capable  of listen ing  
to one another...T his dem ands a  certa in  reciprocal 
com m itm ent. It is the sh a red  co nsc iousness of th is  
com m itm ent w hich creates confidence in  the  various 
sub -g roups th a t they will be heard . (Taylor, 2000:93).
Finally, th is  com m itm ent to the  views an d  in te re s ts  of o thers 
requ ires tolerance, the  inescapable accessory  to the  principle of
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p luralism , w hich is necessary  Banfield a rg u es to “encourage ...the  
m aking  of concessions” (Banfield, 1992: xii; H irst, 2000)
In sum , civility h a s  a  role in easing  two d is tin c t k inds of 
in teraction ; on the  one h an d , those “prom ises an d  com m itm ents 
enforceable by law” (Sklar, cited in S tew art 2000:58), a n d  on the  
o th er those  prom ises m ade outside law, th e  m aking  an d  keeping of 
w hich rely in stead  on “m oral or social p e rsu as io n ” (Stew art, 2000: 
59). This second kind of prom ise is a s  crucial to dem ocracy a s  the 
first because  there  are significant lim its to the  ex ten t th a t 
cooperation an d  partic ipation  can  be enforced or legislated for. And 
yet, w ithou t su ch  participation , dem ocracy is dem ocracy in  nam e 
only, in danger of becom ing Rose’s “b roken-backed  dem ocracy”; a  
dem ocracy th a t  is “inefficient an d  often ineffective, an d  sup p o rted  by 
its  citizens a s  a  lesser evil ra th e r  th a n  because  it is good in  itse lf’ 
(Rose, 1998:5).
While the  norm s of p lurality  or to lerance were superfluous to 
the  single cu ltu re  of C om m unism , the norm  of partic ipa tion  w as, on 
the  con trary , in high dem and. In successive Soviet an d  satellite 
regim es it becam e the responsibility  of all c itizens to strive for the  
a tta in m en t of public goods. At the sam e tim e th is  su m m ons to 
solidarity  w as em pty of w ha t S tew art describes a s  the  dialogical 
req u irem en ts a t the  core of today’s partic ipa to ry  m odels (Stewart, 
2000). Taylor’s d ictum  th a t  deciding together m ean s deliberating  
together (Taylor, 2000) w as no t relevant to the  role of a  L eninist 
s ta te  w hich d ictated  bo th  the  con ten t of the  com m on good a n d  the  
m ean s of arriving a t it.
The legacy of th is  top down, e litist m an ag em en t is evident 
today. People did no t tru s t  each  o ther u n d e r  C om m unism  and , in 
com parison  to W estern Europe, they  do n o t t ru s t  each  o th er now. 
(see for exam ple, Rose, 1998b). This is the  s ta rtin g  po in t for m uch  
sociological com m entary  on E aste rn  E urope. Sztom pka ta lk s  of a
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“cu ltu re  of m is tru s t” th a t  h a s  developed in  the  post-com m unist 
societies of E aste rn  Europe, Sm olar of th e  a tom isation  of society 
(1996:33), an d  Gellner of the  “m oral vacuum  in th e  e a s t” (1996:6) 
M any, su ch  as  P u tnam , believe th a t th is  lack  of ‘civil n o rm s’ holds 
severe consequences for the  reform  of the  region: “w ithou t no rm s of 
reciprocity  and  netw orks of civic engagem ent ... am oral fam ilism , 
clientelism , law lessness, ineffective governm ent, a n d  econom ic 
s tag n a tio n s  - seem s likelier th a n  successfu l dem ocratisa tion  and  
econom ic developm ent.” (Putnam  et al, 1993:183).
2. The Catholic Church: a Civil Organisation?
C an the  Czech Catholic C hurch  be considered  a  civil organization? 
Does it d em onstra te  those norm s of reciprocity a n d  degrees of civility 
th a t  a re  argued  to be lacking in the  form er Soviet U nion a n d  E aste rn  
E urope. My resea rch  suggests th a t am ong the  elites of th e  Czech 
C atholic C hurch , the  answ er to th is  question  is yes. Czech Catholic 
elites dem onstra te  a  strong  com m itm ent to th e  n o rm s of p lurality , 
partic ipa tion , tolerance an d  the  public good. The following section 
d iscu sses  the  views of the  elite on these  issues.
2.1 Participation and the Public Good.
M onsm a an d  Soper argue th a t religion typically “h a s  a  strong  public 
facet to it” (1998:9) an d  is “concerned w ith the  whole of life - w ith 
social, econom ic, an d  political m atte rs  a s  well a s  w ith  private  and  
personal ones” (Bellah et al, cited in M onsm a a n d  Soper, 1998:9). In 
th is  respec t Czech B ishops are no different from  th e ir co u n te rp a rts  
elsew here in E urope in the ir desire to pa rtic ipa te  in the  public  realm . 
The objective of the  Czech Catholic C hu rch  is, F iala  argued , to 
“function  a s  an  independen t o rganisation  looking after the  needs of
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h er believers and serving society a s  a w hold ’ (E sras, 1993c, em phasis 
mine). Like the religious o rgan isations in  the  five coun tries of 
M onsm a and  Soper’s study, the  Czech C h u rch  h a s  a  keen  in te re s t in 
m oving o u t of its privatised existence u n d e r  C om m unism . "The 
c h u rc h ”, B ishop D uka argued, "m ust ap p ea r a s  a n  in s titu tio n  th a t  is 
non-partia l, th a t tu rn s  itself tow ards any  h u m an . T hen  it is a  
question  of its function in the  educa tional an d  o th er facilities - 
m edical facilities w here we show th a t  the  c h u rc h  is open for every 
person , no m atte r if he is believer or non-believer, w ith  no regard  to 
nationality  or race” (interview, 1998).
Alongside th is  desire to partic ipa te  in  the  public , Czech 
B ishops also dem onstra te  a  com m itm ent to collective goods ra th e r 
th a n  purely  personal in te rests . Again, there  is no th ing  su rp rising  in 
som e of the  B ishops’ views w hich echo com m on c h u rc h  teachings. 
The B ishops’ com m ents on the  m arket, for exam ple, were re so n an t 
w ith J o h n  Paul II’s 1991 encyclical le tte r C entesim un annus. B ishop 
H rdlicka argued: "I very m uch  agree w ith the  social teach ing  of the  
c h u rch ...th e  m arke t m akes sense b u t the  first value is the  com m on 
good. Not only egotistical in ten tions b u t  to g u a rd  solidarity” 
(interview, 1998). B ishop Koukl: “The c h u rc h  says th a t  God gave the 
world to all h u m an s  n o t ju s t  one person . People are  certainly  
different, w ith different skills, so there  will alw ays be some 
differences. B u t a  person  who h a s  m ore shou ld  sh a re  th is  w ealth  
w ith som eone who h a s  less.” (interview, 1998). B ishop Maly: “The 
ch u rch  h a s  a  chance to show th a t  it is im p o rtan t to take  care of 
weak, forgotten ones, the  ones who are  p u sh e d  to the  side, who are 
no t productive, who are no t able to co n trib u te  to th e  s ta te  on its 
b u sin ess  profit. Also, th is  is the  m ission of the  ch u rch , also by th is 
the  ch u rch  can  enrich  the society a n d  dem ocratic  life in  ou r 
repub lic .’’(interview, 1998). And B ishop Lobkowicz:
The form er Prime M inister sees the  civil society only a s  a
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m ark e t m atter, it is very pragm atic. The P residen t 
im agines civil society probably in  a  different way. And of 
course  I would be probably on the  side of the  P residen t, 
because  it is h a rd  to accept the life of society only in the  
pragm atic  m arke t economy, because  you have to have on 
your m ind also the  ability of specific groups, w h a t people 
are  able to do. [The] view of the form er Prim e M inister [is] 
only the  b est ones can  succeed an d  the re s t is som eth ing  
like tra sh , (interview, 1998)
Finally, w here the Czech Catholic C hurch  is keen  to be able to 
partic ipa te  in  the  life of society, it is equally keen  th a t  o th ers  should  
also be able to do so. Fr. H erm an, the  spokesperson  for th e  Czech 
Catholic C hurch  argued:
We m u s t su p p o rt also the  responsibility  of a  concrete  
h u m a n  being, you know, because  the  co m m u n ist system  
w as w ithou t any  responsibility. In the co m m u n ist society 
everything w as supervised or controlled by the  s ta te  a n d  
there  w as practically  no subsid iarity  in  th e  life of the  
cities or in the villages or parishes...you  know  to u se  m y 
own responsibility  in my own sm all circle of m y life, 
(interview, 1998)
2.2 Recognition of and Commitment to Plurality
M onsm a an d  Soper argue th a t, if "‘a  v irtuous people’ is essen tia l for 
a  successfu lly  functioning dem ocracy, any  m ovem ents - including  
religious ones - th a t w ork to build  u p  a  sense  of v irtue  or m orality 
am ong the  public an d  th a t teach  respect for the  welfare of o thers 
becom e crucial for a  healthy  dem ocracy.” (M onsm a an d  Soper, 
1997:4). By these  criteria, the Czech Catholic C h u rch  is certain ly  a  
v irtuous organisation , yet a s  I suggested earlier, th ese  v irtues a re  no t
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sufficient to m eet the requirem ents of m odern  dem ocracies. The 
problem  is th a t  m odern dem ocracies have m any g roups com m itted  to 
p a rticu la r versions of The public good’ or the  welfare of o thers . T hus, 
the  key dem ocratic v irtue is no t w hether  one is com m itted  to the  
public good b u t how  one is com m itted. M odern dem ocracies require 
citizens who can  recognise the irreducible reality  of p lu ralism , an d  
who have the  com m unicative abilities to negotiate  betw een various 
versions of the  public good. In brief, dem ocracy ideally requ ires 
p a rtic ip an ts  who have the skills to be able to engage in  the  
dem ocratic process, partic ipan ts who are able, a s  Taylor a rgues, to 
deliberate together before deciding together.
If V irtuous o rgan isa tions’ can  be unders tood  a s  an  ideal type, 
an d  p lurality  one of its m easu res, the  Catholic C h u rch  is, in  general, 
a  w eak version of the  type. The Catholic C h u rch  is form ally a  
theocratic  organisation , no t a  dem ocratic one. “The C h u rch ”, a s  
C ardinal Ratzinger po in ts out, “does not find a  source  of its faith  an d  
s tru c tu re  from the social principles during  each  m om ent in  h isto ry” 
b u t h a s  “the du ty  to be a  bearer of a  superio r fa ith .” (Associated 
Press, 18 November, 1995). As such , it is p e rh ap s  u n su rp ris in g  th a t  
Catholic h ierarch ies are  rarely regarded a s  the  optim al a rran g em en t 
for n u rtu rin g  the ability to recognise and  reckon w ith  difference. This 
p roposed inability to cope w ith difference m ight be expected to be 
m ore likely in E aste rn  Europe w hich m issed o u t on  the  m ore rad ical 
im pulses of V atican II. The chu rches in E as te rn  E urope found 
them selves re-in tegrated  into the  ch u rc h ’s tran s -n a tio n a l s tru c tu re  
u n d e r the  leadersh ip  of Pope Jo h n  Paul, w hose stra tegy  Gill 
describes a s  “aim ed a t recovering a  su b s ta n tia l portion  of pre- 
V atican II orthodoxy...and  to rea sse rt h ierarch ica l contro l over a  
C hurch  th a t  h ad  experienced increasing  decen tra lization  since 
V atican II” (Gill 1998:177).
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However, I argue th a t an  inability to cope w ith difference is no t 
the  case  w ith the  Czech Catholic C hurch. My resea rch  show s th a t 
Czech B ishops have bo th  a  keen sense of w h a t o th er va lues a  
productive com m itm ent to participation or th e  public  good m ight 
involve a n d  a n  in te res t in developing these  values w ith in  th e ir own 
organisation . In co n tra s t to an  elitist notion of the  ‘com m on good’, 
the  views of Czech B ishops resonate w ith the  p ro cessu a l app roaches 
advocated by w riters such  as  Bellah et al who hold th a t  “the  com m on 
good is the  p u rsu it of the good in com m on.” (Bellah e t al., 1991:9). 
B ishop Maly argued, “before the revolution th e  c h u rc h  w as the  only 
official in s titu tio n  w hich could preach  som ething  o th er th a n  w h a t the  
official ideology was. Now there is a  p lu ralistic  society - sp iritually  
p lu ra lis t - an d  C hristian ity  is one am ong o th er offers - o ther 
sp iritua l offers an d  [we m ust] accept th is  position .” (interview, 1998). 
A sim ilar view w as expressed  by Fr. Daniel H erm an:
I th in k  th a t  it is the  ch u rch ’s politic to cooperate, to 
bring  the ir own values to the com m on process, or to 
create , in cooperation with all people of goodwill, th is  
m osaic of the  life, not to supervise everything, b u t  to 
cooperate, not to create their own catholic v irtua l world 
b u t to be a  p a rt of the  norm al life, of the  no rm al society, 
(interview, 1998).
And also from B ishop Duka:
We have constan tly  to bear in m ind th a t  som e six m illion 
people in th is  country  are, partly  a t least, of a  different 
p e rsu as io n  an d  feel them selves rep resen ted  by different 
forces. Today the  political scene h a s  becom e very 
diverse, different people prefer different political 
rep resen ta tives, and  also the ch u rch  m u s t a c t a n d  p lan  
in te rm s of a  wider cooperation w ith non-C atholic  
ch u rch es  a s  well a s  o ther social in s titu tio n s  in o u r
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country . (Esras, 1993b)
Yet, n o t only were the B ishops keen to a d ju s t them selves to the  
• reality  of the ir s ta tu s  in w hat is a  p redom inantly  a the is tic  country , 
they  were also anxious to voice their su p p o rt for p lu ra lism  as  a  good 
in itself. C om m enting on the size of the C atholic C h u rch  in the  Czech 
Republic relative to the  secu lar com m unity, Maly rem arked:
We are a  m inority b u t it is som etim es a n  advan tage  to 
be a  m inority because we are n o t a  dom inating  
com m unity  b u t we are a  com m unity  w hich c an  show 
an o th e r style of life, an o th e r style of th ink ing , an o th e r 
style of fu tu re  com m unication. And in th is  I see a  chance  
- because  the p a th  of the  chu rch  is to accom pany the  
society, (interview, 1998).
B ishop Hrdlicka: “No, it [religious education] is n o t com pulsory, and  
we do n o t w an t it to be so strict. It is be tter to w ork w ith  the  freedom  
of the  h u m an , be tte r to inspire him  th a n  to com m and .” (interview, 
1998). Fr. Daniel H erm an:
Yes, su re , its [non-com pulsory religious education] no 
problem . You know, cooperate w ith th e  society. Not to 
create  own world. In your hom eland  [Ireland] its 
absolutely  different, its clear, you have very different 
history. B u t its my private  opinion, of som ebody w ho w as 
born  an d  lived in a  very secu lar country . I prefer to live 
in  the  a tm osphere, in th is  secularism , th a n  in one very 
very su p e r catholic country. I prefer th e  a tm osphere  of 
freedom , of changing, of free changing  of ideas. You 
know  because  w hen I will visit the  ch u rch , I m u s t  know 
why. (interview, 1998).
And finally, B ishop Duka:
In the  ch u rch  schools, s tu d en ts  - believers a n d  non
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believers - study  an d  learn . It is th e  sam e w ith  the  staff 
w hich is com posed of believers a n d  non-believers. 
S tu d e n ts  are  tau g h t from the beginning  - to lerance, 
friendship , respect. The biggest s tren g th  is n o t in  the  
level of education , no t to be the  b est in giving the  
education  b u t in creating  the  a tm osphere  am ong 
s tu d en ts . The rela tionsh ip  betw eens s tu d e n ts  an d  
teach ers  is different th a n  in o th er schools, (interview,
1998)
2.3  Recognition of the Importance o f Communication and 
Dialogue
In m y interview s w ith all of the  B ishops, references were persisten tly  
m ade to the  im portance of com m unication  a n d  dialogue. B ishop 
H rdlicka explained tha t: “The ch u rch  is above all, praying and  
encourag ing  the ir m em bers to be able to en te r a  dialogue w ith 
society” (interview, 1998). B ishop Maly argued:
The ch u rch  h a s  a  chance to show  th a t  it is possible to 
t ru s t  each  o ther, th a t it is possible to com m unicate , 
because  till now ou r society is very atom ized, there  are 
m any groups w ith different in te res ts , b u t  there  is no 
com m unication  betw een different social g roups (levels).
They com m unicate  only th rough  the  m edia, b u t no t 
im m ediate, (interview, 1998).
D aniel H erm an elaborated:
For in stance  here  in the  Czech Republic we have 
problem s w ith som e m inorities - gypsies for in stan ce  you 
know  - and  I th in k  th a t the  role of the  ch u rc h es  could be 
very helpful on th is  platform  of dialogue a n d  o penness  of 
the  society for various system s a n d  sty les of life - the
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c u ltu re  of bridge. B ishop Koukl from Litom erice he h as  
th is  com m ission for the  pasto ral service am ong the  
gypsies an d  I th in k  th a t  its very im p o rtan t too because  
the  rac ism  an d  the xenophobia am ong th e  Czech 
popu lation  is terrible, (interview, 1998).
B ishop Koukl: “Gypsies have 18 in s titu tio n s , b u t  do no t
com m unicate  m uch. In O ser there  w as a  G ypsies fair so they  can  get 
to know  each  other. This w as organised by the  c h u rc h .” (interview, 
1998).
In 1994, partly  in response  to the  C hurch  of E ng land’s 
o rd ination  of wom en, the  V atican issued , th ro u g h  the  offices of 
C ard inal Ratzinger, a  th ree  page s ta tem en t th a t  sa id  the  ord ination  
of w om en shou ld  no t even be a  topic of debate. R atzinger w rote th a t 
the  b an  on wom en p riests  is “irrevocable, a  d o c trin e ...th a t h a s  a  
infallible ch a rac te r.” (Associated Press, 18 Nov, 1995). Czech B ishops 
have a  different view however. For som e in the  coun try  parishes, 
d eba tes ab o u t the  ord ination  of women a n d  o th er m a tte rs  did no t 
hold any  g rea t in te res t b u t none showed any  an tagon ism  to a  m ore 
open d iscussion  of the  issues. B ishop Liska noted: “These p ro tes ts  or 
critic ism s in the  fashion of G erm any or A ustria  are  n o t here. I am  
n o t saying there  are no critical voices, th a t  there  is no th ing  to 
criticize, b u t m ass or organized p ro tests  are  n o t h e re .” (interview,
1998). Sim ilarly, B ishop H rdlicka said:
Yes, they  can  [discuss different viewpoints] b u t  in th is  
diocese there  never occurred  any  le tter th a t  w ould 
p re sen t fem inism  or hom osexuality  or a  dem and  for 
o rdain ing  wom en. No one from 2 ,000  people in ou r 
diocese who would be telling me th a t  we shou ld  do 
som ething  w ith th is  question...M aybe in Prague, m aybe 
in  Prague som e people d iscu ss it. In the  A ustrian  ch u rch  
there  is a  com pletely different s itu a tio n , abso lu te ly
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different. (Interview, 1998).
N evertheless, H rdlicka w ent on to note w ith som e e n th u s ia sm , “We 
are  now preparing  a  big plenary assem bly w hich  will be a  dialogue 
am ong all people from levels w ithin the  c h u rc h .” B ishop Maly 
explained the  situa tion  in  the  Czech Catholic C h u rch  a s  follows:
There is a  polarization in ou r c h u rc h  too...I like 
personally  the  decision of A ustrian  B ishops to invite all 
g roups of the  whole chu rch  to a  m eeting a n d  to d iscu ss  
these  question  together. It is necessary  to clear, to 
c lean se ...b u t it is necessary  to listen too. It isn ’t possible 
to solve it a t once b u t no t to exclude, n o t to judge, n o t to 
sen tence, (interview, 1998).
In response  to the  com m ent th a t th is  view m ight be a t  odds w ith  the  
V atican, Maly responded:
It is a  very difficult question - one m u s t resp ec t the  
V atican decisions, b u t on the  o ther h an d , I w ould say  
these  questions are  alive and  in the  m ind  a n d  th ink ing  
of believers an d  it isn ’t  possible to say sim ply s top it, stop  
it. Therefore it is hidden and  it con tinues to live an d  
personally  I’ll aim  for an  open d iscussion  for a  p a tien t 
d iscussion ...I am  n o t for the solution to h ide those 
q uestions an d  to say  it doesn’t  exist, (interview, 1998).
This po in t is supported  by H erm an :
There are som e stream s w ithin the  ch u rch ; som e 
s tream s are m ore liberal, some are m ore conservative. I 
th in k  th a t  it is correct th a t the  s tream s exist in the  
ch u rch , b u t I th in k  th a t it is very bad  a n d  sad  th a t  these  
two groups are n o t able to be in  dialogue, you know.
W hat could w e  offer to the society w hen  w e  are not able to 
live in a  dialogue w ithin the church?l th in k  th a t  i t’s a  very
155
counterproductive  apostolate. I th in k  th a t  we m u st  learn  
very m uch  ab o u t the  cu ltu re  of dialogue w ith in  the  
ch u rc h  and  I hope an d  I will help  to th is  developing of 
th is  cu ltu re  of dialogue, (interview, 1998).
2.4  Tolerance
The B ishops’ u n d e rs tan d in g  of the im portance of to lerance w as 
evident even in a reas  w here values were very different. The 
C om m unist Party  is an  exceptionally iso lated  p a rty  in the  Czech 
Republic, an d  Fr. H erm an is one of the  few public  figures who m eets 
w ith R ansdorf, the  Party ’s Vice-Chair. W hen I a sked  H erm an ab o u t 
th is , he com m ented, “It’s su re  th a t for in stan ce  w ith  the  C om m unist 
Party  i t’s very h a rd  to cooperate b u t I th in k  th a t  also w ith these  
ex trem ist parties , its  possible to be in  d ialogue.... it is n o t the  m ost 
im portan t th ing  if do we agree to each  o ther b u t to be able to be in 
dialogue.” (interview, 1998). In sim ilar vein, B ishop Lobkowicz 
argued:
I th in k  these  people who are criticizing the  c h u rc h  they  
are  looking for a  dialogue ... This belongs to dem ocracy; 
one says one opinion and  the o th er can  say  a  different 
opinion. It would be bad  if on a  certa in  po in t one side 
w ould like to speak  and  would no t let the  o th er side to 
express itself. If he says any o ther opinion different th a n  
m ine I do no t excom m unicate him , I do n o t p u n ish  him  
or som ething  like tha t. He can  say  h is  opinion b u t also I  
can  say  my opinion. I  have a  different opinion an d  have 
the  righ t to express it a s  well, (interview, 1998).
And regarding  differences w ithin the C hurch , B ishop D uka  rem arked
There exists certa in  stra in s . None of u s  in  the  ch u rch  are 
satisfied  w ith everything. I will n o t be satisfied  w ith
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everything. The problem  of a  bigger, free d iscu ssio n  is 
c reated  from the  polarization into two groups. One is 
conservative th a t  h a s  tendencies fundam en ta lis t. And 
the  second, we can  say h as tendency  to progressivism .
B oth groups are  convinced th a t they  w an t only good for 
the  chu rch . The disadvantage is th a t  the  fu n d am en ta lis t 
group would convince o thers a t any  cost. The second 
group also th in k s  th a t it is being right, b u t  is m ore 
to leran t. They do no t condem n, (interview, 1998).
3. The Causes o f Civility?
I have a rgued  th a t  the  elite of the Czech Catholic C hu rch  display 
significant signs of civility. The following- section a ttem p ts  to 
e stab lish  why th is  is so. Why is th is p a rticu la r organization  a  ‘civil’ 
organization or, in m ore general term s, w here does civility come 
from?
A ttem pts to estab lish  the causes of v irtue  have tended  to fall 
into two sociological cam ps. On the one h an d , there  is a n  em phasis 
on endogenous factors th a t focus on the s tru c tu re  of the  organization 
or its  professed ideology as an  explanation  of w hy a  p a rticu la r 
organization or association  exemplifies civic v irtue. In c o n tra s t to th is  
app roach , there  h a s  been a  growing concern  to h ighlight the  
relevance of exogenous factors such  as th e  role of the  s ta te  or o ther 
political a n d  econom ic institu tions, or indeed  cu ltu ra l factors, lying 
ou tside  the  association  in question.
3.1 Organisational Structure
Since de Tocqueville, m any have built u p o n  h is  p roposition  th a t  the  
norm  of m u tu a l respec t derives from the assoc ia tions of civil society, 
th a t in the  ac t of association  itself one lea rn s the  "habits of the  h e a r t’
so essen tia l to dem ocracy. This basic  prem ise th a t  th e  civic v irtues 
can  be n u rtu re d  th rough  the  ac t of partic ipa tion  in public  ven tu res 
h a s  becom e an  axiom  of dem ocratic theory. At the  sam e time, the 
a rg u m en t h a s  failed to specify adequately  w h a t it is ab o u t 
associational life th a t  can  guaran tee  these  functions. If it is the  case 
th a t  “assoc iations instil in their m em bers h a b its  of cooperation, 
solidarity, an d  pub lic-sp iritedness” (Putnam  et al, 1993: 89-90), an  
im p o rtan t an d  related  question  m u s t be, “w hich k inds of 
assoc ia tions do so, u n d e r w hat c ircum stances, an d  w ith  w h a t effects 
for the  polity?” (Edwards an d  Foley 1998a: 15).
The recen t Am erican revival of in te res t in  these  question  h a s  
cen tred  a ro u n d  the  w ork of Robert P u tnam , w ho is regarded  a s  the 
pivotal a u th o r  in the  contem porary  p ost Tocquevellian debate  over 
w ha t m akes dem ocracy work. P u tn a m ’s resea rch  in to  the  civic 
trad itions of N orthern  Italy concluded th a t  the  cause , o r source of 
civility, is tru s t. Individuals ac t civilly w hen they  can  tru s t, w hen 
they  are confident th a t, their actions will be reciprocated  by o thers. 
“It is necessary ,” P u tnam  m ain tains, “n o t only to t ru s t  o thers before 
acting  cooperatively, b u t also to believe th a t  one is tru s te d  by  
o th ers .” W ithout tru s t, good will an d  jo in t action  are  unlikely. 
(Putnam  e t al, 1993:164).76
If t ru s t  is the  source of civility, th is  begs th e  question  of tru s t  
itself. For P u tnam , like de Tocqueville, th e  answ er lies in 
associations, or w ha t he otherw ise describes a s  ‘netw orks of civic 
engagem ent.’
Networks of civic engagem ent facilitate com m unication
a n d  improve the  flow of inform ation  ab o u t the
76 “In a world of saints, perhaps, dilemmas of collective action would not arise, but 
universal altruism is a quixotic premise for either social action or social theoiy. If actors are 
unable to make credible commitments to one another, they must forgo many opportunities 
for mutual gain - ruefully, but rationally” (Putnam, 1993:164).
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tru s tw o rth in ess  of individuals. N etw orks of civic 
engagem ent allow repu ta tions to be tran sm itte d  an d  
refined... t ru s t  an d  cooperation depend  on reliable 
inform ation ab o u t the  p a s t behaviour an d  p resen t 
in te re s ts  of po ten tial p a rtners , while u n ce rta in ty  
reinforces dilem m as of collective action. Thus, other 
things being equal, the greater the communication (both 
direct and  indirect) among participants, the  greater their 
m utual trust and  the easier they will f in d  it to cooperate. 
(Putnam  e t al, 1993:174, em phasis mine).
P u tn am  no tes th a t  n o t all associations are equally  good a t  facilitating 
com m unication . “A vertical netw ork”, P u tnam  w rites “c an n o t su s ta in  
social t ru s t  and  cooperation.” “Vertical flows of inform ation  a re ,” 
P u tn am  con tends, “often less reliable th a n  horizon tal flows, in p a rt 
because  th e  subord ina te  h u sb a n d s  inform ation a s  a  hedge aga in st 
exploitation.” Additionally in vertical netw orks “san c tio n s th a t 
su p p o rt norm s of reciprocity against the th re a t of oppo rtun ism  are 
less likely to be im posed upw ards and  less likely to be acceded to, if 
im posed .” (Putnam  e t al, 1993:174).
It is then , the  quality o f  horizontality th a t  is key to the  
p roduction  of tru s t. And as such , Pu tnam , in h is  conclusion  to h is 
investigation into w ha t m akes dem ocracy w ork w rites, “m em bersh ip  
ra te s  in h ierarchically  ordered organizations (like the  M afia or the  
in stitu tio n a l Catholic Church) should  be negatively assoc ia ted  w ith 
good governm ent.”(Putnam  e t al, 1993:175). And th a t, “In today 's 
Italy, a s  in the  Italy of M achiavelli’s civic h u m a n is ts , the  civic 
com m unity  is a  secu lar com m unity .” (Putnam  e t al, 1993:109). In 
sum , the  deeper the  com m unicative s tru c tu re  of a n  organization  the  
g rea ter the  am o u n t of tru s t  betw een its m em bers a n d  the  g rea ter its 
capacity  to p roduce civic citizens.
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P u tn a m ’s w ork h as been criticised for (am ong o th er things) 
neglecting the  roles of the sta te  and  the public  sphere  (see for 
exam ple Cohen 1999; Tarrow 1996). N evertheless, h is  general 
proposition th a t the  functions associations have for dem ocracy 
depend  in p a rt on the ir in ternal s tru c tu re  is sup p o rted  by som e of 
h is  m ost tre n c h a n t critics. Cohen, in a  view th a t  h a s  been  echoed by 
m any  o thers , m ain ta in s th a t “only associations w ith  in te rn a l publics 
s tru c tu re d  by the  relevant norm s of d iscourse  can  develop the  
com m unicative com petence and  interactive abilities im p o rtan t to 
dem ocracy.” (Cohen, 1999:63). Given the  b road  co n sen su s  th a t 
dem ocratic s tru c tu re s  are decisive to the  acqu isition  of dem ocratic 
a ttitu d es , it is n o t therefore surprising  th a t  m any  th eo ris ts  a ttrib u te  
to the  h ierarch ical, theocratic, male organization th a t  is the  Catholic 
C hu rch  a  w eak potential to produce individuals bearing  th e  v irtues 
described  in the  opening parag raphs of th is  chap ter. C ontem poraiy  
a u th o rs  concerned w ith identifying the type of a ssoc ia tions capable 
of fostering dem ocratic virtues tend  no t to sea rch  am ong the  
trad itiona l religions for support for their w ork.77
Is P u tn am  right? Are ‘h ierarchically  ordered  organ izations’ 
sub-op tim al p roducers of dem ocratic v irtue? Should  they  be 
“negatively associated  with good governm ent”? (1995:163) Do they  
breed  d is tru s t an d  in tolerance? If so, how are th e  ‘dem ocratic  v irtu es’ 
of Czech B ishops explained? In the case of the  Czech Catholic 
C hurch , P u tn a m ’s argum en t is supported  by a n  exam ination  of the  
way in w hich in te rna l conflicts of the ch u rch  were dealt w ith after 
the  collapse of C om m unism . The m ajor conflict w ith in  th e  Czech 
Catholic C hurch  after 1989 was over the  way in w hich p ries ts  and
77 For example, Cohen contrasts organizations that produce “democratic competence” 
with “hierarchical, authoritarian association such as the Mafia (which) can easily generate 
skill in strategic action” and the Catholic Church which “can generate loyalty”. (Cohen, 
1999: 63).
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B ishops were o rdained  u n d e r C om m unism . U nder C om m unism , it 
w as illegal for a  p riest or bishop to be o rdained  w ithou t sta te  
perm ission , an d  since m any aspiring  can d id a tes  were u n ab le  to get 
s ta te  approval, o rd inations were often carried  o u t in secret by 
B ishops e ither w ithin the  Czech Republic or acro ss the  border in 
G erm any.78 These p riests  and  B ishops becam e p a r t  of w h a t today is 
variously  referred to a s  the  U nderground C hurch , the  S ilent C hurch , 
or the  Secret Clergy.
A m ajor conflict w ithin the C hurch  em erged early  in  1990 
w hen it w as discovered th a t  a t  least 200 of those  ordained  u n d e r 
C om m unism , bo th  p riests  and  B ishops, h a d  been  m arried , again st 
the  ru les  of the  Rom an Catholic C hurch .79 The p rocess of resolving 
th is  issue  w as begun  by the  Czech Catholic h ierarchy  b u t very 
quickly w as tak en  o u t of the h a n d s  of Czech B ishops to be m anaged 
by the  V atican. W here m ost accoun ts of th e  reso lu tion  of th is  
problem  have tended  to focus on the  fa irness or otherw ise of 
outcom es m y research  w as m ore concerned w ith  process. Here, the  
course  adopted  by the  V atican w as regarded  by those  involved as  
highly unsatisfac to ry . The w illingness in  principle of the  'secret 
clergy’ to cooperate in an  investigation quickly cam e into  tension  w ith 
the  V atican’s dem and  for com pliance, a  m odel of conflict reso lu tion  
w hich w as strictly  h ierarch ical and  non-discursive. Fr. Kratky, one of 
the  u n d erg ro u n d  p riests  sub ject to investigation com plained: “We 
told the  (Vatican) B ishops everything they  w an ted  to know  b u t we
78 For a long period only three of the 13 dioceses had Bishops as the Czechoslovakian 
State and the Vatican could not agree on the choice of candidate. Many of the hierarchy in 
today’s Czech Catholic Church were ordained in secret, for example Cardinal Vlk, Tomas 
Halik, and Vaclav Maly.
79 The Greek Catholic Church allows married men to be ordained as priests but not to be 
consecrated as Bishops. The issue was resolved, partly, by the setting up of a Greek 
Catholic diocese in Prague headed by Bishop Ljavinec (of my interviews) to which the Czech 
married priests were transferred to.
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were n o t called to a  dialogue.” (The Tablet, 28 M arch, 1992). A view 
echoed by Fr. V entura:
All the  steps he (Cardinal Ratzinger, V atican h ead  of the  
Congregation for the Doctrine of the  F a ith80) h a s  tak en  
suggest a  tendency n o t to talk  ab o u t the  problem  - so 
w ha t we are doing here  right now (talking ab o u t it) is 
done aga in st C ardinal R atzinger’s w ishes. (Esras, 
1993o).
M ost of the  m arried  clergy obeyed the  V atican’s in stru c tio n s: first, to 
take  a  theological exam ination, second, to undergo  re-ord ination  
subconditione, th ird , to tran sfe r to the  G reek C atholic C hu rch  w hich 
allows p ries ts  to be m arried  (a G reek C atholic Diocese w as 
conveniently opened in Prague), and  finally n o t to d isc u ss  the  m atte r 
in public. A m inority  refused  to comply a n d  have bu ilt u p  a  sm all, 
h a rdened , an d  vocal opposition to the  V atican’s solution. The 
m arried  B ishop J a n  Konzal, for exam ple, describes the  proposal to 
undergo  re-ord ination  as an  “in su rm o u n tab le  obstacle” (Esras, 
1993e). For som e, the  order to be re-ordained  is resen ted  less for the  
affront to the  validity of the original a n d  secre t o rd ination , and  m ore 
for the  m an n e r in w hich the  order w as m ade. Fridolin Z ahradn ik , a  
m arried  m an , consecrated  a s  B ishop in  1968, co n tin u es w ith h is 
m in istry  an d  w orks with the  g roups he developed u n d e r 
C om m unism . Refusing to relinqu ish  h is  episcopal rights, he in s is ts  
th a t  a s  long a s  Rom e’s reasons for doub ting  h is  o rd ination  are  no t 
explained to him  he will con tinue to say  m ass. Z ah rad n ik  h a s  
actively cam paigned for the  righ ts of the  ‘secre t clergy’ a n d  a ttended
80 known by its old name The Inquisition’ until 1964 and reinvigorated with John Paul 
II’s election to the Papacy, the role of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, is to 
restrain any revisionist or schismatic tendencies. Essentially, its aim remains the same as 
that of the inquisition, to stamp out heresy.
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the  ‘Fair for an  O pen C h u rch ’ a t Salzburg u n d e r  the  b an n er, “The 
once Silent C hu rch  silen t no m ore.” (The Tablet: 16 May, 1991).
In sum , the  m ajor d ispu te  th a t arose  w ith in  the  Czech Catholic 
C hu rch  post-C om m unism  w as m anaged  by the  V atican 
au thorita tive ly  an d  non-deliberatively, sp read ing  susp ic ion  and  
fru stra tio n  am ong those who insisted  on having the ir voices heard . It 
seem s th a t  P u tnam  is right. His a rg u m en t th a t  vertical netw orks 
im pede an d  disable com m unication  an d  th u s  b reed  d is tru s t is 
suppo rted  em pirically by contem porary  events w ith in  the  Czech 
C atholic C hurch .
If the  rela tionsh ip  betw een the U nderground  C h u rch  an d  the  
Catholic h ierarchy  ended here, th is  would seem  to b ear o u t P u tn am ’s 
pessim istic  view of the  dem ocratic functions of Catholic C hurches. 
B u t there  is m ore to the  rela tionsh ip  th a n  th is. Once one m oves on to 
the  views of the  national h ierarchy, a  different a ttitu d e  tow ards 
com m unication  w ith sub o rd in a tes  is clearly visible, a n  a ttitu d e  th a t 
is m oreover sharp ly  a t  odds w ith th a t  adopted  by the  V atican. From  
the very beginning of the  V atican in tervention , the  Czech national 
h ierarchy  advocated a  considerate  an d  open ap p ro ach  to the  m atte r 
of the  ‘u n d erg round  p rie s ts ’ in the  hope th a t  “delicate case s” would 
be, in  the  w ords of Fr. Halik, “resolved am icably, if the  V atican show s 
h u m an ity  an d  u n d e rs tan d in g  in dealing w ith  th em ” (The Tablet, 20 
October: 1990).
In the  end, the  m atter, from the  B ishops’ po in t of view, w as 
dealt w ith very poorly. B ishop Maly w as strongly  critical of the 
V atican approach:
The com m unication  w a sn ’t so good. Above all the  
V atican au tho ritie s  issued  guidelines a n d  it w as a  
m istake  - an d  even C ardinal R atzinger acknow ledges it 
now - th a t  these  guidelines were secret. They were 
oriented  only for B ishops and  ou r d iocesan  B ishops h ad
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them  in the ir h a n d s  b u t they were prevented  to show  
them  to those secretly ordained  B ishops a n d  p ries ts  and  
to those people who were being touched  by them . It w as 
a  m istake because  w hen from the very beginning th is  
question  would be open  an d  these  guidelines w ould be 
open  it could cleanse th is  tension ...B ishops h a d  to keep 
secrecy, to keep it in secret, and  th is  secrecy w orking 
betw een B ishops and  p riests  had  the  im pression  th a t 
o u r B ishops hide som ething th a t is ag a in s t th em  and  
th is  tension  increased , grew and  grew an d  it w as a  
m istake  because  the  b est m anner to solve problem s is to 
be open and  n o t to hide an d  no t to keep it in  secre t and  
it w as a  m istake, (interview, 1998).
Fr. D aniel H erm an agreed:
Its really true , yes absolutely, th is  m odel w as no t 
optim al. Problem  of com m unication ... th is  is also a  
question  of em pathy. I th in k  th a t the  C ongregation [for 
the  doctrine of the  faith] or the  B ishops conference in  the 
d iscu ssio n s w ith these  people m u s t feel very very 
sensitive to w hat they suffered, and  to sp eak  w ith  them  
in  the  a tm osphere  of bro therhood and  n o t so directly, 
(interview, 1998).
E m pathy  w ith the  Secret Clergy w as also in  evidence am ong o ther 
m em bers of the  B ishops Conference. T hus, B ishop Hrdlicka: “am ong 
them  I have m any  colleagues and  friends, who I esteem  veiy m uch , 
they  are  very brave p e rso n s.” (interview, 1998), a n d  B ishop 
Lobkowicz “I have also in my town several of th ese  m en, I knew  them  
all before an d  I know  them  a s  a  people and  m em bers of the  chu rch , 
believers an d  we are all friends. I can  say.” (interview, 1998). This 
d istinc tion  betw een the  a ttitu d e  of the V atican a n d  the  a ttitu d e  of the  
na tio n a l elite w as clear to som e of those m ost critical of the  way the
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secret o rd inations were being investigated. For exam ple, V entura, 
one of the  m arried  p riests  u n d e r investigation, com m ented: 
“A rchbishop Vlk and  ou r B ishops greatly w ish a n d  tiy  to help u s  
resolve the  s itu a tio n .” (Esras, 1993o).
I suggest th a t  th is  com plicates greatly  P u tn a m ’s conten tion  
th a t  “the  basic  c o n tra s t betw een horizontal a n d  vertical linkages, 
betw een ‘w eb-like’ and  ‘m ay-pole-like’ netw orks is reasonab ly  clear”’ 
(Putnam  e t al, 1993:173). J u s t  w here in a n  organization  h ierarch ical 
re la tions b reak  down an d  m ore dem ocratic ones begin is a  crucial 
issue  in  assess in g  the  possibilities of a n  organ ization’s ac tu a l or 
po ten tial con tribu tion  to the  elaboration of civic norm s. If the  line of 
com m and in the  Czech Catholic C hurch  begins a t  th e  V atican an d  
m oves dow n to the  d isenfranch ised  priests , it is c lear th a t  th is  line of 
com m and encoun ters definite points of resistance . The Czech 
B ishops’ Conference h a s  adopted  a  strongly reflective an d  critical 
a ttitu d e  tow ards the  organizational s tru c tu re  w ith  w hich it h a s  so 
recently  becom e re-un ited , an d  no t only w ith  resp ec t to the  m arried  
p ries ts  on w hose behalf the  B ishops have acted , b u t on a  range of 
o ther issues. For exam ple, Fr. H erm an told me: “D uring  the  la s t 
adlim inal visit of ou r B ishops in Rome th is  S ep tem ber they  spoke, 
they  d iscussed  ab o u t it w ith the chief of the  F aith  of the 
Congregation - C ardinal Jo sep h  Ratzinger” (interview, 1998). H erm an 
also rem arked: We [the Czech B ishops Conference] are  p reparing  
now the  p lenary  council of the  Czech Catholic C hurch . We will create  
here really the  platform  of the dialogue. Surely  these  very living or 
sensitive questions m u s t be opened in th is  p rocess of the  council of 
the  c h u rc h  here .” (interview, 1998). Sim ilarly, B ishop Maly 
com m ented: “there  are  groups w hich w ould like to d iscu ss  m ore 
ab o u t questions like the  ord ination  of w om en, the  celibacy of p riests  
an d  the  d irect election of B ishops etc” (interview, 1998). And B ishop 
Lobkowicz expressed  the  hope th a t  “p e rh ap s  the  c h u rc h  of the  fu tu re
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will be less clerical, more civic. The role of a  p ries t or religious m an  of 
the  consecrated  life is great and  it will be alw ays here. B u t pe rh ap s 
in an o th e r m easu re”.(interview, 1998).
The crucial poin t to be draw n here  is th a t  it is im portan t 
n e ither to predict no r read  action off from the  official non-dem ocratic  
theocratic  form of the  Catholic C hurch . Indeed differences in  a ttitude  
am ongst Catholic organ isations on a  whole range of issu e s  from 
hom osexuality  to dem ocracy show th a t  we c an n o t alw ays derive the  
actions of catholic elites from the s tru c tu re s  w ith in  w hich they are 
em bedded. Yet, th is  is precisely the assu m p tio n  of P u tn am  and  a  
h o st of o thers working in social cap ita l research . There are  two 
reaso n s for rejecting su ch  a  strategy in  the  case  of th e  Czech 
Catholic C hurch . F irst, the  Czech Catholic C hu rch  is a  case  of an  
elite th a t  h a s  been separa ted  from its o rgan isational s tru c tu re  for a  
su b s ta n tia l period of time. Second, the  vertical an d  au thorita tive  
d im ension  of organised tran s-n a tio n a l C atholicism  th a t  Czech 
B ishops now find them selves a  p a rt of, is one res isted  by them . 
Certainly, a s  P u tnam  argues, vertical au tho rita tive  s tru c tu re s  are not 
conducive to d iscursiveness, b u t the trad itiona l vertical s tru c tu re s  of 
the  Catholic C hurch  held no place in the  lives of the  p re sen t day 
Czech B ishops w hen they  lived u n d e r C om m unism  an d  th e ir  im pact 
today is u n ce rta in  an d  contested. We can  conclude th a t  th e  search  
for factors responsib le for producing the  d em o n stra ted  civility of the  
key figures of the  Catholic C hurch  shou ld  not seek  a  cau se  in the  
C h u rch ’s official in te rnal s truc tu re .
W here th en  do the  civil individuals th a t  h ead  th e  Czech 
Catholic C hurch  come from? I suggest th a t  a  u se fu l beginning is to 
d istingu ish  the  h isto ry  of individuals  from  the  h isto ry  of the ir 
organisations. In short, if netw orks an d  s tru c tu re s  a re  held  to have a  
pedagogical effect on ‘the ir b eare rs’ there  is no reaso n  why the  
relevant o rganisational s tru c tu re  h a s  to be the  one in  w hich the  acto r
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is p resen tly  em bedded. P u tnam  does n o t separa te  o u t ac to rs from 
the ir netw orks an d  therefore fails to c reate  the  space to consider the 
effect of o th er s tru c tu re s  or netw orks w ith in  w hich ac to rs  m ay have 
been  engaged. In short, we should  consider n o t ju s t  a n  acto r's  
association  but also an actor's associational history. The 
o rgan isational s tru c tu re  of the  Catholic C hu rch  m ay well n o t be 
conducive to the  build ing of social capital. Yet religious organ isations 
a re  n o t necessarily  the  sole organisational experience of the  clergy. In 
the  Czech case, B ishops and  p riests  lived the ir lives in  a lternative 
netw orks an d  o rgan isations w hose po ten tia l a s  sou rces of social 
cap ita l shou ld  also be taken  into account.
3.2 Historical Structures and Networks
The d istingu ish ing  experience of Czech B ishops in  com parison  to 
those in neighbouring  coun tries w as in the  degree of religious 
oppression  they  suffered. Czech B ishops lived u n d e r  a  regim e th a t, 
since 1968, regulated  an d  sub jugated  the  ch u rch es  (in p a rticu la r the 
Catholic Church) to a  far g reater ex ten t th a n  in  e ither Poland or 
H ungary. In Czechoslovakia, there  w as su b s ta n tia l res is tan ce  to the 
s ta te  au th o ritie s  an d  a  large un d erg ro u n d  C hurch  existed; th is  w as 
no t the  case  in H ungary. V ajda an d  Kuti a rgue  th a t, “H ungarian  
ch u rch es  trad itionally  cu rried  favour w ith the  governm ent. The re s t 
of the ir credibility w as lost w hen they were ready  to cooperate w ith 
com m unist au tho rities. H ungarian  citizens did n o t have an  
‘oppositional c h u rc h ' w hich would have preserved som e basic  values 
an d  w ould have rep resen ted  and  pro tected  th e ir in te re s ts .” (cited in 
D eakin, 2001:16; see also U.S. News a n d  W orld Report, 25 A ugust 
1986). In Poland too, a lthough  the  C hurch  resisted  m any  asp ec ts  of 
s ta te  policy, there  w as nevertheless a  m arked  “w illingness to m ake 
com prom ises and  concessions.” (Chiypinski, 1990:124). In sum , the
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Polish an d  H ungarian  experience w as p redom inan tly  one of 
accom m odation, an  accom m odation th a t e n su red  th a t  B ishops and  
clergy were able to m ain tain  the ir clerical circles an d  live the ir lives 
largely w ithin  a  private religious sphere. This c o n tra s ts  greatly  w ith 
the  C zechoslovakian case w here clerical in te rac tio n s were severely 
restric ted . At a  tim e w hen ch u rch -sta te  re la tions ac ro ss  E aste rn  
Europe were improving, Czechoslovakia w as “d istinc tly  o u t of step  
w ith its  C om m unist ne ighbours”. The Irish  P ress no ted  th a t 
“C zechoslovakia’s C om m unist regime h a s  s tren u o u sly  escala ted  its 
cam paign ag a in st the  C hurch  -  especially the  Catholic- and  its 
followers. [There h a s  been] a  system atic tigh ten ing  of adm inistrative  
contro ls ...b a rring  the  clergy from carrying o u t its  no rm al sp iritua l 
functions an d  rejecting the appo in tm ent of B ishops to long v acan t 
d ioceses”. (The Irish  Press: Ju ly  26,1972).
In w h a t follows I will suggest th a t a  u sefu l p lace to search  for 
the  p roduction  of the  civic values of Czech B ishops is the  variety of 
organizations and  netw orks in which the B ishops were involved 
u n d e r C om m unism . The aim  here is no t to provide a n  in -dep th  
acco u n t of the  im pact these  organ isations h ad  on  the  B ishops, b u t to 
propose th a t  there  are  a  n u m b er of sites o th er th a n  the  ch u rch  
w here the  qualities of the Czech clerical elite were fostered. I suggest 
th a t  these  a lternative sites of netw orks an d  o rgan isa tions h ad  a  
strong  form ative influence on Czech B ishops, encourag ing  values of 
to lerance, plurality , and  public m indedness, in  sho rt, civility. These 
netw orks were bo th  consciously political (secular a n d  religious) an d  
netw orks of everyday life.
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Political Secular:
Charter 77
Religious:
The underground 
church
Everyday Life
Work Prison
Work
M ost of today’s Czech B ishops had  their licences to p ractice a s  
p ries ts  rescinded  by the com m unist s ta te  a n d  were consequently  
forced to seek norm al em ploym ent. Priests were notoriously  assigned  
som e of the  m ost u n p o p u la r jo b s u n d e r C om m unism . For exam ple, 
C ardinal Vlk worked as a  window cleaner an d  B ishop Ljavinec a s  a  
s tree t cleaner. B ishop Maly w as employed a s  a  bo iler-stoker and  also 
for a  period of tim e as  a  n igh t cleaner in the  m etro. T his forced 
em ploym ent offered the  B ishops an  opportun ity  to m eet people 
outside of the  narrow  confines of the chu rch . For exam ple, Maly’s 
two fellow stokers also C harter 77 signatories, were today ’s Chief 
Rabbi of Prague, Karol Sidon, and  the poet Andrej Stankovic. (Prague 
Post: 23 November, 1994). Yet, com m enting on h is  w ork Maly 
extolled the  benefits of losing h is license to practice.
I am  paid  badly, b u t I live w ith the people...I ride tram s 
an d  b u se s  an d  have to worry ab o u t food, a n d  I no longer 
live in the  p a rish  house isolated from the  m an  in  the  
street. Now I am  the m an  in the  s tree t.” (Irish Press, 
February: 1985).
Reflecting on th is  experience years later, Maly said , "Living like th is  
helped m e to u n d e rs tan d  be tter the th ink ing  a n d  behaviour of 
o rd inary  citizens. A nd  it forced m e to express m y fa ith  in a  very civil
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w a y ” (cited in D unn , 1996:41). This experience of o rd inary  life is 
greatly valued by today’s Czech B ishops. H erm an argued ,
they  know  th is  norm al daily life. They lived before the  
collapse of C om m unism  like w orkers or s tree t c leaners 
an d  like norm al people an d  I th in k  th a t  it w as a  tim e for 
them  of the  so called U niversity  of Life’. T hese w ords 
were u sed  once by C ardinal Vlk in one cerem ony an d  I 
th in k  th a t  th is  personal experience is very im portan t, 
(interview, 2002)
And com m enting on one of the  m ost p opu lar figures in the  chu rch , 
Fr. Halik, who worked u n d e r C om m unism  w ith alcoholics, H erm an 
rem arked , “he d o esn ’t live in a  v irtua l reality. He know s norm al daily 
life.” (National Catholic Reporter, 9 Feb:2001).
Prison
It w as n o t only th rough  work th a t the  clergy found a n  opportun ity  to 
m eet an d  live w ith the  non-clerical. M any of the  key figures in today’s 
Czech C atholic C hurch  were incarcerated  for periods of tim e ranging  
from a  few m on th s to 15 years. There is am ple evidence th a t  these  
experiences offer a  usefu l line of enquiry  for investigating w here 
Czech B ishops learned  to tru s t, to cooperate, an d  to value solidarity. 
B ishop O tcenasek , who w as im prisoned for 13 years, explained th a t 
in p rison  “it w as strictly forbidden even to h e a r  a  confession, to 
bap tise  som ebody, to pray  together.” (E sras, 1993i) M ass w as 
celebrated  in  the  following way: “everybody in  the  cells ... h ad  to 
p re tend  th a t  no th ing  w as happening , th a t  som e were asleep, o thers 
m oving ab o u t slowly, so a s  n o t to a rouse  the  s ligh test susp icion  of 
the  g u a rd s because  all th a t  w as a  p u n ish ab le  offence. Fr. Fiala 
describ ing h is experiences in p rison  com m ented: “We were 28 in  the  
cell, th ere  w as no m a ttre ss  for me left so I h a d  to lie on a  so rt of
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bench , b u t it w as quite an  in teresting  school for m e because  there  
were m any  political opponents of the  regim e, they  were in teresting  
com pany ... one learned to p ray , learned so lidarity  (E sras, 1993c, 
em phasis  mine). And Bishop D uka d iscu ssin g  h is  p rison  term  w ith 
the  now Presiden t of the  Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel: “In Plzen, in 
1980-81, we sp en t a  nu m b er of m o n th s together, m y term  w as 
sh o rte r th a n  his, and  ou r conversations took place w ith in  the  
fram ew ork of the  so called prison  university  w here politics, lite ra tu re , 
philosophy, religion were d iscussed  an d  I th in k  som e of these  
conversations are reflected in the  la s t of six teen “Letters to Olga” in 
w hich he d iscu sses  religious them es am ong o th e rs .” (E sras, 1993b).
The Underground Church
A part from the  life of work an d  prison , p rie s ts  were involved in 
un d erg ro u n d  religious netw orks. Again, the  B ishop 's com m ents 
reflect a n  apprecia tion  for the experiences the  re s tra in ts  of 
C om m unism  presen ted . B ishop Koukl: “U nder to ta lita rian  system  I 
w as m aking som e sp iritua l exercises w ith o th er people illegally in  the 
m oun ta in s. So the bishop gets closer to believers.” (interview, 1998, 
em phasis  mine). Fr. Fiala d iscussing  h is  tim e in  the  un d erg ro u n d  
said: “It w as a  very in teresting  and  a d v en tu ro u s  life...we form ed 
various com m unities, a t  work, in the  p laces w here we lived, in 
various a re a s  of Prague and  in the country ...w e rem em ber those 
tim es fondly. We h ad  fun  even a t w ork.” (E sras, 1993c). And B ishop 
Maly rem arked , “I w as very involved in the  w ork of the  so-called 
u n d erg ro u n d  church . I lectured, I o rganised  biblical lessons ... I 
p repared  couples for weddings, I said  holy M asses. All the  th ings 
th a t  were im possible to do in ch u rch es  I did in som ebody's 
apartm en t. At the  sam e tim e I had  a  m an u a l jo b .” (cited in D unn , 
1996:40).
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Charter 77
Both B ishop D uka an d  B ishop Maly were involved in the  Czech 
o rgan isation  C harte r 77. Maly served a s  one of the  C h arte r’s 
spokespersons an d  se t u p  its ad ju n c t organization, T he  O rganization 
for the  U njustly  R epressed’ (Vons), w ith the  ex-R evolutionary Youth 
leader, Petra  Sustrova. C harte r 77 w as th e  m ajor, n o n -s ta te , political 
secu lar organization existing in the Czech Republic after 1968. The 
o rgan isa tion ’s aim  w as to secure  the  G overnm ent’s observance of the  
C onstitu tion , m ore specifically, th a t the  G overnm ent shou ld  “honou r 
its h u m an  righ ts pledges u n d e r the 1968 in te rn a tio n a l covenants of 
the  U nited N ations, w hich h ad  been reaffirm ed in  the  1975 Helsinki 
Final Act an d  en tered  in the  coun try ’s Register of Laws the  following 
year.” (Luxmoore and  B abiuch, 1995:291)
These ra th e r  m inim um  aim s allowed for people of diverse 
political p e rsu as io n s  an d  backgrounds to come together; first, the  
reform ist M arxists expelled from the C om m unist Party  after 1968, 
second, m em bers of the  rep ressed  ch u rc h es  a n d  religious 
associations, an d  th ird , p layrights an d  a rtis ts . D espite being a  
generally inform al group, the  organ ization’s leadersh ip  s tru c tu re  
nevertheless h ad  a  fixed rule  th a t  there  be a  ro ta ting  se t of th ree  
spokespersons; one from each of the  th ree  groups -  M arxist, 
C ultural, and  Religious - th a t com prised C h arte r 77. This en su red  
th a t con trasting  viewpoints were equally rep resen ted . It w as an  
a rrangem en t th a t  the  Catholic d issiden t, Nemcova, argued , tu rn ed  
the organization into som ething ak in  to a  ‘school of dem ocracy .’ “All 
s ta tem en ts  h ad  to be approved by rep resen ta tives of the  different 
stream s, so they  h ad  to reflect sh a red  p u rp o ses ra th e r  th a n  
p a rticu la r in te res ts .” (Luxmoore an d  B ab iuch  1995:293). And, “if 
agreem ent proved difficult, previous spokesm en were sum m oned  ... 
to give help an d  advice”’ (1995:300.)
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There w as no reason  why th is ‘un ity ’ or p lu rality  forced from 
necessity  m ore th a n  choice should  generate  any th ing  beyond 
strategic  calculation  or inculcate  any genuine feelings of respec t or 
to lerance tow ards o ther m em bers. At the  o u tse t th is  w as the  view of 
som e of the  partic ipan ts . B enda described the  u n ity  of C h arte r 77 a s  
“a  defensive unity , a  un ity  born  of necessity  w hich in its  p re sen t form 
is incapable  of achieving anyth ing  m ore concrete  th a n  it h a s  
a lready .” (Benda, 1985:120). B ishop D uka rem arked  th a t, “for m any 
C hris tian s the  p resence of com m unists in the  C h arte r rem ained  a  
problem ” w ith the  C hristians convinced th a t  the  ex-com m unists 
w ould “ju s t  u se  the  C harte r a s  a n  in s tru m en t for th e ir own re tu rn  to 
power” (cited in Luxmoore an d  Babiuch, 1995:297). There were a  
g rea t m any  differences am ong the m em bers of C h arte r 77. 
N evertheless, over tim e, com m unication betw een the  o rgan isa tion ’s 
m em ber began to have an  effect on how they  regarded  each  other. 
S ustrova  a rgues th a t the  need to reach  a  c o n sen su s  on all 
d ocum en ts th a t  were released m ade “the abso lu te  priority  in C harte r 
77 - sim ple m u tu a l u n d ers tan d in g .” (Luxmoore a n d  B abiuch, 
1995:300). The initially pessim istic  B enda found  th a t  “th is  un ity  
am ong people of d ispara te  opinion and  background  is a  g rea t forum  
of learn ing .” (Benda, 1985:120). And D uka no ted  th a t  the  suspicion  
betw een the  C hristians and  the  C om m unists lessened  w hen “both  
sides h a d  m ore experience of working a n d  suffering together.” 
(Luxmoore an d  B abiuch, 1995:298)
4. Counter Arguments: Culture and Political Institutions
T hus far, I have argued th a t  m em bership  of a n  organ isation  or 
netw ork is an  im portan t factor in developing the  dem ocratic  v irtues, 
b u t, in  the  case  of the  Czech Catholic B ishops, it is th e ir experiences 
in o rgan isations and  netw orks under Communism, ra th e r  th a n  post- 
C om m unism , w hich m ay have provided the  m ore im p o rtan t civic
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education . Before moving to a  conclusion, th ere  are  two im portan t 
co u n te r a rgum en ts  th a t need to be considered . T hese coun ter 
a rg u m en ts  are concerned w ith the role of cu ltu re , an d  the  role of 
s ta te  an d  political in stitu tions.
4.1 Culture
A su b s ta n tia l body of critique h a s  begun to bu ild  in  opposition  to the  
em p h asis  on associational experience a s  the  key to civic virtue. The 
cen tra l focus of th is  critique is th a t the  b roader political cu ltu re  
w ith in  w hich associations are em bedded h a s  been  ignored. A uthors 
su c h  a s  Ro& teutscher (2002) argue th a t  ra th e r  th a n  viewing civic 
assoc ia tions a s  responsible for the  developm ent of a  dem ocratic 
cu ltu re , we shou ld  reverse the  causa l chain , a n d  consider w hether it 
is in  fact political cu ltu re  th a t im pacts on assoc iations. In sum , the  
a rg u m en t is th a t  associations are not constitu tive  of cu ltu ra l values, 
they  m erely reflect or echo these values.
Applied to the  case of the Czech Catholic C hurch , the  
a rg u m en t m ight be th a t  given the p u rpo rted  civility of Czech C ultu re  
th e re  is no th ing  su rp rising  in the  civil views of Czech B ishops. Czech 
B ishops sim ply display the sam e civil a ttitu d e s  a s  m ost o ther 
Czechs. Czech B ishops are civil because Czech culture is civil..*1 The 
a rg u m en t th a t  Czech B ishops simply reflect dom in an t cu ltu ra l 
va lues is an  im portan t one to consider. However, a  consideration  of 
som e of the  m ost controversial public issu e s  in  the  Czech Republic 
suggest th a t  in m any  in stances the  views of Czech B ishops do not 
m irro r the  dom inan t cu ltu ra l views of the  w ider population . The 
B ishops’ views are in fact more civil. Czech B ishops often seem  to be
81 I am grateful to Karen Henderson who suggested this argument in response to a paper
I presented at the Political Studies Association 2002. Her question was whether Czech 
Bishops are liberal because Czech culture is liberal.
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no t sim ply to leran t, tru sting , or respectfu l of p lu rality  a n d  the public 
good, b u t m ore to le ran t and  m ore respectfu l th a n  the  b roader 
society, a s  the  following exam ples suggest.
Pluralism and the Gypsies
Betw een 1992 an d  1995 tw enty-eight R om anies were m urdered  in 
rac is t a tta c k s  in the  Czech Republic. R acist a ttitu d e s  in  the  country  
are  consisten tly  high. Polls conducted  by Stem  a n d  the  In stitu te  for 
Crime an d  Social Prevention for the  M inistry of Ju s tic e  on a ttitu d es  
am ong school s tu d e n ts  show  th a t  80% of all s tu d e n ts  w ould m ind 
living nex t to a  Rom any family. Nearly 80% w ould n o t like a  Rom any 
a s  a  m arriage p artn er, and  nearly  30% w ould n o t like a  Jew  a s  a  
m arriage partner. (CTK (Czech News Agency), 25 Ju ly , 1995). A poll 
a t  the  end  of 1998 by the Institu te  for Public O pinion R esearch 
show ed th a t  36% of people adm itted  to being indifferent to d isplays 
of racial in tolerance, while 6% of people said  th a t  they  approved of 
su ch  d isp lays (CTK (Czech News Agency), 21 Dec, 1998). According 
to the  new s agency “only a  tiny m inority  were in favour of m ore 
m u tu a l u n d e rs tan d in g  and  com m unication  or creating  be tter 
conditions for people of o ther races an d  na tionalitie s” (4 February,
1999). The n u m b er of d ea th s  an d  a ttac k s  h a s  been  the  source of 
com m ent by the  E uropean  Union, yet there  is little action  by 
politicians, an d  little public p ressu re  on them . In U sti Nad Labem, a  
tow n w here 15% of the  population  are gypsy or Rom a, a  2 m eter high 
wall, approved by a  m ajority of politicians on the  local council, began 
to be co n stru c ted  to separa te  from w hite Czechs a n  a re a  m ainly 
inhab ited  by the  Roma. The E uropean  C om m ission called for the  
im m ediate rem oval of the wall. In response, Vaclav K laus com plained 
“I see w alls in N orthern  Ireland w hich a re  far g rea ter in significance
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th a n  th a t  in M aticni S treet, and  no one th re a te n s  to expel B ritain  
from the EU” (cited in The G uardian, 27 Oct, 1999).
A lthough I can n o t coun ter these  s ta tis tic s  on rac ial a ttitu d es  
w ith ones specifically for the B ishops, it is relevan t th a t  th e  Czech 
B ishops have been an  exceptionally strong  voice a g a in st rac ism  in 
the  Czech Republic. Not only w as to lerance em phasised  by the  
B ishops in m y interviews, b u t the B ishops a re  also actively involved 
in fighting ag a in st racism . In M arch 1998 the  B ishops Conference 
issued  a  pasto ra l le tter specifically ad d ressed  to in to lerance  against 
Racism . The Spokesm an for the B ishops Conference s ta ted  “Racially- 
m otivated crim es are becoming increasingly m ore frequen t and  the  
situa tion  is unbearab le . The Catholic C hu rch  rea lises th a t  it m u s t 
raise  its voice,” (CTK (Czech News Agency) 13 M arch 1998) The stance  
of the  Catholic C hurch  against racism  h a s  d raw n the  a tten tio n  of the  
E uropean  Union. Com m issioner Van den  Broek interview ed by CTK 
com m ented th a t  improving the position of the  R om anies w as 
regarded by the  Union as of key im portance to the  Czech R epublic's 
m em bership . Referring to the B ishops p asto ra l letter, he rem arked , 
“We value the  role of the chu rch  in the  in teg ration  of R om anies,” and  
added “In general I th ink  th a t the m ain  p a rtic ip an ts  in the  civic 
society, an d  the  ch u rch  is undoubted ly  one of them , play a  g rea t role 
in inform ing the  public, highlighting the  s ta n d a rd s  a n d  values th a t  
un ite  u s  in the  EU” (CTK, 26 May 1996)
Racism  w as again raised  in the  B ishops L etter on Social Issues 
in 2000:
Fear of foreigners predom inates in  th e  m inds of a  
considerable n u m b er of our citizens. However th e  m ost 
serious problem  in ou r country  is the  co-existence of the  
m ajority of the  population and  o u r dom estic  Rom any 
nationals. The C hurches em phatically  w arn  ag a in st 
ex trem ist g roups who proclaim  xenophobia, rac ism  and
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h a tred  ag a in st all who are ‘d iffe ren t/ As a  p a rt of the ir 
responsibility  for the  life of society, the  C hu rches 
consider the protection o f  hum an rights a s  one o f  their 
priorities. We call on legislators to gradually  am en d  ou r 
laws so th a t  they  are in harm ony  w ith in te rna tiona l 
conventions on h u m an  rights in every aspect. (Czech 
B ishops Conference, 2000:Section 61)
Prostitution and Public Goods.
A recen t and  controversial issue  to em erge in the  Czech Republic 
followed the  publication  of a  report by the  Czech S ta tistica l Office on 
p rostitu tion . The issue  of p rostitu tion  gets very little public  a tten tion , 
b u t  the  repo rt w as requested  by the E uropean  U nion a s  p a rt of a  
b roader investigation into b lack econom ies in m em ber an d  po ten tial 
m em ber sta tes. The sex in d u stry  in the  Czech Republic is poorly 
regu la ted  m aking  p rostitu tion  the  m ost dangerous occupation  in the 
country . Additionally, the  failure to regula te  the  in d u s try  h a s  m ade 
th e  coun try  an  attractive  place for the  illegal trafficking in wom en 
an d  children. D espite th is, the  issue  receives sc a n t public or 
parliam en ta ry  a tten tion . The report for the  EU w as the  first official 
in -dep th  descrip tion  on p rostitu tion  show ing it to be a  m assive 
industry . It appeared  in the  ru n  u p  to the  elections m ak ing  it all the 
m ore likely th a t  it would be buried  quickly, an d  indeed it w as clear 
th a t  politicians were no t going to com m it them selves to the  question. 
“It's a  m oral question  m ore th a n  a  m a tte r  of legislation, so it is 
difficult to find a  com m on position .” said  Ivan Langer, the  depu ty  
ch a irm an  of the  m ain  opposition Civic D em ocratic Party  (ODS). 
(Prague Post, 10 April 2002). A gainst th is  background , B ishop Maly 
in tervened in a  m an n er th a t placed the  issue  squarely  on the 
political agenda. Arguing publicly for the  legalisation of p rostitu tion ,
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Maly insisted : “it isn ’t enough sim ply to m oralize, to judge, b u t it is 
necessary  to do som ething.” (The Prague Post, 10 April, 2002). 
A lthough B ishop Maly spoke as  an  individual, it w as, a s  Radio 
Prague p u t it “no secret th a t  m any Czech B ishops are  of the  sam e 
opinion.” The radio sta tion  com m ented:
The fact th a t a  dignitary  of the Catholic C hu rch  shou ld  
be the  one to call a tten tion  to these  issu e s  -  especially in 
pre-election tim e -  is a  slap in the  face for Czech 
politicians ... Czech politicians rem ain  a t  odds over 
w hether or no t p rostitu tion  should  be lega lised ...bu t 
w hatever the ir position, none of them  have show n a  
serious inclination to take  the m atte r fu rth e r an d  a c t on 
it. (Cesky Rozhlas 7 (Radio Prague), 5 April:2002)
The Prague Post added, “If a  good Catholic like Maly can  sum m on 
the  com passion  needed to suggest the sex trad e  needs regulation, 
why, we w onder, do ostensibly  enlightened n a tio n a l leaders idle?” 
(The Prague Post, 10 April, 2002).
These exam ples show th a t the values of the  c h u rc h  do no t 
reflect the  dom inan t values of the b roader society.82 The Czech 
Catholic C hurch  is in fact critical of these  b roader values. This 
em pirical critique aside however, the  a rg u m en t th a t  associations 
reflect dom inan t values h a s  fu rther problem s. If assoc ia tions are 
held to be the m ere reflections of the dom inan t cu ltu re , w here th en  
do those associations antagonistic  to the  d o m in an t cu ltu re  come 
from? How, for exam ple, did C harte r 77 em erge? How can  we explain 
the  existence of the  Slovakian ‘Public A gainst V iolence,’ or indeed the 
un d erg ro u n d  ch u rch es in Czechoslovakia?
82 There are other examples. The Bishops Conference has been an extremely vocal critic 
of the unregulated market and the “fundamentalist liberalism” that informs this failure to 
regulate in the Czech Republic. (See for example, Czech Bishops Conference 2000: Sections 
19-24, 36-42, and 43-49).
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R oftteu tscher’s argum en t is th a t h e r  th es is  applies only to 
non-political associations, n o t to politically active ones. M em bers of 
non-political associations, she argues, a re  m ore likely to uncritically  
accep t the  dom inan t m essage, w hereas m em bers of politically active 
associations are  unlikely to do so. So far, so good. R oftteu tscher’s 
a rgum en t can  provide an  explanation for the  conform ity of m any 
o rganisations, if no t for political ones. B u t here in  is the  problem . 
How do we th en  explain the  existence of those  o rgan isa tions who are 
not conform ist, who do challenge dom inan t values? W here do these  
o rgan isations come from? Why an d  how do they  have different values 
to the  b roader cu ltu re . W here did the  civic an d  dem ocratic  a ttitu d es  
of Czech B ishops who grew u p  u n d e r C om m unism  come from, if no t 
from them selves an d  the  associations they were p a rt of.
4.2 Political Institutions: Parties and the State
A final co u n te r a rgum en t to the  associational exp lanation  for the 
origin of civility focuses on the  role of political p a rties  an d  the  role of 
the  sta te . P u tn a m ’s bottom  u p  approach  to the  question  of the  origin 
or creation  of social capital h a s  been criticised for ignoring these  
in stitu tions. Indeed, Tarrow  argues, the lack  of s ta te  agency is one of 
the  m ajor flaws of P u tn am ’s explanatory  model; a  m odel, Tarrow  
m ain ta ins, w here “the ch arac te r of the s ta te  is ex ternal...su ffering  
the re su lts  of the  region’s associational incapacity  b u t w ith no 
responsibility  for producing  it.” (Tarrow, 1996:395). T arrow ’s 
a rgum en t is th a t  the  s ta te  an d  political p a rties  have bo th  the 
potential to stifle associational capacities an d  the  ability to develop 
them . W hitehead agrees: “There seem s no strong  reason  either 
theoretical or em pirical - for p resum ing  the  existence of only one 
strongly determ inate  re la tionsh ip  betw een civil society an d  political 
dem ocracy” (W hitehead, 1997:104). A sim ilar po in t is m ade by 
Hefner who in sis ts  th a t “cu ltu ra l and  organizational p receden ts
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m atter, an d  m atte r deeply [but] dem ocracy a n d  civility can  be 
advanced  th rough  strategic in terventions a t  any  n u m b er of po in ts in 
the  dem ocratic circle” (Hefner, 1998b:41).
W here these  a u th o rs  po in t to the im portance  of considering  the  
civic po ten tial of both  s ta te  and  civil society, RoiSteutscher, on the  
con trary , is ad am an t on the  greater im portance  of the  sta te . Her 
a rg u m en t th a t  associations “sim ply reflect general tre n d s” leads her 
to reject any  reliance on them  as  som ething th a t  could  bolster or 
produce civility. This, she s ta te s , is “a  w aste  of tim e a n d  energy.” 
Instead , civic cu ltu re  should  be fostered by
the  trad itional in s tru m e n ts  of dem ocratisation : crafting 
good dem ocratic in stitu tions, dem anding  respectab le  
an d  h o n est incum ben ts of political roles, c reating  social 
an d  econom ic environm ents th a t  encourage civic 
a ttitu d es , investing in education  a n d  political 
socialisation. (Rofeteutscher, 2002:525).
The a rg u m en ts  of R obteu tsher, Tarrow, W hitehead, a n d  Hefner, 
suggest th a t, in  seeking a  cause  to the d em o n stra ted  civility of Czech 
B ishops, the  civility or lack of civility of o th er Czech citizens, we 
m u st n o t ignore the role th a t  m ay have been  played by the  
in s titu tio n s  of the  Czech S tate , Czech G overnm ent, or Czech Political 
parties. Have these  relatively new  in stitu tio n s , we m u s t ask , been 
responsib le for fostering, protecting, or n u rtu r in g  the  civility of the  
C hurch?
R olSteutscher’s em phasis on “good dem ocratic  in s titu tio n s” 
(2002) is, of course, im portan t. B u t w hat h e r recipe for civility fails to 
tell u s  is who will craft these  good in stitu tions. Who will dem and  th a t 
dem ocratic in stitu tio n s  should  be good? Who will dem and  political 
honesty? In the  Czech Republic, to date , th is  dem and  h a s  come 
prim arily  from civil society. Politicians have n o t so u g h t to p ro tec t or 
n u rtu re  the  v irtues of the ir own in stitu tions , a n d  have n o t been
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successfu l a t protecting the  civic com m unity  or n u rtu r in g  civility 
am ong the  post-com m unist citizenry. D uring  h is  period in 
G overnm ent Prime M inister K laus persisten tly  blocked the  creation  
of laws and  the  allocation of resou rces th a t  w ould develop and  
p ro tec t the  non-profit sphere  and  continually  reneged on coalition 
party  p rom ises to w ork tow ards the creation  of a n  U pper H ouse and  
the  appo in tm en t of a n  om budsm an. (Potucek 1999). T ru s t in  political 
pa rties in the  Czech Republic as a  whole is low. Surveys show 
“w idespread aw areness of elite corrup tion  - a n d  a  tendency  to see it 
a s  w orsening w ith dem ocratisation” (Rose, 1998:15) Nearly 70% of 
people in the  Czech Republic “th in k  corrup tion  am ong public officials 
in national governm ent is worse th a n  u n d e r  C om m unism .” (Rose, 
1998:15). In 1998, The C orruption  Perception Index (CPI) of the  n o n ­
governm ental organisation , T ransparency  In te rn a tio n a l placed the  
Czech Republic in 27th place o u t of 52 coun tries. I t’s position h a s  
even w orsened since then . A survey by The C entra l E uropean  
Opinion R esearch  G roup in 2000 show ed th a t  60%  of people in the 
Czech Republic were “no t satisfied w ith the  functioning  of 
dem ocracy.” 67% felt th a t both  the  G overnm ent a n d  P arliam ent ac ts  
“in the  in te res ts  o f’ a  “m inority of the society” or “sm all groups only”, 
and  53% said  th a t people like them selves could n o t “openly express 
the ir opinions on problem s an d  negative social p h en o m en a .”83 A 2001 
report from the  M inistry of Ju s tic e  show ed th a t  26% of Czechs in 
1999 th o u g h t th a t  the  G overnm ent of Vaclav K laus w as responsib le  
for the  sp read  of co rrup tion  in the  coun try .84
There are  good reasons for these  opinions. All p a rties  in the  
Czech Republic have been involved in political co rrup tion , an d  they
83 Results can be viewed at the Research Group’s website on http://www.ceorg- 
europe.org/topics.html
84 Both results reported by the Ministry of Justice at 
http://www.mvcr.cz/korupceplneni/angl/zprava3 .html
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have n o t supported  a ttem p ts  to ‘legislate t r u s t ’. Nor have a ttem p ts  to 
‘legislate t r u s t ’ been supported  by the  politicians. For exam ple, none 
of the  pa rties  supported  P residen t Havel’s p roposal to create  a  
tra n sp a re n t schem e for party  funding. Havel argued  th a t, “such  a  
system  w ould en su re  public tran sp aren cy  regard ing  the  sources of 
party  funds, an d  a t  the  sam e tim e it could function  a s  a  professional 
tool to identify the ir tru stw o rth in ess .” (cited in Potucek, 1999:106).
In sum , the  in s titu tio n s of the  new  post-C om m unist S tate, 
particu larly  during  the  K laus years, 1993-1998, did little to inculcate  
tru s t  or confidence. W hitehead is no do u b t correct w hen he a rgues 
th a t there  is no reason  to a ssum e the  existence of one strongly 
determ inate  rela tionsh ip  betw een civil society an d  trad itional 
dem ocratic in stitu tions. Similarly, Stolle holds th a t  the  sources of 
t ru s t  an d  cooperation are “m ulti-faceted a n d  will n o t be explained by 
ju s t  one factor.” (Stolle, 2000:10) Hefner agrees, in sisting  tha t: “no 
single ‘d e te rm in an t in the  la s t in s tan c e ’ can  explain the  b read th  of 
th is  diffusion [of civil ideals].” (Hefner, 1998b:40). N evertheless, the  
evidence suggests th a t  in  the  Czech case  the  key factors responsib le 
for the  developm ent of civic norm s are not, a s  R oS teu tscher would 
hope, the  new politicians and  the ir in stitu tions. The im petu s tow ards 
civility com es, on the  contrary , from those  ‘non-political’ 
o rgan isations and  individuals in civil society; env ironm ental groups, 
in tellectuals, a rtis ts , and  non-party  public figures. O n 23 Ju ly  1999, 
these  varied peoples cam e together an d  form ally an n o u n ced  the  
launch  of a  new m ovem ent ‘Im pulse 9 9 ’ w hich called “for the 
developm ent of a  civil society and  the ru le  of law .” (Prague Post, 28 
Ju ly  1999) 70 ,000  people cam e onto the  s tree ts  of P rague supporting  
the o rgan isation  an d  dem anding an  end  to co rrup tion  an d  an  end  to 
the G overnm ent’s ‘opposition agreem ent’. T om as Halik, a n  ex­
spokesm an of the  B ishops Conference w as one of the  key spokesm en
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for th e  m ovem ent. The National Catholic R eporter sum m ed u p  h is 
influence in th is  way.
Particu larly  for educated  Czechs, Halik h a s  becom e a  
voice of reason  articu la ting  their concern  over corrup tion  
a t every level and  bickering politicians m ore concerned 
w ith power th a n  with public good. (National Catholic 
Reporter, Feb:2001)85
85This is an analysis that is lent support from Halik’s standing in the public eye. A poll of 
public opinion in 2001 placed Halik 6th in the list of greatest living Czechs. Interestingly the 
poll placed Havel and Klaus equal first showing just how divided public opinion is.
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C hapter Six
Conclusion
1. Introduction
This th esis  se t o u t to answ er the question , why is civil society 
im portan t for dem ocracy? The aim  of th is  conclusion  is bo th  to 
clarify and  re -s ta te  the  significance of each  c h a p te r’s con tribu tion  to 
th a t  answ er an d  to indicate directions for fu rth e r resea rch  provided 
by the  thesis . The conclusions are  draw n in  re la tion  to the  them es 
th a t  organised the  m ain  body of work; independence, au tonom y, and  
civility. I also re tu rn  to S chm itter’s fourth  elem ent of civil society 
briefly d iscussed  in C hap ter One, the issu e  of n o n -u su rp a tio n . While 
the  m ain  focus of the  thesis  w as the years from  the  rise  of K laus’s 
Civic D em ocratic Party  in  1992 to their defeat in  1998, the  ch ap ter 
in troduces som e new m aterial relevant to the  overall argum ent.
2. Civil Society Research
In C hap ter One above, the  two d o m inan t con tem porary  
u n d e rs tan d in g s  of dem ocracy were identified. The first, D ahl’s 
concept of polyarchy is a  m inim al accoun t of dem ocracy, invaluable 
for its m ethodological advantages over m axim al an d  ‘unw orkab le’ 
definitions. The second w as an  associational conception of 
dem ocracy, w hich seeks to su s ta in , im prove, a n d  deepen th is  
m inim al version, th rough  the in stitu tiona lisa tion  of a  civil society. 
While these  versions of dem ocracy do no t necessarily  con trad ic t each  
other, th ro u g h o u t the  thesis there  is a  recognition th a t  the  m inim al 
accoun t of dem ocracy draw s from the norm ative core of a  m uch
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stronger version. As Antony A rblaster h a s  noted , “a t  the  root of all 
definitions of dem ocracy, however refined an d  com plex, lies the  idea 
of popu lar power, of a  situation  in  w hich power, an d  p e rh ap s  
au thority , re s ts  w ith the  people” (Arblaster, 1994:9). In theory, civil 
society is im portan t w ithin both  conceptions of dem ocracy. As noted 
in  C hap ter One, in the  ‘really existing dem ocracies' we have today, 
civil society associations can  have functions fo r  dem ocracy. Indeed, 
th is  functional underp inn ing  is generally em phasised  over the  
portrayal of civil society as  dem ocracy. In the  la tte r  case, the  
a rg u m en t is th a t the  possibilities for self-governm ent (dem os kratidj 
can  be realized in the  expansion of the  capacities of the  civic realm , 
ra th e r  th a n  the  in s titu tio n s of represen tative  dem ocracy (Hirst, 1994; 
M onsm a an d  Soper, 1997). Both the proceeding acco u n ts  provide an  
answ er to the  question  of the re la tionsh ip  betw een civil society and  
dem ocracy, yet, in  both  instances, the  re la tionsh ip  is expressed  in 
a b s tra c t term s. Moving beyond th a t a b s tra c t level to a  grounded 
accoun t of the  re la tionsh ip  betw een civil society a n d  dem ocracy 
proves elusive in  the  context of the  “m any  w ritings [where] the  
precise lineam ents of civil society rem ain  u n c lea r” (Biyant, 
1993:397). It is the  persisten tly  a b s trac t n a tu re  of th is  rela tionsh ip  
th a t  provides the  m ethodological point of d ep a rtu re  in the  thesis.
T his thes is  h a s  addressed  th is  excessive a b s trac tn e ss  
specifically th rough  an  appropriation  of S chm itte r’s ideal type m odel 
of civil society and  its application to the  em ergence of one civic 
association , the  Catholic C hurch  in  the  p o st-com m un ist Czech 
Republic. S chm itter’s model provides th e  possibility  of moving 
beyond sim ply philosophical responses to the  question  of civil 
society’s im portance for democracy. As such , th e  em p h asis  in th is  
research  is firmly sociological in th a t  it a ttem p ts  to arrive a t an  
accoun t of those factors causally  identifiable for th e  dem ocracy-
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build ing  n a tu re  of civil society and  n o t ju s t  a  descrip tion  of civil 
society’s role w hen it does occur.
3. Independence
A civil society can n o t be held to exist if all assoc ia tions an d  
organizations are  ru n  by the sta te . Independence, or som e elem ent of 
it, is the  constitu tive feature  sine qua non  of an y  civil society, w ithout 
w hich  the  question  of civil society’s functions for dem ocracy canno t 
even be posed. In th is  regard, C hap ter Two d iscu ssed  the  Czech 
Catholic C h u rch ’s con tinu ing  econom ic dependence  on the  p o st­
com m un ist sta te . Ruled by the  sam e econom ic law s it w as governed 
by u n d e r  the  C om m unist regim e, though  freed from o ther 
in terference by the  sta te , the  c h u rc h ’s p re se n t econom ic s ta tu s , 
d ep en d en t on the  resolu tion  of the  re s titu tio n  issue , p reven ts the ir 
ability  to participa te  in civil society a s  they  w ould w ish. The desire of 
the  c h u rc h  to be econom ically independen t of th e  s ta te , to m anage, 
a s  Lobkowicz argued, “their own econom y’ (C hapter Two) is both  
p rac tical an d  symbolic. C hurch  res titu tio n  is n o t sim ply a  question  
of the  righ t to have rights, no r a  question  of the  balance  betw een  
righ ts  an d  responsibilities. For the  B ishops, it is also ab o u t the  
righ ts to responsibility  - “to su p p o rt”, a s  H erm an  argued  “the 
responsib ility  of a  concrete h u m an  being ... to u se  m y own 
responsib ility  in m y own sm all circle of m y life” (C hapter Five).
S uch  righ ts to responsibility  have a  hollow ring  in the  context 
of the  Czech C h u rch ’s con tinued  econom ic m anagem en t by the  sta te  
a n d  the  failure of the  ch u rch  to retrieve its  property . This failure 
can n o t be a ttrib u ted  to m erely p ragm atic  obstacles, for the 
descrip tion  of such  obstacles a s  pragm atic  is often a  political 
descrip tion . Moreover, a s  w as d em onstra ted  in C hap te rs  Two and  
T hree, judgem en ts  ab o u t the  ex ten t to w hich su c h  obstacles m atte r
186
are also con tingen t on the  political process, an d  changing  coalitions 
of power. In the  Czech Republic, econom ic independence  for the 
Catholic C hurch  is sub ject to the  reso lu tion  of res titu tio n , creating  
the  possibilities for a  m eaningful ra th e r  th a n  a  purely  titu la r  
independence. It is th is  th a t  h a s  m ade the  issu e  of re s titu tio n  so 
profoundly political, a  poin t well illu stra ted  by the  rem ark s of the 
vice cha ir of the  C om m unist Party: “We are  n o t ag a in st financing the 
activities of chu rches, we are  aga in st the  c reation  of an  u lterio r 
econom ic b asis  for political clericalism  in the  Czech Republic” 
(C hapter Two). The obstacle is no t ch u rch  independence, b u t the  fear 
of w hat the  ch u rch  will do w ith th a t independence. It is n o t the 
s ta tu s  of righ ts th a t  a ttra c ts  opposition, b u t  the  pow er of rights. It is, 
a s  K laus in sisted , “exclusively an d  only a  concern  of p roperty  - an d  
certa in  advantages, political an d  otherw ise linked w ith th a t” (C hapter 
Four). Yet, K laus’s concerns w ith these  advan tages have been 
exclusively w ith the  advantages th a t m ight accrue  to collective acto rs 
a s  opposed to individual ones (C hapter Four).
While the  obstacles to res titu tion  are  clearly n o t p ragm atic , b u t 
dependen t on politicians’ preferences ab o u t res titu tio n , a  sa tisfactory  
explanation  needs to focus on w hich political preferences prevailed in 
general. On closer exam ination, it w as c lear th a t  p a rty  preferences 
on res titu tio n  were persisten tly  trum ped  by o th er m ore im portan t 
concerns. Party-building dom inated b u s in e ss  in a n d  o u t of 
Parliam ent, an d  res titu tion  w as both  the  paw n a n d  the  victim  of 
such  p re ssu re s  (C hapter Three).
Today, the  issue  of restitu tion  rem ains unresolved . Following 
the election of the  Social D em ocrats in 1998, p rogress on the issue  
looked m ore likely w ith the  creation of a  c h u rc h -s ta te  com m ission in 
1999. Subsequently , however, the  failure to come to any  agreem ent 
caused  the  issue  to be dropped from the  com m ission’s agenda a t  an  
early stage in negotiations over the  new 2002 Law (C hapter One). The
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obstac les to agreem ent were outlined to m e by K laus’s chief advisor 
J ir i  Weigl:86
The o ther ch u rch es w an t to be paid  by th e  s ta te  because  
they  have no m eans ... so am ong the  ch u rc h es  there  are 
serious conflicts, they are no t u n an im o u s. The Catholic 
C hurch  h a s  one specific program m e an d  stra tegy  w hich 
d o esn ’t  take into accoun t the  m eans of the  o thers, 
(interview, 2001, em phasis mine)
The acco u n t is n o t entirely correct. The reality  is th a t  four of the 
sm allest ch u rches , including the  H ussite  ch u rch , in  the  m ore th a n  
tw enty  strong  E cum enical Council of C h u rch es a re  opposed to 
end ing  the  p resen t econom ic arrangem ent. T hese ch u rc h es  have no 
re s titu tio n  claim s, and  as  such , the ir preferences are  reasonable, 
given th a t  w ithou t sta te  subsid ies, they  m ight n o t survive. As a  
so lu tion  to th is  problem , the E cum enical C ouncil of C hurches 
together w ith the  Catholic C hurch  have offered to create  a  budget 
from  the  res titu ted  properties, a  portion of w hich will go to the  four 
c h u rc h es  th a t  are  opposed to form al econom ic independence. 
W hether or n o t th is  solution could w ork an d  w ould prove acceptable 
is p e rh ap s  less im portan t th a n  the  c o n tra s t it offers to Weigl’s 
response  to the  ch u rch es d isagreem ents over pay:
b u t there  is a  problem , the  catholic c h u rc h  ... you ca n ’t 
have different regimes, because the  s ta te  is n e u tra l in  the  
religious affairs, so it c a n ’t su p p o rt one religion an d  no t 
the  other. You c a n ’t pay P ro testan t p ries ts  a n d  leave the  
Catholic C hurch  alone, (interview, 2001, em p h asis  mine)
The em phasis  in Weighs response is n o t on the  p ragm atic  obstacles 
to having different ru les, b u t on h is belief th a t  it w ould be wrong to
86 I had written to Klaus requesting an interview, and he asked Weigl to meet me on his 
behalf.
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have different ru les. Yet, th is  response, “you c a n ’t  have different 
regim es,” im m ediately ra ises  the  question , w hy no t?  W hy no t pay 
th e  P ro te stan t p riests  if they need to be paid, a n d  leave, a s  Weigl p u t 
it, th e  Catholic C hurch  alone? Weigl’s in sistence  th a t  “you c a n ’t have 
different regim es” is echoed by m any  who fear th a t  the  g ran ting  of 
specific righ ts over general ones,
[not only] offends again st the  principle of equality  ... b u t 
leads to fragm enting an d  divisive recognition struggles; 
a n d  th a t  consequently , in the  absence  of any  clear 
princip les of sta te  in tervention, differentiating c itizenship  
will bo th  appear an d  be arb itrary . (Stewart, 2001:200- 
201 )
Yet, the  a rg u m en t th a t all citizens m u s t be trea ted  the  sam e is deeply 
problem atic, for w hat is the  substan tive  m odel of w hich su ch  
c itizenship  shou ld  be based?  To m ain ta in  the  p re sen t m odel of 
ch u rc h -s ta te  a rrangem en ts m ay m eet the  needs of the  H ussite  
ch u rch , b u t n o t of the  m ajority of chu rches . A lternatively, to propose 
a  m odel th a t  w orks for those m ajority ch u rch es  will of course  destroy 
th e  m inor religious groups. It is clear from th is  exam ple th a t  if a  
d ifferentiated  citizenship “offends ag a in st the  principle of equality”, a  
non-differentiated citizenship does likewise. It is for th is  reason  th a t 
S tew art su p p o rts  P a tem an ’s a rgum en t th a t  “for c itizenship  to be of 
equal w orth, the  su b stan ce  of equality  m u s t differ according to the 
diverse c ircum stances an d  capacities of citizens” (Patem an, cited in 
S tew art, 2001:197). Patem an w as talk ing  of m en  a n d  wom en, b u t the  
sam e can  apply to the  religious an d  the  non-relig ious, or in  th is 
in stance , the  C atholics an d  the  H ussites.
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4. Autonomy
C hap ter Four argued  th a t, while independence is a  condition of civil 
society, th is  condition says little ab o u t the  capacities of civil society 
to act. As A rendt pointed out, freedom  to is n o t the  im m ediate 
corollary of freedom  from. Yet, the  issue  of a n  a sso c ia tio n ’s scope or 
abilities for action  is a  crucial one because  independence  a s  a  s ta tu s  
m ay be sim ply m eaningless w ithout a  considera tion  of the  question , 
independent to do w ha t?  (see Taylor, 2001). A rendt provided an  
answ er to th is  question  w ith the rem ark  th a t, in  addition  to 
liberation, freedom  needed, “the  com pany of o th er m en  [and] a  
com m on public space to m eet them  - a  politically organized world, in 
o th er w ords, into w hich each  of the  free m en could in se rt h im self by 
word an d  deed” (Arendt, 2000:442). In C h ap te r F our the  poverty of 
th is  com m on public space w as described w ith  resp ec t to the  elites of 
the  Czech Catholic C hurch . While the  B ishops in the  regions m et 
w ith politicians, these  m eetings bore little resem blance  to A rendt’s 
‘politically organised w orld’, b u t were in effect chance  affairs, n o n ­
in stitu tiona lised  personal encoun ters, th a t  were su b jec t to the  whim  
of politicians a s  to w hether they  took place or not. The ch u rc h  found 
few opportun ities to access or have an  im pact u p o n  the  policy a ren a  
th rough  political parties, and , a lthough  a  form al com m ission w as 
prom ised betw een the  ch u rch  an d  s ta te , the  com m ission w as never 
convened in the  period th a t  K laus held pow er.87
A gainst the  lite ra tu re  th a t  cred its su c h  failu res of partic ipa tion  
to the  anti-political a ttitu d e s  of the p o st-com m un ist citizen, I have 
argued  th a t  in the  case of the  Czech C atholic C hurch , no such  
a ttitu d e s  are  evident. F ar from it, for the  B ishops in the  Czech 
Republic are  highly political an d  keen to be p a r t  of Czech public life.
87 The commission was finally created in 1999.
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Instead , the  re luctance  to adm it the  political partic ipa tion  of the  
religious lies no t w ith the  ch u rch  b u t w ith those  ou tside  the  ch u rch  
who th in k  it inappropriate  th a t  the  ch u rch  shou ld  play a  public or 
political role. This a ttitu d e  is m ost clearly visible w ith in  the  Civic 
D em ocratic Party  (ODS), an d  is persisten tly  espoused  by its leader 
Vaclav K laus who, though  strongly com m itted to the  righ ts of 
individuals, is deeply c ircum spect ab o u t the  notion  of collective 
ac to rs  an d  the ir claim s to political involvem ent. This issu e  of the  
p roper role of civic associations w as re tu rn e d  to again  in my 
interview s in  2001. Weigl, K laus’s chief advisor, described  the  ODS 
position  in  the  following way.
Definitely in te res t groups exist, an d  those  will influence 
the  politics an d  politicians, b u t it shou ld  som ehow  be a  
s ta n d a rd  type of in te res t ... lobby groups who come and  
they  convince legislators, they convince politicians ab o u t 
the ir positions, an d  I th in k  it’s legitim ate b u t  I th in k  they 
shou ld  no t claim  th a t they rep resen t, th ey  should  not 
claim to be a p art o f  the decision m aking process, because  
they  do not have the m anda te  (interview, 2001, em phasis  
mine)
Clearly, Weigl su p p o rts  those rights of free speech  an d  association  
w hich are the  ind icators of D ahl’s polyarchy (C hapter One). S upport 
for free speech, however, does no t con trad ic t the  cen tra l th ru s t  of 
h is  a rgum en t, w hich is to endorse the  ‘gatekeeping’ role of political 
parties: political parties w hich can , a s  F ink-H afner argues,
“selectively s treng then  or w eaken the  voice of in te res t g roups in 
policy-m aking” (C hapter One). For Weigl and  the  ODS, it is the  role of 
politicians an d  no t of civic associations to decide w h a t issu es  are 
legitim ate an d  w hat concerns shou ld  be acted  upon . Certainly, 
a ssoc ia tions can  voice the ir concerns an d  can  a ttem p t to influence 
politicians, b u t it is politicians who decide w hich issu e s  to take  up ,
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because  they, an d  n o t civil society, are society’s represen ta tives. It is 
on th is  po in t th a t there  is c lear divergence betw een the  views 
expressed  by the  ODS and  those  of the  civil society theo rists  
d iscussed  in th is  thes is  (see for exam ple, Post a n d  R osenblum , 2002, 
an d  D iam ond, 1996). For the  ODS, the  role of civic assoc ia tions is to 
a ttem p t to influence politicians b u t  these  a ttem p ts  do n o t have to be 
regarded  a s  im portan t or even necessary . While D iam ond’s 
d iscussion  is sim ilarly cas t in term s of influence, he a rgues the  
con trary  case  th a t “civil society can, and  ... m ust, play a  significant 
role in build ing an d  consolidating dem ocracy” (C hapter One).
The view, however, th a t  influencing politicians is the  purpose  
of civil society ac to rs is very lim ited an d  very lim iting. It is a  view th a t 
co n tra s ts  w ith the  a ttitu d es  of the  civil society ac to rs in  m y case 
study. W here the  civil society lite ra tu re  ten d s  to privilege rela tions 
betw een  the s ta te  and  civil society  (C hapter One), the  m em bers of the 
B ishops Conference em phasised  the  forging a n d  streng then ing  of 
re la tions betw een them selves an d  o ther citizens in civil society 
(C hapter Five). The aim  of the  Catholic C hu rch  is, a s  B ishop Maly 
argued, to, “create  com m unities of t ru s t” (Maly, cited  in the  Prague 
Post, 23 November, 1994), to convince people, Fr. F iala insisted , 
“th a t the  ch u rch  is a  p a rtn e r in the  gam e, a  voice to be reckoned w ith 
in the  build ing of ou r society.” (Esras, 1993c). M ention of the 
governm ent or sta te  w as also ab sen t in the  B ishops’ d iscussions 
ab o u t w ha t m ight be considered the ir concrete successes. An 
exam ple is Fr. H erm an’s d iscussion  of the  re la tions betw een Catholic 
C hurches on the  G erm an and  Czech border, an d  the  po ten tial role of 
the ch u rch  in  w ha t he described a s  “the  p rocess of forgiveness w ith 
the G erm an n a tion”:
I th in k  th a t  in the  process the  ch u rch  p lays a  very
positive role because  there  exists a  p latform  of m eeting
in the  villages w hich were destroyed after the  expelling of
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the  S udeten  G erm ans. ... There is a  ch a in  of forgiveness 
ch u rch es  a ro u n d  the border an d  I th in k  its  a  very 
positive sign. It’s done, its  c reated  a  pre-political 
diplom acy you know, and  I th in k  th a t  its  very im portan t, 
(interview, 1998)
Of course, it is debatab le  w hether a  m icro-strategy  su ch  a s  th is 
could be e ither successfu l or significant,88 b u t the  po in t of the  
d iscussion  here  is no t to debate  the  efficiency or u se fu ln ess  of 
politics a s  p rac tised  by the  bishops; it is sim ply to po in t o u t th a t  th a t 
the  political is no t necessarily  abou t, or even prim arily  abou t, 
influence. It c an n o t be cap tu red  by the  language of the  p lu ra lis t 
m odels into w hich contem porary  a u th o rs  on civil society too often 
lapse. Civil society does no t exist solely to influence the  governm ent, 
n o r can  the  activities of civil society assoc ia tions be reduced  to 
build ing links w ith the  governm ent or the  s ta te . While th is  po in t is 
tru e  in the  context of a  n a tio n -sta te  context, it is especially relevant 
w hen politics can n o t be confined to a  p a rticu la r territory , a s  is the 
case  w ith the  S udeten  G erm ans, a  po in t I re tu rn  to later.
The prim ary  pu rposes and  concerns of Czech b ishops a re  no t 
expressed  by Rose an d  S h in ’s civic assoc ia tions w hich “can  link  the 
in te res ts  of individuals ... w ith the  actions of governm ent” (Rose, 
1996:261), or by D iam ond’s “channe ls o ther th a n  political p a rties  for 
th e ...representation  of in te res ts” (Diamond, 1996:231), no r by Havel’s 
“streng then ing  rela tions betw een citizens a n d  th e ir s ta te ” (Havel, 
1994:18). The Czech Catholic C hurch , while fully supportive of the 
new  regim e, does no t see its prim ary  role a s  th a t  of a  he lper to the  
s ta te  or to elected politicians. The po in t is m ade perfectly c lear in 
the ir social letter, w here they em phasise  the  im portance of draw ing
88 The efforts of the German and Czech Government to form a committee to discuss the 
expulsion of the Sudeten Germans reached an early deadlock over its inability to agree on 
who should be on the committee.
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“a  clear d istinction  betw een the  s ta te  and  its  irrep laceable functions 
on one side an d  civil society  on th e  o ther” (C hapter Four). Non­
governm ental civic bodies, they  argue, “support and  develop hum an  
freedom  [and] every level in the  h ierarchy  of social life shou ld  act, a s  
m uch  a s  possible, au tonom ously  a n d  responsib ly  a t  it's  own level of 
decision m aking” (C hapter Four).
At the  h e a rt of both the  B ishops' an d  Weigl's rem arks is a  
debate  ab o u t the  p roper role of the  citizen, a  debate  cen tra l to the  
lite ra tu re  on civil society an d  also to S chm itter’s th ird  feature  of civil 
society, “n o n -u su rp a tio n ”. S chm itter’s condition of n o n -u su rp a tio n  
requ ires th a t  associations, “do no t seek  to replace s ta te  agen ts ... or 
to accep t responsib ility  for governing the  polity a s  a  whole” (C hapter 
One). One can  agree easily w ith the  necessity  of th is  condition, for if 
a n  organization in civil society replaced the  s ta te , it could no longer 
be considered  a  p a rt of civil society, an d  if a n  assoc iation  colonised 
civil society from w ithin th is  would destroy  th e  very p lu ralism  th a t  is 
constitu tive  of the  civic realm . S chm itte r’s definition of n o n ­
u su rp a tio n  is especially useful, m oreover, b ecau se  it allows for the  
possibility  of d istingu ish ing  betw een the  d an g ers  of replacing the  
sta te  an d  the  dangers of replacing governm ent,89 while the  em phasis 
in the  lite ra tu re  is m ore typically on the  d an g ers  of replacing the  
governm ent. Cohen an d  Arato, for exam ple, w rite,
We do no t see social m ovem ents a s  prefiguring a  form of 
citizen partic ipation  th a t will or even ou g h t to su b s titu te  
for the  a rrangem en ts of rep resen ta tive  dem ocracy ... 
M ovem ents can  and  should  supp lem en t a n d  shou ld  no t 
aim  to replace competitive p arty  system s. (Cohen and  
Arato, 1992:19-20)
89 The distinction between state and government is made in Stewart (2001) which 
discusses the theoretical and analytical losses deriving from the commonplace elision of the 
two terms.
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The problem  w ith su ch  views lies n o t in th e  defence of rep resen tative  
dem ocracy, b u t w ith the  failure to p rob lem atise  sufficiently the  
com m on assu m p tio n  th a t  there  is som e pre-given, widely accepted 
division of labour betw een elected governm ent a n d  the  people. 
W ithout su c h  a  critical investigation, civil society ac to rs are 
chronically  vulnerable to the  view th a t  they  a re  the  governm ent’s 
little  h e lp e rs’, leaving m ore easily deem ed a s  ‘u su rp a tio n ’ a ttem p ts  
by civil society ac to rs to ‘take over’ issu es  th a t  th e  governm ent claim s 
for its  own purview. The poin t is th a t, while there  is m u ch  cau tion  in 
d iscu ssio n s of civil society ab o u t the  danger of organizations 
a ttem p ting  to colonise or to replace governm ent, th e re  is far too little 
sa id  ab o u t the  a ttem p ts  of the  governm ent to replace the  people. 
Indeed, th is  is the  concern of bo th  Havel a n d  the  Czech Catholic 
C h u rch  in the ir criticism  of the  new  2002 Law (C hapter Two): th a t  it 
seeks to inh ib it the  c h u rc h ’s charitab le  work.
The contem porary  debate on civil society does n o t give due 
recognition th a t  it is n o t possible to decide once a n d  for all w here the  
line betw een the  governm ent an d  the  people shou ld  be draw n. For 
th ese  are  political questions: it is an  ongoing issu e  in any  society 
how  m uch  the  people should  govern them selves, an d  how m uch  the  
governm ent should  govern for them .90 T hese questions are 
p a rticu larly  sa lien t in E aste rn  E urope w here, a s  u n d e r  C om m unism , 
th ere  is a  con tinu ing  struggle over the  d is trib u tio n  of power betw een 
the  people and  the  governm ent. This is a  po in t ch u rch  
rep resen ta tives are  well aw are of, as evidenced in  the  rem arks of 
spokesm an  Fr. Fiala.
She [the church] w ishes to function  a s  a n  independen t
90 Robbins recognises this in his comment on the public sphere that “no sites are 
inherently or eternally public. The lines between public and private are perpetually shifting, 
as are the tactical advantages of finding oneself on one side or the other.” (Robbins, 
1993:xv)
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organisation  looking after the  needs of h e r  believers and  
serving society a s  a  whole. T hat schem e is a t  variance 
w ith the  p resen t balance of political forces in  ou r 
governm ent coalition. Some of them  have lately argued  
th a t  it is no b u sin ess  of the  ch u rch  to be socially active 
th a t  h e r p roper ta sk  is to look after the  proper 
functioning of tem ples, places of w orsh ip  so th a t  the  so 
called religious needs of the  faithful m ay be satisfied.
This in essence u sed  to be the  C om m unist a rgum ent. 
(Esras, 1993c)
If there  is an  assu m p tio n  am ong civil society a u th o rs  th a t  th e  line 
betw een the  governm ent an d  civil society is one th a t  can  be 
unproblem atically  draw n, th is  is no t the case  w ith  the  b ishops who 
struggled w ith th is  question  in my interviews. In  a  d iscussion  of the  
Polish chu rch , B ishop Liska, com m ented
The chu rch , m u s t play a  role even in the  public  life. 
B ecause it w ould be strange if the  m ajority  w ould be 
C hristian , an d  it would no t show  in public  life or 
politics... there  are som e excesses, b u t it does n o t seem  
to me th a t  the  ch u rch  in Poland a ttem p ts  to directly 
intervene in the  political life, (interview, 1998)
B ishop Lobkowicz rem arked,
I m ean  there  are  events w here we have to say  o u r word.
Of course we do no t w an t to involve u s  into a  political 
scene, I m ean  elections ...we do no t w an t to say  you have 
to elect th is  pa rty  or th a t  party , it is n o t o u r religious 
du ty  , b u t to say you have to be responsib le  for your 
citizenship, th a t  is ou r duty, (interview, 1998)
B ishop Koukl:
The ch u rch  m u s t always be independen t ... it is no t good
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if it is in any  way connected to any  regim e ...b u t if it 
concerns the  righ ts of citizens or people th en  th e  ch u rch  
can  an d  shou ld  m ake these  s ta tem en ts , (interview, 1998)
B ishop Ljavinec:
We have to be political because  we live in  society, 
(interview, 1998)
Fr. H erm an:
I th in k  th a t the  m ain question  is w ha t do we u n d e rs ta n d  
as  the  politics. Is it a  th ing  of the  political parties , or is it 
a  th ing  of the  com m onw ealth, of the  com m on good? 
W hen the  ch u rch  is a  p a rt of th is  civic society I th in k  
th a t  sh e ’s responsible to say word, very clear w ord to the  
p resen t situation . It would be very b ad  a n d  coun te r 
productive, for in stance, before the  elections to say  th a t 
it would be be tter to vote for ODS or ... so on. It w ould be 
absolu tely  incorrect. B ut to say  th is  hand ling  for 
in stance  is n o t m oral, I th in k  its norm al. I t’s also in  th is  
m entality  of cooperation, to help to the  h igher quality  of 
the  com m on life, no t to be separa ted , n o t to live only in 
the  sacristies, (interview, 1998)
B ishop Maly:
I do n o t th in k  the ch u rch  should  play any  political role 
a t  all, b u t it is necessary  to notify th a t  du ring  the 
d ic ta to rsh ip  every public speech th a t  does n o t agree w ith 
the  ideology of th a t d ictato rsh ip  is big political. So in  the  
p a s t the  ch u rch  w as doing a  politic in th is  sense, 
because  it p ro tested  against the  ideology th a t  w as lying 
an d  did it publicly. In the free society th e  c h u rc h  does 
no t have to fight w ith the d ictato rsh ip , b u t  again  every 
public speech, public voice of b ishops to the  social
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questions is in th is  sense political a s  well ... [The church] 
should  n o t depend on any political power. It shou ld  no t 
prom ote only one political party , etc. It is n o t the  
c h u rc h ’s duty ... B u t the  ch u rch  shou ld  be able to 
express its opinion on the  basic  questio n s of the  
society... an d  th a t  is political, (interview, 1998)
The significance of Maly’s point th a t public  com m ent by b ishops is 
“political as well” is show n in the  reactions of Prim e M inster K laus to 
the  B ishops’ d iscussions of the ‘S udeten  q u estio n ’ w ith the  G erm an 
ch u rches . C ardinal Vlk’s visit to the  h ead  of th e  G erm an Catholic 
C hu rch  an d  the  c h u rc h ’s apology for the  S ude ten  expulsions drew  a  
fu rious response  from Klaus who dem anded  to know  w hether Vlk 
h a d  becom e the  Czech Republic’s new Foreign M inister.
W hat is a t  stake  in the  above exam ple is c ap tu red  well by 
D eakin in h is question , “who h a s  the  responsib ility  of rep resen ting  
the  com m on good ... and  how can  it be identified an d  legitim ated?” 
(Deakin, 2001:82). M uch of C hapter Four w as devoted to a n  accoun t 
of ju s t  why the  ODS party, in the  years  1992-1998, w as so 
ex traord inarily  successfu l a t m onopolising th a t  responsibility. 
D espite the  preferences of o ther parties to sh a re  in the  pow er of 
governing, the  ODS m ajoritarian  princip les w ere secu red  by their 
abilities to control the ir coalition p a rtn e rs , allowing them  an  easy 
victory in the  dom ination of the political agenda.
5. Civility
C hap te r five d iscussed  the  fourth  feature  of S ch m itte r’s m odel of civil 
society, ‘civility’. This is often held to be the  m ost im p o rtan t e lem ent 
of civil society, and , indeed, m any claim  it is c ruc ia l for dem ocracy. 
Not only is civility necessary  to the  su ccess  of rep resen tative 
dem ocracy, b u t it is also essen tia l to the  m ain ten an ce  of a  civic
198
sphere  w here self-governm ent is m ade possible because  of 
“sp o n tan eo u s cooperation, governed by collective no tions of fairness 
an d  ju s t  desert, no t regulation  or ru les im posed  by au tho rity” 
(Deakin, 2001:60).
The norm  or v irtue of civility fea tu res p rom inently  in  m any 
d iscussions of civil society b u t as som eth ing  described  and  
app lauded  ra th e r  th a n  explained. Perhaps th is  is w h a t explains the  
rem arkable  success of P u tn am ’s book, ‘M aking D em ocracy W ork’ 
(1993), w hich se ts  o u t to explain w h y  people a re  civil. His 
explanatory  m odel h a s  now becom e so p opu lar th a t  h is  followers are 
frequently  referred to a s  the  school of social cap ita l theo rists . For 
P u tnam , the  source of civility is horizontal assoc ia tions. Horizontal 
associational m em bership , the  m ore the b e tte r (even in  overtly n o n ­
political associations), incu lca tes values a n d  h a b its  critical for 
dem ocracy:
W hen individuals belong to ‘c ro ss-cu ttin g ’ g roups w ith 
diverse goals and  m em bers their a ttitu d e s  will ten d  to 
m oderate  a s  a  resu lt of group in te rac tion  a n d  c ro ss­
p ressu re s  ... Taking p a rt in a  choral society or a  bird- 
w atching  club  can  teach  self-discipline a n d  a n  
apprecia tion  for the  joys of successfu l collaboration. 
(Putnam  e t al, 1993:90)
A h o st of s tud ies  have been bu ilt on th is  a ssu m p tio n , th a t  cross 
cu tting  m em bersh ips breed m u tu a l respec t (C hapter Five). The 
difficulty w ith these  stud ies however, is n o t in th e ir em p hasis  on  the 
im portance of m em bership , b u t in the  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  levels of 
civility should  be derived from extan t m em bersh ip . Yet a  
m ethodological strategy th a t  adop ts as a n  ind icato r of to lerance the 
nu m b er of g roups people are presently  in, ignores a n  ind iv idual’s 
associational history. The Czech B ishops in  th is  s tu d y  lea rn t the ir 
values from the  netw orks and  associations they  were p a r t  of u n d e r
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com m unism . These values still exist, even if the  netw orks and  
assoc ia tions do not. P u tnam  em p h asises  the  im portance  of 
horizontal m em bersh ip  over vertical ones. My a rg u m en t is, th a t  
w ith in  a  form ally  vertical or h ierarch ica l o rgan isation , su ch  a s  the 
Czech Catholic C hurch , there  m ay exist highly civil or ‘horizontally  
inclined’ individuals.
T his leads to a  second problem  w ith P u tn am  a n d  o th er social 
cap ita l theo rists : the  rigidity of the  o rgan isa tions th a t  ap p ea r in  the ir 
stud ies. The Czech Catholic C hurch  m ay be form ally h ierarch ica l 
b u t, a s  th is  resea rch  show s, the  B ishops take  a  highly reflexive an d  
critical ap p ro ach  to the ir organisation . In P u tn a m ’s m odel, there  is 
no sense  of the  fluidity or m utab ility  of o rgan isation . O rganisational 
h ierarch ies, however, do no t ju s t  a c t u p o n  th e ir m em bers, they  are 
also resisted  by them . Czech B ishops are  n o t only com m itted to the ir 
own dem ocratic  values, b u t they  are  also com m itted  to dem ocratising  
th e ir o rgan isa tions (C hapter Five). The case  of th e  Catholic C h u rch  in 
the  Czech Republic proves P u tnam  wrong. Not only can  Catholic 
ch u rch es  be civil, they also have the  po ten tia l to p roduce  civil 
m em bers. F urtherm ore  the ir civility an d  reflexivity is visible w ith in  
the  civil spaces and  publics th a t they are  p a r t  of. This is illu stra ted  
well by even ts a t  only the  second E u ropean  B ishops’ Sym posium  
since the  collapse of C om m unism , w hose p res id en t for the  first tim e 
com es from E aste rn  Europe - the  Czech C ard inal, Vlk. The T ablet 
com m ented:
P erhaps the  m ost rem arkab le  experience of lay delegates 
a t  the  E uropean  B ishops’ Sym posium  w as the  unforced  
a ssu m p tio n  on the  p a rt of the  b ishops th a t  we h a d  every 
righ t to be there  and  to take a  full p a r t  in the  
d iscu ssio n s ... the  generous and  open a tm osphere  of the  
sym posium  allowed critic ism s to be ra ised  a t a  p lenary  
session  devoted to a  reflection on the  co n d u c t of the
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sym posium  itself. At th a t  session , the  resp o n ses of the  
laity were actively canvassed . The po in t w as well tak en  
th a t  if the  C hurch  is to speak  to E urope w ith credibility 
of “com m union”, it m u s t be seen  to reflect com m union  in 
its  own dealings. (The Tablet: 26 October, 1996)
P u tn am  (2000) a rgues th a t hom ogenous social g roups su ch  a s  the 
Catholic C hurch  produce w hat he calls a n  “exclusive” type of social 
cap ita l th a t  h a s  social effects th a t a re  “fragm enting, divisive an d  
an ti-p lu ra lis tic” (Putnam , 2000:475). My a rg u m en t is th a t  “exclusive” 
or w hat P u tn am  also calls “bonding social cap ita l” can n o t be 
regarded  as  the  inevitable p roduct or the  necessa ry  correlate of 
form ally hom ogenous social groups.
A final problem  w ith P u tn am ’s w ork is the  assu m p tio n  th a t 
“the  in te rpersonal t ru s t  generated  in face-to-face re la tionsh ip s [is] an  
in stan ce  of a  m ore general im personal phenom enon .” (Stewart, 
2002:475). B u t P u tnam  fails to consider w h a t it is exactly th a t  
generalises th a t social t ru s t  from o u t of those civic associations 
w ith in  w hich they  are  produced. C ohen’s answ er to th a t  question  is 
th e  concept of the  public sphere, w ithou t w hich, she a rgues “the 
d iscourse  of civil society will rem ain  hopelessly  one-sided an d  
analytically  u se less  because  it will n o t be able to explicate the  
com plex articu la tion  betw een social an d  political in s titu tio n s” (Cohen 
1999:59).91 This thesis  h a s  pointed to a  n u m b er of civil publics - 
publics w ithin civil society - th a t  have allowed for the  a rticu la tion  of 
the  b ish o p s’ values betw een the ir own association  an d  associations 
an d  citizens w ith w hich they coexist. One of these  is the  ju s t  cited 
exam ple of the  E uropean  B ishops Conference, an o th e r Im pulse 99, 
an d  a  th ird  the  com m ission for the  Rom a (C hapter Five). The 
existence of these  civil publics however does n o t disprove the  poverty
91 See Robbins (1993) for a range of interesting perspectives on the concept and 
existence of public spheres.
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an d  lack of political publics - publics betw een citizen, party , and  
p arliam en t - d iscussed  in C hap ter Four. Nor shou ld  the  m edia 
reporting  of the  b ishops views, for exam ple on p ro stitu tio n  or racism , 
be tak en  a s  indicating  the  hea lth  or accessibility  of th e  Czech m edia. 
Indeed, the  parlous sta te  of the  Czech m edia  shou ld  be, a s  C ohen’s 
critic ism s suggest, a  sub ject of concern  for anyone seeking to 
exam ine the  rela tionsh ip  betw een civil society a n d  Czech dem ocracy. 
In the  Czech Republic, the  m ajority of m edia is ow ned by a  few large 
com panies w ith profit-driven agendas th a t  keep “som e papers 
seriously  understaffed  ... an d  investigative jo u rn a lism  in the  Czech 
Republic lim ited to a  few individuals” (K aratnycky e t al., 2002:155). 
R ecurring changes in ow nership an d  d irection a n d  the  chronically 
un d erfu n d ed  public m edia con tribu te  to n ew spapers an d  radio 
lacking  e ither identity  or the  resources to stubbo rn ly  p u rsu e  an  issue  
of public concern. The su s ta in ed  stance  tow ards a n d  p u rsu it of 
political co rrup tion  typical of papers su ch  a s  th e  UK G uard ian  is 
rare ly  possible in the  Czech Republic. Im p o rtan t sto ries are followed 
often w ith little consistency, dropped, or p assed  on to jo u rn a lis ts  in 
G erm any.92 The Freedom  of Inform ation Law “does n o t specify 
sanc tions for failure to comply w ith it and  allows the  governm ent to 
se t a rb itra ry  fees for providing inform ation”.93 In add ition  there  have 
been  successive a ttem p ts  by politicians to in terfere w ith  the  m edia. 
In 1999, the  director of the  public Czech Television resigned 
com plaining th a t  he w as tired of political p a rtie s ’ a ttem p ts  to control 
the  news. The following year, em ployees a t  the  television s ta tion  
occupied the  p rem ises for nearly  a  m onth , b roadcastin g  th e ir own 
program m es in p ro test a t w hat w as seen  a s  the  political appo in tm en t 
of a  know n strong  su ppo rte r of the  ODS party  a s  the  new  D irector of 
Czech TV, an d  th a t new d irec to r’s su b seq u e n t appo in tm en t of
92 Private conversation with Kate Connolly, Guardian Correspondent in Czech Republic.
93 See http://www.freedomhouse.org/ pdf docs/research/nitransit/2001/13 czech repub.pdf.
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K laus’s ex-econom ic advisor a s  h is d irector of new s. The Prague Post 
reported ,
T housands tu rn ed  o u t daily to su p p o rt the  rebels, who 
... in  a  cu ltu re  of growing cynicism  tow ards governm ent 
... were depicted  a s  com bating n o t only th e ir bosses, b u t 
a  whole political cu ltu re  th a t  polls suggest the  public 
sees a s  w asteful, co rrup t, and , w orst of all, inept. 
Crowds dem anding  H odac’s [the new  director] 
resignation  form ed in Prague, B rno an d  O strava. (Prague 
Post, 2000)94
6. Directions for Future Research
6.1 Comparisons between Civil Societies
The critics of civil society are  correct w hen they  argue th a t  the 
concept of civil society is vague, yet they  are  m istak en  w hen they 
conclude from th is  th a t  the  concept shou ld  be abandoned . The 
developm ent an d  application of ideal type m odels su c h  a s  
S chm itter’s is extrem ely usefu l in analysing  the  em ergence and  
developm ent of actually  existing civil societies. The advan tages of the  
m odel for th is  research  suggest the  possibilities for som e careful 
com parisons. It is typically a ssu m ed  th a t  civil society is m ore 
developed in som e east-E u ropean  coun tries an d  less so in o th ers  (see 
for exam ple O st, 1993:479-480). While th is  m ay be the  case, the  
difficulty is th a t these  assu m p tio n s are  based  on  concepts of civil 
society th a t  are often highly ab strac t, m aking  it difficult to 
investigate the  possibility th a t w here civil society is regarded  as 
poorly developed in  one country , th is  m ay in  fact only be tru e  w ith
94 The Prague Post, Toxic Television’, January 3, 2000
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resp ec t to one of its charac teristics. The app roach  adop ted  in th is 
th es is  allowed for the  fact th a t  the  developm ent of each  of civil 
society’s co n stitu en t charac teristics  could have u n re la ted  causes. An 
especially in teresting  com parison, an d  one th a t  h a s  n o t been  draw n, 
w ould be th a t  of s ta te -ch u rch  rela tions in H ungary  an d  the  Czech 
Republic w here post-com m unist a rran g em en ts  w ith respec t to 
religion ap p ea r to differ greatly. The c o n tra s t s ta n d s  in  need of 
explanation , given th a t bo th  coun tries sh a re  a  n u m b er of rem arkably  
sim ilar features: bo th  have sim ilar levels of socio-econom ic
developm ent, bo th  are strongly secu lar, a n d  bo th  have m ajority 
Catholic religions. A com parative s tu d y  could seek  to e stab lish  why 
differences exist w ith respec t to the  following:
• Independence - the  H ungarian  an d  Czech C onstitu tions 
bo th  endorse n eu tra l s ta te -ch u rch  rela tions. However, in the  
H ungarian  case, the  in te rp re ta tion  of the  C onstitu tion  h as  
em phasised  a  positive neu tra lity  w hich h a s  resu lted  in a  far 
g rea ter degree of au tonom y for the  ch u rc h  th a n  is evident in 
the  Czech case. For exam ple, a  concordat w ith the  Holy See 
w as estab lished  in 1997, th e  arm y chap laincy  in  1994, and  
early p rogress w as m ade on the  issue  of res titu tion .
• Autonom y - In com parison  to H ungary, the  visibility of the 
Czech Catholic C hurch  is low. In the  Czech case  th is  w as 
explained by reference to the  political program m e of the 
right wing party , ODS. B u t while re la tionsh ip s betw een the  
Czech ODS and  the  ch u rch  have from the  beginning been 
antagonistic , in H ungary the  re la tionsh ip  betw een the  
Catholic C hurch  an d  the  righ t wing p a rty  Fidesz-M PP h a s  
been sym pathetic  an d  cooperative.
• Civility - B ishops in the  Czech republic  d em o n stra te  a  
stronger com m itm ent to the  no rm s of civility th an , I 
tentatively suggest, is the  case  in H ungary. The explanatory
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factor m ay be the  lower level of rep ression  suffered by the  
H ungarian  ch u rch es u n d e r C om m unism . The H ungarian  
Catholic clergy con tinued  to operate  w ith in  the  s tru c tu re s  of 
the  C hurch , while in the  Czech case  th e  revoking of p rie s ts ’ 
licences an d  p e rs is ten t a rre s ts  led to a n  early  alliance with 
the  largely secu lar and  dem ocratic  an ti-C om m unist 
m ovem ent.
6.2 Civil society and the International Dimension
T his thes is  focused prim arily  on the  Catholic C hu rch  w ithin  the  
Czech Republic. However, it is also a p p a ren t th a t  w ith  resp ec t to the  
Czech Catholic C hurch , issu es  to do w ith the  in s titu tio n a lisa tio n  of 
civil society can n o t be confined to na tiona l territory . As H erm an 
rem arked  in  C hap ter Four: “we are n o t the  [sole] m akers of the  legal 
system  of the  chu rch . The m aker of the  s ta te ’s law in the  Czech 
Republic an d  the  m aker of the  ch u rch  law [Holy See] m u s t d iscu ss  
w ith one an o th e r” (C hapter Four). Since the  Social D em ocrats have 
come to power, th is  u n d ers tan d in g  h a s  been  m ore forthcom ing, a s  
expressed  in  the  creation  of a  b ran ch  to the  s ta te -ch u rc h  com m ittee 
th a t  can  ad d ress  the  reality  of the  c h u rc h ’s in te rn a tio n a l existence. 
An in teresting  direction for fu rth er resea rch  is posed  by th e  co u n try ’s 
im m inen t en try  into the  E uropean  U nion an d  the  ex ten t to w hich 
th is  will shape  the  ongoing debate ab o u t the  c h u rc h ’s p roper role 
an d  s ta tu s .
A part from su ch  form al a rrangem en ts  a s  th a t  of the  ch u rch - 
s ta te  com m ission, it is also clear th a t w here the  ‘ho rizon tal’ level is 
concerned, a  territorially  defined civil society is equally  problem atic. 
W hat is especially in teresting  ab o u t the  Catholic C h u rc h ’s activities 
a ro u n d  the  S udeten  G erm ans is th a t  it is an  issu e  th a t  sp a n s  two 
borders, a  case  of politics th a t  can n o t be confined w ith in  a  na tional
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territory . This is tru e  of m uch  civil society activity. In th e  case, for 
exam ple, of global environm ental issues, civil society ac to rs  rarely 
re s tric t them selves to a  politics of influence over na tional 
governm ent. At the  m ost, th is  sort of ‘linkage politics’ is regarded  as 
ju s t  one available strategy in a  repertoire of political stra teg ies, for 
th ere  are  lim its to w hat can  be gained from  a ttem p ts  to rep resen t 
one’s in te res ts  to the  sta te  if one’s concerns are  in te rn a tio n a l or even 
global and  the  s ta te ’s power is local. Yet th is  is a n  issu e  th a t  rem ains 
largely unexplored  in today’s debate on civil society. Indeed, the  
developm ent of som e m odels of civil society actively obscu re  and  
close off the  possibilities for th is  d iscussion . The concerns and  
opera tions of in te rnational religious com m unities, a ssoc ia tions like 
G reenpeace or the  v irtual com m unity of com pu ter p rogram m ers who 
developed the  Linux operating  system  (or indeed  the  Internet) a re  no t 
adequate ly  add ressed  by those like M cFaul who describe a s  “a-civil” 
those  societies w here “a  great m any activities take  place ou tside  the 
sta te , b u t w ith no d irect connection, ind irect leverage, or even desire 
for connection  w ith or influence over the s ta te ” (McFaul: 1993:3). Yet, 
a ttem p ts  like th is  to define civil society p roper need  to proceed with 
care, for if, a s  S tew art argues,
the  general goal of a  transform ative m odern  politics 
rem ains the  p u rsu it of universal possibilities of ju s tic e , a  
necessary  elem ent in su ch  a  project is clearly a  critical 
in terrogation  of the  validity an d  desirability  of privileging 
s ta te s  a s  bo th  a re n as  and  collective ac to rs  in  late 
m odernity. (Stewart, 2001:128)
6.3 Democracy and Religion
Bishop Maly, one of the  key spokespersons in  the  C zech’s velvet 
revolution com m ented a  n u m b er of years  after the  collapse of
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C om m unism , “I will never en te r professional politics. B u t th a t 
d o esn ’t m ean  th a t  I am  no t in terested  in  it ... A p ries t can  be 
politically active, b u t w ithout any  function, to show  tha t it is possib le  
to be involved w ithout profiting from  it” (Maly, cited  in The Prague 
Post, 23 November, 1994, em phasis mine). Yet, su ch  possibilities a s  
these  for non-profit participation  are com m only denied  a n d  often 
feared a s  the  following com m ents from K laus’s chief advisor 
dem onstra tes:
(On the notion that citizens have responsibility fo r  others).
Public choice theory tells th a t  a ltru ism  is ju s t  an o th e r 
way th a t  you get an o th e r type of sa tisfac tion  ... If you 
d istribu te  your w ealth  to the  poor th en  you get a  
satisfaction  w hich o ther people get from  hoard ing  
m oney. It depends on individual preference a n d  people 
choose w h a t’s the  b est for them .
(On the disagreem ents be tw een  K laus and  environm ental 
groups) C om m unism  won su ch  enorm ous suppo rt, n o t 
from certa in  layers b u t am ong in te llectuals because  of 
th is  very sophisticated  an d  logical a ltru is tic  a rg u m en t 
w hich backfired in su ch  a  way... the env ironm en ta lists 
behave in th is  m an n er “Let’s ban  th is, le t’s b a n  th a t, we 
shou ld  stop  th is, we should  stop th a t” B oth [Klaus an d  
Environm entalists] ad d ress  different type of m otivation 
an d  generally the  m ost effective way of achieving som e 
social benefit is to m otivate people to do som eth ing  no t 
to prescribe.
(On the notion that people are motivated by ideas about 
w h a t is good and  right).
“Look [indicates to the television screen] a t  the  d isa s te r  in 
New York City, so those who com m itted the  terrib le 
crim e, I am  su re  have a  very perverse b u t  very strong
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m orality ... they sacrifice, 5 ,000 people, an d  th en  the ir 
lives a s  well, b u t they  are doing it for the  sake  of som e 
benefit nobody know s, b u t they  believe th a t  they  help 
the  world, definitely.” (interview, 2001)
The difficulties of grasping  the  politics of solidarity  espoused  by Maly 
a n d  Czech b ishops and  the  anti-politics of solidarity  w hich Weigl 
describes w ith reference to New York95 are c ap tu red  inadequately  by 
the  grow th in political science m odels dom inated  w ith  ra tional choice 
u n d e rs tan d in g s  of social in teraction , (see for exam ple, Gill, 1998). 
The Czech Catholic C hurch  is an  exam ple of a  civic association  
productively engaged in the  elaboration  a n d  in stitu tio n a lisa tio n  of 
post-C om m unist dem ocracy. Yet, a s  th is  th es is  h a s  argued , resea rch  
on civil society ten d s to d ism iss su ch  assoc ia tions a s  capable of such  
endeavours (for exam ple, Cohen, 1999; P u tn am  e t al, 1993). W here 
fem inists have pointed to the  chronic exclusion of w om en from public 
activities on the  g rounds of som e pu rpo rted  ‘irra tiona lity ’, the  sam e 
is often tru e  for religious groups, a  po in t dem o n stra ted  by the 
con tinu ing  failure of UK M uslim  organ isations to qualify for public 
funds to finance the  public education  m any  of them  w ish to provide. 
D espite the  em phasis on the  im portance of the  ‘civil’ in civil society, 
the  public  a n d  civil m indedness of religious o rgan isa tions is often 
regarded  a s  susp icious, w hereas it is p ra ised  a n d  encouraged  w hen 
evidenced in  secu la r o rgan isations.96 The a ssu m p tio n  is th a t  the  
beliefs of the  religious in  the  o ther wordly - the  non-public  - render 
them  incapable  of any  genuine concern  w ith th e  public, or th a t  a
95 See Hannah Arendt ‘On Violence’ for a distinction between politics and violence 
(Arendt, 2002:137-145).
96 For example, the criteria for the UK Single Regeneration Budget often excluded 
religious groups from those deemed eligible to apply for funding to run activities such as 
youth groups.
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concern  w ith the  non -secu lar m ake people sim ply u n fit to g rasp  the  
n a tu re  of, or in te rac t w ith, th a t  w hich is secu lar. T h a t assu m p tio n  is 
in stitu tiona lised  in varying degrees acro ss different coun tries. While 
th is  research  concen tra ted  on the  Czech Republic, it endo rses the 
views of M onsm a and  Soper who argue  for fu rth er com parative 
research  on the  s ta tu s  of religious o rgan isations. From  th e ir five 
coun try  case  study, they conclude th a t,
P ractices th a t  are  largely un q u estio n ed  in  one country , 
su ch  a s  E ng land’s estab lished  c h u rc h  or G erm any’s 
ch u rch  tax, are unim aginable  in o th er countries...w e 
believe th a t coun tries can  learn  m u ch  from  each  o ther 
an d  th a t  the  d istinc t ch u rch -s ta te  policy of th ese  five 
coun tries is largely u n tap p ed  soil for resolving w h a t are  
p e rs is ten t tensions betw een religious a n d  political 
in stitu tions. (M onsma an d  Soper, 1997:200)
7. Conclusion
K um ar concludes h is article ‘Civil Society: An Inquiry  Into the 
U sefulness of an  H istorical C oncept’ w ith the  com m ent th a t,
To rediscover civil society, to retrieve a n  a rcha ic  concept, 
m ay be an  in teresting  exercise in  in te llectual h isto ry  b u t 
it evades the real political challenges a t  the  end  of the  
tw entieth  century . (Kumar, 1993:391-392)
These real political challenges, K um ar a rgues, “rela te  n o t to the 
in stitu tio n s of civil society b u t to the  in s titu tio n s  of the  s ta te  an d  to 
the reconstitu tion  of a  functioning political society” (Kumar, 
1993:391). This thesis  rejects both  those a rgum en ts . F irst, the  thes is  
show s th a t  civil society itself plays a  key p a r t  in these  political 
societies an d  in the ir reconstitu tion . Second, th e  th es is  a rgues th a t 
the question  of w hat the  political challenges a re  or w ha t is be
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regarded  a s  of political im portance, is in itself a  profoundly  political 
question . K um ar claim s th a t  civil society evades th e  “real political 
challenges”, b u t it is clear from th is  th es is  th a t  w h a t the  real 
challenges are  can n o t be defined by K um ar, or a n  ex ternal observer 
or analyst, for who defines an d  decides is p a r t  of the  struggle 
betw een civil society an d  the  sta te . K um ar concludes th a t  “the 
e stab lish m en t of a  dem ocratic polity an d  a  public  sphere  of political 
debate  a n d  political activity are  the  prim ary  cond itions for a  thriving 
civil society of independen t associations a n d  a n  active civic life” 
(Kumar, 1993:391-392). This thesis  h a s  d em o n stra ted  th a t  such  
p rio ritisa tions can n o t be defended, for in  the  Czech Republic the  very 
expansion  an d  pro tection  of public spheres h a s  com e from m em bers 
of civil society. W hat th a t  civil society is and  w h a t it will becom e is a s  
yet unc lear, b u t the  politics of the  Czech Republic show  th a t  there  is 
m uch  a t  s take  in the  concept and  ba ttles over civil society, in  w hat 
those b a ttles  will m ean  for citizens and  non-citizens, for the  societies 
they  inherited  and  for the  ones th a t  they create.
210
Appendices
A. Interviewees
The Catholic C hurch  is divided into two ecclesiastical provinces: The 
Czech E cclesiastical Province is m ade u p  of the  Archdiocese of 
Prague an d  the  Dioceses of Ceske Budejovice, Litomerice, H radec 
Kralove, an d  Plzen. The M oravian E cclesiastical Province is m ade u p  
of the  Archdiocese of Olomouc and  the D ioceses of Brno and  
O strava-O pava. The Apostolic E xarchate is the  organizational and  
ju rid ic ia l ecclesiastical u n it for Catholics of the  B yzantine Rite (Greek 
Catholics) in  un ion  w ith the  Holy See who live w ith in  the  boundaries 
of the  Czech Republic. It is sub ject to the  Holy See. The Czech 
B ishops ' Conference w as estab lished  on M arch 3 0 th  1993 after the  
foundation  of the  Czech Republic on the b asis  of a rticles approved by 
the  C ongregation for B ishops on J a n u a ry  23 rd  1993 (Katolicka 
Cirkev v Ceske R epublica (The Catholic C hu rch  in the  Czech 
Republic), pam ph le t pub lished  by the Czech B ishops Conference. 
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List of interviewees
B ishops from six of the  eight dioceses in the  Czech Republic a n d  the 
Spokesm an  for the  B ishops' Conference agreed  to a c t a s  
responden ts.
■ Vaclav Maly, B ishop of Prague.
■ A ntonin Liska, B ishop of Ceske Budejovice.
■ Ja ro slav  D uka, Auxiliary Bishop of H radec Kralove.
■ Jo se f  Koukl, B ishop of Litomerice.
■ Jo se f  Hrdlicka,. B ishop of Olomouc.
■ F ran tisek  Lobkowicz, B ishop of O strava-O pava.
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■ Ivan Ljavinec, Bishop-Apostolic E xarch, H ead of the  Czech 
R epublic’s Greek Catholic C hurch
■ D aniel H erm an, Priest and  p ress secre tary  of the  B ishop’s 
conference.
A fu rth e r five interview s were conducted  w ith  politicians who hold 
responsib ility  in their pa rties  for religious affairs or a re  deem ed to be 
particu larly  knowledgeable ab o u t the  topic.
■ Jarom il Talir, ex- M inister of C ultu re  an d  a  m em ber of the  
C hristian  Dem ocratic Union - Czechoslovakian People’s Party  
(KDU-CSL).
■ M iroslava Nemcova, Shadow  M inister of C u ltu re  in  the  Civic 
D em ocratic Party  (ODS).
■ Miloslav Ransdorf, Vice-Chair of the  C om m unist Party  of 
B ohem ia and  Moravia. (KSCM).
■ Karel Floss, m em ber of the  Senate for the  Social D em ocratic 
Party  (CSSD)
■ J ir i  Weigl, chief advisor to ex-Prime M inister K laus (ODS)
Two open-ended questionnaires (one for b ishops, one for politicians) 
were designed w ith the  aim  of generating inform ation  a ro u n d  the 
th ree  d im ensions of S chm itter’s ideal type ‘civil society’ d iscussed  
above. The interview allowed for follow-up questio n s to be p u rsu ed . 
The interview s lasted  approxim ately 1-3 h o u rs . All the  interview s 
were taped  w ith the  exception of the  interview w ith  B ishop Ljavinec 
who refused  perm ission.
B. Questionnaire for Interviews with Bishops
1. U nder com m unism  the chu rch , acro ss e a s te rn  Europe, 
partic ipa ted  in the  struggle for dem ocracy. The Pope h a s  often 
com m ented  since th a t the  ch u rch  h as  an  im p o rtan t role to play in
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the  new  post-com m unist societies. In you r opinion w h a t is the  
g rea tes t con tribu tion  the  ch u rch  can  m ake to dem ocracy - to 
safeguard ing  or even deepening th is  relatively new  dem ocracy?
2. The Pope h a s  m ade m any  com m ents on the  social consequences of 
a  free m arket. W hat c a n /d o e s  the  ch u rch  in  th e  Czech Republic do 
to prom ote its  own vision of capitalism ?
3. The Catholic C hurch  in Poland played a  very im p o rtan t role in 
challenging the  com m unist sta te . However in  recen t years there  h as  
been  criticism  from som e q u a rte rs  th a t the  c h u rc h  in  Poland, h a s  
played too m uch  of a  political role - an  inapp rop ria te  role. W hat is 
y ou r opinion of th a t view?
4. Political pa rties an d  the  church .
• How responsive do you find politicians in  the  Czech Republic 
are  to the  c h u rc h ’s needs an d  the  c h u rc h ’s in te res ts?
• W hat are the  m ain  p a th s /a v e n u e s  of influence th a t  are  open to 
the  ch u rch ?  For exam ple, in your diocese do you have regular 
in stitu tiona lised  m eetings w ith any of the  political parties?
• Are you invited to sit on any  com m ittees?
• How effective have any  of your efforts to com m unicate  w ith local 
politicians been?
• How effective are  these  politicians in rep resen ting  the  c h u rc h ’s 
in te re s ts  a t  local an d  national level?
• W hat do you th in k  a  good w orking re la tionsh ip  betw een 
politicians an d  im portan t organizations like the  c h u rc h  shou ld  
be?
5. There have been tim es w hen C ardinal Vlk critic ised  Vaclav Klaus. 
In w estern  E uropean  dem ocracies it is n o t very norm al for the
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c h u rc h  to openly criticise politicians. W hen is th is  app ropria te?  How 
far shou ld  the  ch u rch  go in openly criticising governm ent?
6. R estitu tion
• W hat is the  m ain  obstacle to resolving th e  conflict over restitu tion?
• H as the  res titu tio n  issue  p u t a  s tra in  on ecum enical rela tions?
• W ould the  ch u rch  su p p o rt the  re tu rn  of p roperty  to the  S ude tan  
G erm ans?
7. Are you happy  w ith the  organisation  of religious education  in  your 
diocese?
8. There h a s  been  som e ra th e r  sensationalised  artic les in  the  w estern  
m ed ia  ab o u t the  so called underg round  ch u rch . Do you have any 
sym pathy  for som e of those in the  ‘underg round  c h u rc h ’ who did no t 
w an t to accep t the  so lu tions offered by the  V atican? (They claim ed 
th a t  the  V atican did no t u n d e rs tan d , or em path ise  w ith the  role they 
played - th a t  they  w eren’t really apprecia ted  for w h a t they  did.)
9. At tim es the  ch u rch  h as  been criticised by m em bers of the  laity 
a n d  even m em bers of the  clergy for supp ressing  d iscu ssio n  on issu es 
su c h  a s  the  role of wom en or celibacy. How accoun tab le  is the  
c h u rc h  to its  own m em bers? For exam ple can  they  express their 
views on these  issu es  in ‘Katolicky Tydenih?97 or in  any  o ther forum ?
10. W hat do you th in k  of the  Catholic C h u rc h ’s recen t efforts to 
reconsider the  teach ings of J a n  H us?
97 A Catholic Newspaper published by the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic.
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11. A cross E urope, the  ch u rch  is in cris is in a ttrac tin g  new 
m em bers. W hat can  the ch u rch  do ab o u t th is?  In your opinion w hat 
new  skills does the  ch u rch  need to survive a n d  p rosper?
C. Questionnaire for Interviews with Politicians
1. Havel h a s  spoken a  lot ab o u t the  role of a  civil society in 
dem ocracy. K laus h a s  been  m uch  m ore w ary of th is  term . W hat is 
your u n d e rs tan d in g  or opinion of th is  notion  of civil society?
2. W hat do you consider an  appropria te  re la tionsh ip  betw een 
politicians an d  in te res t g roups should  be?
3. W hat are  the  obstacles to form ing th is  re la tionsh ip?
4. Are political rep resen ta tives from your p arty  (in th e  P arliam ent or 
the  Senate) actively encouraged to cultivate links w ith in te res t 
g roups?
5. R elationship  w ith the chu rches?
• Do you have a  rela tionsh ip  w ith any  of the  ch u rch es?
• W ith w hich ch u rch  an d  w ith whom ?
• Are m eetings reg u la r/in stitu tio n a lised ?
• W hat are  the  n a tu re  of the  dem ands m ade on you?
6. In y ou r opinion w hat is the  appropria te  role in society for religious 
organizations like the  Catholic C hurch?
7. To w h a t ex ten t should  the  ch u rch es be involved in  politics?
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8. H as there  been  any  conflict betw een the  political pa rties  over the 
provisions for religious education?
9. W hat, in your opinion is the  m ain obstacle to resolving the  conflict 
betw een ch u rch  and  sta te  over restitu tion?
10. C an you describe to me the  rela tionsh ip  betw een the  C hristian  
D em ocratic Party  an d  the  Catholic C hurch?
11. In your opinion w hat is the  grea test con tribu tion  th e  c h u rc h  can  
m ake to dem ocracy?
D. The Esras Transcripts
W hat proved to be a n  extrem ely usefu l source  of inform ation  were 
interview  tran sc rip ts  given to me by E dras, a  sm all Irish  film 
com pany devoted to religious affairs. E sras  p roduced  two 25 m inu te  
docum en taries for Irish  Television on religion in the  Czech Republic. 
The m ajority  of m ateria l in the  tran scrip ts  h a s  n o t ap p eared  in  the  
public  dom ain e ither on T.V or in prin t. T itles of re sp o n d en ts  below 
are  given a s  they  were a t  the  tim e of the E sras  interview s in 1993. 
Not all these  tran sc rip ts  are referred to in the  th es is  b u t  I give here 
th e  com plete lis t of interviews as  they provided u se fu l background  
inform ation.
• Miloslav Vlk -A rch-bishop of P rague a n d  Prim ate of 
Czechoslovakia. (Now C ardinal Vlk)
• Miloslav Fiala, Reverend and  spokesm an  of Czech B ishops 
Conference.
• Karel O tcenasek , B ishop of H radec Kralove
• Ja ro slav  D uka - P riest (Now the  B ishop D uka  of my 
interviews)
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• Vaclav B enda, Leader of the  C hristian  D em ocrat Party, 
(CDP)
• Vaclav V en tura  (m arried priest),
• J a n  Konzal (m arried priest)
• Karel Chytil (m arried Bishop),
• J ir i  Stejkoza (m arried priest),
• J ir i  Kvapil (m arried priest),
• Vaclav Dvorak (m arried priest).
• Vaclav Vasko, (Director of the  Catholic Publish ing  H ouse 
Zvon).
• Fr. S istronek  (Prior of the  B enedictine M onastery in 
Brevnov).
• S ister B ohuslava K ubacakova (Congregation of the  Merciful 
S isters of St. C harles Boromeo).
• Peter Im lauf (Secretary of the  Fam ily Renewal Movement).
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